Goodman v. Wineland

• Decision Date: 25 March 1884
• Citation: 61 Md. 449
• Parties: PHILIP GOODMAN v. MARX WINELAND and Harriet L. S. Wineland, His Wife.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

61 Md. 449

PHILIP GOODMAN v. MARX WINELAND and Harriet L. S. Wineland, His Wife.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 25, 1884

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in Equity.

This is an appeal from a decree of the court below (Syester, J.,) dismissing the bill of complaint, and requiring each party to pay his own costs. The case is stated in the opinion of this court.

The cause was argued before Miller, Yellott, Alvey, Irving, and Ritchie, JJ.

William Brace, for the appellant.

J Frank Seiss and William Walsh, for the appellee, Mrs. Wineland.

Ritchie J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill in this case was brought to set aside a deed and bill of sale made by Marx Wineland to his wife, and to subject the property conveyed, to the payment of debts due from Wineland to Goodman, the complainant, at the time of their execution upon the ground that said conveyances, being voluntary and without consideration, and made when Wineland was so indebted, their legal effect, without charging they were made with such actual intent, was to delay, hinder and defraud his creditors.

Some of the questions of law raised in the case by the appellees may be appropriately considered here.

Objection was urged to the sufficiency of the bill because it contains no allegation that Wineland executed the conveyances with fraudulent intent.

The motive or purpose with which a voluntary transfer of property is made by a party indebted at the time is not material. The legal effect of such a conveyance is, that, without reference to the actual intent of the debtor, it is prima facie in fraud of creditors. This presumption of law may be repelled by proving, that the grantor, at the time of the gift, was possessed of other means amply sufficient to pay all his debts, and the onus of so proving is upon those seeking to uphold the gift. Baxter v. Sewell, 3 Md. 334; Williams v. Banks, 11 Md. 198; Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Md. 414.

It is also contended by the appellees that the bill is defective because it does not aver that Wineland was not at the time the suit was brought, as well as at the date of the execution of the conveyances, possessed of ample means outside to pay all his creditors, upon the theory that although unable to do so at the date of the conveyances, if between that time and the filing of the bill he had, either by acquiring more property or by reducing his indebtedness, become able to pay his debts, the complainant had no longer the right to resort to equity, but must seek the satisfaction of his claim through proceedings in a court of law.

We think such an averment unnecessary. The prejudice to the creditor is occasioned by the making of the conveyance, and his right to proceed by a bill in equity to vacate it thereupon attaches. The jurisdiction of a court of equity thus established is not thereafter contingent upon the fluctuations that may attend the value of the grantor's property. Otherwise, the creditor from day to day might in turn have, lose and regain his right to proceed according to the shifting condition of his debtor's means. He is subjected to no such uncertainty. If it should appear from the proof in the cause that the debtor, although unable to pay his debts at the time of the conveyance, was at the time of filing the bill abundantly able to do so from property outside the conveyance that could be readily subjected to the satisfaction of his debts, the court might in its discretion so frame its decree by limiting a day for the payment of the claim, or otherwise, as to preserve to the grantee the property conveyed to him while at the same time securing the creditor; but this implies no want of jurisdiction, and is very different from dismissng his bill and remitting the creditor to a suit at law, pending which the debtor might lose or dispose of the very property which caused the dismissal of the bill. The protection of the creditor from the hazards attending the delay of making his claim by judgment and execution, was a leading object in enacting sec 2, ch. 380 of Act of 1835 (Rev. Code, 649,) which enables him to proceed at once in equity to vacate a deed made to his prejudice and obtain through decree the satisfaction of his debt.

In addition to the above mentioned Maryland cases, which impliedly indicate the date of the impeached conveyance as the particular time for enquiring into the sufficiency of the debtor's means, may be cited as of similar import, Bump on Fraud. Con. 284; King v. Thompson, 9 Pet. 204; Posten v. Posten, 4 Whart. 27.

It is further to be observed, that in showing the debts due to Wineland they are not such means as can be considered equal to real and personal property, such as was conveyed to his wife, in their availability to creditors for the prompt satisfaction of their claims. It is a "hindrance" to creditors for a debtor to dispose of his real property and tangible chattels, which are readily subjected to execution and compel them to rely upon merely personal obligations, with the risks and the necessity for...