Goodnow v. Empire Lumber Company

• Decision Date: 28 January 1884
• Citation: 18 N.W. 283,31 Minn. 468
• Parties: Mary H. Goodnow and another v. Empire Lumber Company and another
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

18 N.W. 283

31 Minn. 468

Mary H. Goodnow and another v. Empire Lumber Company and another

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 28, 1884

Appeal by defendants from an order of the district court for Winona county, Start, J., presiding, overruling a demurrer to the complaint, the substance of which is stated in the opinion.

Order reversed.

Thomas Wilson, for appellants.

J. M Gilman and W. H. Yale, for respondents.

Mere acquiescence, short of the statutory period of limitations after the removal of the disability, never operates as a confirmation of an infant's deed. This is as firmly settled as adjudications can settle any proposition.

Elizabeth M. Hamilton, the mother of plaintiffs, lived only four or five years after majority, and was under the disability of coverture during that time, so that neither silent acquiescence nor any other act on her part would work a ratification of her deed made during infancy, except joining with her husband in a deed of release. One of the plaintiffs was married before she became of age, and the other within three years after. There was therefore no unreasonable delay in avoiding the deed. Coverture, like infancy, is a disability which neutralizes lapse of time, and arrests the running of the statute of limitations.

OPINION

Gilfillan, C. J.

November 27, 1857, Elizabeth M. Hamilton, then a married woman and owner of certain real estate in the city of Winona, conveyed the same, her husband joining in the deed, to the defendant Huff, under whom the other defendant claims. Mrs. Hamilton was born April 21, 1842. She died December 16, 1867, and her husband died November 10 1874. Plaintiffs are their children, Mary, born March 31, 1859, and Eugenia, January 29, 1863. They bring the action to avoid the conveyance, because of the minority of Elizabeth M. Hamilton when she executed it. Plaintiffs gave notice to the lumber company of their intent to disaffirm the conveyance, March 22, 1883. Treating this as a sufficient act of disaffirmance in case they then had the right to disaffirm, -- and it is not material whether it was or not, for the bringing of the action, which was sufficient, immediately followed, -- there elapsed between the execution of the deed and its disaffirmance twenty-five years and four months. The disability of infancy on the part of the infant grantor ceased April, 21, 1863, and, as the real estate was owned by her at the time of her marriage, her disability from coverture, so far as affected her right to reclaim, hold and control the property, ceased August 1, 1866, when the General Statutes (1866) went into effect; so that for four years and eight months before she died, she was free of the disability of infancy, and for one year four and a half months, she was practically free of the disability of coverture. During the latter period, at least, she was capable in law to disaffirm the deed, if she had the right to do so; and if she was required to exercise the right within a reasonable time after her disability ceased, the time was running for that period. The youngest of the plaintiffs became of age January 29, 1881, so that, even if the period of minority of plaintiffs were to be excluded, (and we doubt if it should be,) there is to be added at least two years and two months to the time which had elapsed when the grantor died, making the time three years and over six months.

The main question in the case is, must one who, while a minor, has conveyed real estate, disaffirm the conveyance within a reasonable time after minority ceases, or be barred? Of the decided cases the majority are to the effect that he need not, (where there are no circumstances other than lapse of time and silence,) and that he is not barred by mere acquiescence for a shorter period than that prescribed in the statute of limitations. The following are the principal cases so decided: Vaughan v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236; Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164; Youse v. Norcum, 12 Mo. 549; Norcum v. Gaty, 19 Mo. 65; Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541; Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Huth v. Car. Mar. Ry. & Dock Co., 56 Mo. 202; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N.H. 374; Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539; Voorhies v. Voorhies, 24 Barb. 150; McMurray v. McMurray, 66 N.Y. 175; Lessee of Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Ohio 251; Cresinger v. Lessee of Welch, 15 Ohio 156; Irvine v. Irvine, 76 U.S. 617, 9 Wall. 617, 19 L.Ed. 800; Ordinary v. Wherry, 1 Bail. 28.

On the other hand, there are many decisions to the effect that mere acquiescence beyond a reasonable time after the minority ceases bars the right to disaffirm, of which cases the following are the principal ones: Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35; Dublin & W. Ry. Co. v. Black, 8 Exch. 181; Thomasson v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 419; Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85; Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 N.Y. 53; Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N.Y. 407; Jones v. Butler, 30 Barb. 641; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Wallace v. Lewis, 4 Del. 75, 4 Harr. 75, 80; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Hum. 467; Hartman v. Kendall, 4 Ind. 403; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353; Richardson v. Boright, 9 Vt. 368; Harris v. Cannon, 6 Ga. 382; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill. 158; Black v. Hills, 36 Ill. 376; Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102; Little v. Duncan, 9 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 55.

The rule holding certain contracts of an infant voidable, (among them his conveyances of real estate,) and giving him the right to affirm or disaffirm after he arrives at majority, is for the protection of minors, and so that they shall not be prejudiced by acts done or obligations incurred at a time when they are not capable of determining what is for their interest to do. For this purpose of protection the law gives them an opportunity, after they have become capable of judging for themselves, to determine whether such acts or obligations are beneficial or prejudicial to them, and whether they will abide by or avoid them. If the right to affirm or disaffirm extends beyond an adequate opportunity to so determine and to act on...