Goodpaster v. Leathers
| Citation | 23 N.E. 1090,123 Ind. 121 |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1890 |
| Docket Number | 13,991 |
| Parties | Goodpaster v. Leathers et al |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
From the Morgan Circuit Court.
The judgment is reversed, with costs.
W. S Shirley, J. V. Mitchell and J. F. Cox, for appellant.
G. A Adams and J. S. Newby, for appellees.
The facts specially found by the court show, inter alia, that on the 4th day of February, 1878, James Madison Leathers, being the owner of a certain tract of land executed a deed in substance as follows:
"This indenture witnesseth, that I, James Madison Leathers, of Morgan county, in the State of Indiana, convey and warrant to Phoebe Tucker Leathers, my wife, and Florence Mabel Leathers, and James M. Leathers, junior, on condition of the support of Phoebe T. Leathers, their mother, off of said lands described below, in Morgan county, in the State of Indiana, for the natural love and affection I have for said above parties, the following real estate in Morgan county in the State of Indiana, to wit:" Then follows a description of the land, the formal attestation clause, and an acknowledgment of the instrument in due form.
The court stated, as a conclusion of law, that the above conveyance vested in Phoebe Tucker Leathers, wife of the grantor, an estate for life of one-third of the lands described therein, and that the fee to the whole estate was vested in Florence M. and James M. Leathers, charged with the support of their mother. We do not concur in this conclusion. The land is granted to the three grantees therein named in plain and unambiguous language. The effect of the deed was to vest an estate in fee simple in the mother and two children as tenants in common, each taking an undivided one-third, and to charge the income from the whole with the support of the mother. Stout v. Dunning, 72 Ind. 343; Williams v. Owen, 116 Ind. 70, 18 N.E. 389; Commons v. Commons, 115 Ind. 162, 16 N.E. 820.
The intention of the parties is what the law addresses itself to in the construction of deeds; but the intention is to be gathered from the language found in the instrument. The entire deed is to be regarded, and when the language is unambiguous, and the intent plainly appears upon the face of the instrument, there remains nothing for the court to do but to give the deed effect according to the terms written therein.
There is nothing in the circumstances of the present case which justifies a...
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