Goodrich v. Hacker
Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
Docket Number | No. C15-3114-LTS,C15-3114-LTS |
Parties | DONALD W. GOODRICH, Plaintiff, v. JANA HACKER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
The matter before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 21). Proceeding pro se, the plaintiff filed a resistance (Doc. No. 23). The defendant did not file a reply. Neither party requested oral argument, and, in any event, oral argument is not necessary. The motion is fully submitted.
The plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on May 4, 2015. In his complaint (Doc. No. 1), the plaintiff generally asserts that the defendant: (1) refused to send him to a specialist for his plantar fasciitis; (2) refused to provide him with proper medical footwear; and (3) refused to provide him with medication. With respect to relief, the plaintiff states that he wants: (1) injections to be reinstated and provided in the proper manner; (2) pain medication to be reinstated and provided in the proper manner; (3) a specialist to see him every six months unless the specialist orders otherwise; and (4) medical footwear as needed. In an order dated August 27, 2015, the court noted:
Before proceeding with his action, the plaintiff should consider that merely disagreeing with the medical treatment that is provided does not typically give rise to a valid cause of action. See Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) ( ); see also Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2000) ().
Doc. No. 9. Additionally, in an order dated February 17, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel but, before doing so, observed:
It is a very close call as to whether the plaintiff's claim against the defendant survives initial scrutiny under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because: (1) it is unclear whether the plaintiff actually suffers from a serious medical condition and (2) it appears that the plaintiff's plantar fasciitis has been treated and he is merely dissatisfied that more is not being done to help him, that is, he desires to be sent to a specialist every six months, to be provided proper fitting medical footwear and to receive different medication and/or medication in a different dosage.1Cf. Reif v. Griffin, 808 F.3d 1191, 1192 (8th Cir. 2015) ( ); Triplett v. Palmer, 592 F. App'x 534, 535 (8th Cir. 2015) ( ); Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394, 396-98 (8th Cir. 2007) ( ); Smith v. Corr. Med. Servs., 207 F. App'x 737, 739 (8th Cir. 2006) ( ); Rowe v. Norris, 198 F. App'x 579, 580-81 (8th Cir. 2006) ( ); Still v. Crawford, 155 F. App'x 241, 242 (8th Cir. 2005) ( ); Brewer v. Graves, 152 F. App'x 548, 549 (8th Cir. 2005) ( ); Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1337 (8th Cir. 2004) ( ); Vonoczky v. Hedrick, 44 F. App'x 41, 42 (8th Cir. 2002) ( ); Prater v. Dep't of Corr., 11 F. App'x 668, 669 (8th Cir. 2001) ( ); Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 2000) ( ); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1240 (8th Cir. 1997) ( ); Logan v. Clarke, 119 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1997) ( ); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996) ( ); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 177 (8th Cir. 1995) ( ); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (8th Cir. 1995) ( ); Fletcher v. Butts, 994 F.2d 548, 549 (8th Cir. 1993) ( ); Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990) ( ).
Doc. No. 10. After the defendants filed an answer (Doc. No. 12), the court entered a scheduling order (Doc. No. 13) and denied the plaintiff's additional requests for appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 16). On April 13, 2016, the plaintiff sought to supplement his complaint (Doc. No. 17), which the court permitted (Doc. No. 18). The plaintiff's supplement (Doc. No. 19) reiterates and expands upon the points that he makes in his complaint: (1) the defendant refused to send him to a specialist for his plantar fasciitis and (2) although the defendant sent him to Dr. Kosinski at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center, she refused to provide proper medical footwear or muscle relaxers even after Dr. Kosinski recommended the use of medical footwear and muscle relaxers. Ultimately, the defendant filed her motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff resists.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case." Amini v. City of Minneapolis, 643 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)).
"The movant 'bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [his or her] motion,' and must identify 'those portions of [the record] . . . which [he or she] believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 ( )(quoting CelotexCorp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) ( ). Once the movant has done so, "the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
When doing so, "[t]he nonmovant 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts' . . . ." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "To survive a motion for summary judgment, the [nonmovant] must substantiate his [or her] allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his or her] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy." Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) ( )(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2003)). The nonmovant cannot simply rely on unsupported "self-serving allegations and denials . . . to create a genuine issue of material fact." Anuforo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 614 F.3d 799, 807 (8th Cir. 2010); accord Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 2016). The nonmovant must substantiate factual allegations with independent documentary evidence. See Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2013). Hence,"[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Throughout the summary judgment stage, the court must view genuinely disputed "evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giv[e] the...
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