Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1888
• Citation: 35 F. 35
• Parties: GOODRIDGE et al. v. UNION PAC. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

35 F. 35

GOODRIDGE et al. v. UNION PAC. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, D. Colorado.

May 12, 1888

Sampson & Millett, for plaintiff.

Teller & Orahood, for defendant.

BREWER J.

This complaint is in three counts. The first seeks to recover the triple damages given by section 9, c. 273, Acts 1885, p. 310; the second seeks to recover damages for an unreasonable exaction of freight; and the third is the old common-law count for money had and received. Two cases involving somewhat similar questions were presented to my brother HALLETT, and decided in April last.

One objection made to the first count is that it is ambiguous and uncertain, in that it fails to state when these freight charges paid by the plaintiffs were paid; that is, it alleges that they were paid between October, 1885, and August, 1887 not specifying any particular month or year in which they were paid; and it is insisted that section 8 of the statute of limitations bars all actions of this nature unless brought within one year from the time the cause of action accrued and hence, as it is uncertain how much of this bulk of freight charges was paid within the year, the complaint is uncertain. That depends upon two questions,-- first, whether this is an action for a penalty, and, if so, whether section 8 applies to an action of this nature. My brother HALLETT, in his opinion, without deciding, intimated that he thought said section 9 was a remedial, as contradistinguished from a penal, statute. I cannot agree with that. It is plainly under the decision of the supreme court as well as the rules of the common law, a penal statute; and this is an action to recover the penalty. The statute forbids unjust discriminations, and then section 9 gives triple damages in case of such unjust discrimination. The section is headed 'penalty,' and the party injured is authorized to recover three times the actual damage. Now, this excess above the actual damage is something imposed as a penalty upon a railroad company for doing that which by a former section of the statute is forbidden. A remedial statute is one which simply furnishes a new remedy, or makes a more perfect remedy than existed before; so that the party injured under the new statute may more effectually secure full compensation for the injury which he has suffered. A penal statute is one which while it may secure actual compensation, goes beyond and punishes the wrong-doer for the wrong he has done; and it matters not that none of the penalty goes to the state, and that all goes to the party injured. Statutes are very frequent in all states-- and it is in the exercise of the police power of the state that they are passed-- which, giving full compensation, say, in addition, that the wrong-doer shall forfeit or pay double, triple damages, or a fixed sum or penalty, for the wrong hs has done. If I had any doubt upon that proposition it would be settled by the case of Railroad Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 6 S.Ct. 110, in which was considered a statute of Missouri, which gave to a party double damages in case its cattle were injured by a railroad whose track was not fenced. That statute is like this. There the cattle of Humes were injured, and he was entitled to recover double damages. Here the party who is wronged by unjust discrimination is allowed to recover triple damages. All goes in this case to the party injured; all went in that case to the party injured. It was held that that action was brought under a penal statute,-- was an action for a penalty,-- that the additional damages were by way of punishment to the company for its negligence, and that it was not a valid objection that the sufferer, instead of the state, received them. The...