Goodsell v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 03 June 1875
• Citation: 42 Md. 348
• Parties: JAMES H. GOODSELL v. HANCE LAWSON, MICHAEL SOMERS, WILLIAM H. ROACH and THOMAS H. DIXON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

42 Md. 348

JAMES H. GOODSELL v. HANCE LAWSON, MICHAEL SOMERS, WILLIAM H. ROACH and THOMAS H. DIXON.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 3, 1875

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Somerset County, in Equity.

The facts of the case are fully set forth in the following opinion delivered by the Court below, (FRANKLIN and IRVING J.):

"The complainants, by their bill, allege that they are the owners in fee simple of a tract of land in Somerset County on the Little Annamessex River, called 'Honesty,' which was granted to Hance Lawson and Michael Somers by the State of Maryland, on or about the 13th of June, 1858, the title to which, by mesne conveyances, has become vested in them. That the said tract of land, from the end of its first course, binds upon the navigable waters of Little Annamessex River, and that the said patentees and their alienees, by virtue of the said grant, became entitled to all accretions to the said land by recession of the waters of said river or made by natural causes or otherwise, and to the exclusive right of making improvements into the water in front of said land. They further allege, that the said Hance Lawson and Michael Somers, the original patentees, together with John W. Crisfield, who, at that time, was a joint owner with them of the said tract of land with a view to the improvement of the property, had the same surveyed and with the contiguous water, which it was proposed to use in connection with the land, for the purposes of commerce and trade, laid out into streets and town lots, and called it 'Crisfield.' That the plat of the said town was caused to be recorded among the land records of Somerset County, and all subsequent improvements were laid out and controlled by it. That they sold a part of said property to the Eastern Shore Railroad Company, for the purposes of their business, and in 1866, erected a pier themselves in front of their said land, which they leased to one Nathaniel Dixon. That on the 24th day of May, 1867 John W. Crisfield, acting for himself and his co-tenants and with their consent, entered into an agreement in writing with the respondent to permit him to occupy and use a position in the water in front of said complainants' property, adjoining the pier leased to Dixon, to build a pier thereon for the purpose of the oyster trade, in which he was about to engage, and to lease the same to him for ten years, he, on his part, agreeing to distribute the shells which he should make in the prosecution of his business in the water on said premises, so as to fill up the same, and reclaim it for building and other purposes and also if a surplus of shells remained after filling and reclaiming the premises occupied by him, then such surplus to be applied to the filling up and reclaiming the adjoining premises which had been leased to Dixon. They further allege, that they and those under whom they claim, have in all respects performed their part of the said agreement; and that the respondent, in pursuance thereof, entered upon the said premises, erected his pier, commenced to prosecute, and is still extensively prosecuting the oyster business, and from the shells arising therefrom, has filled up and reclaimed from the water, a large space of the lot mentioned in the said agreement, and also of the adjoining lot, upon which many valuable buildings have been erected, and a large and growing commercial business established. But that in July, 1871, they discovered that he had sued out of the Land Office, a special warrant of survey, and laid it on those lots which had been reclaimed from the water by the deposit of shells aforesaid, claiming it to be vacant land. They further charge, that by themselves and their tenants, they are in full possession of the tract of land called "'Honesty,' and its appurtenances, with some few exceptions, having no bearing on this case, subject only to the lease of Dixon and some others for short terms, and to the agreement with the respondent aforesaid; and that, having the right to all accretions, whether natural or otherwise, and as an incident to their ownership of 'Honesty,' the exclusive right to make improvements in the waters in front thereof, the proceedings of the respondent in suing out and prosecuting a warrant of resurvey from the Land Office, for the purpose of procuring a patent for the land thus made and reclaimed, is a fraud on the Land Office. That they were instituted with the fraudulent intent and purpose, and in fact do defraud and injure the complainants, cloud and entangle their title and impair the value of their property, and they ask that their title to the said land may be declared, and that they may be quieted in the enjoyment of the same. That the respondent may be restrained, &c.

The answer of the respondent, taken in connection with the agreement filed in the cause, relieves the Court of all difficulty as to the facts. Most of the material allegations of the bill are either admitted or not denied; and as to those which are denied, the proof leaves them free from doubt. The title of the complainants to the tract of land called 'Honesty,' its contiguity to the water in question, its true location, the leases and improvements in the water in front of it, and the general plan of the town of Crisfield, the execution of the agreement marked 'Ex. H.' and the entry of the respondent under that agreement, and his acts in virtue thereof, which resulted in the raising from the water, the parcel of land now in question, the location of that parcel of land adjoining the Dixon lot, and in front of the tract called "Honesty,' the application by the respondent for a warrant to resurvey the same as vacant land, and the certificate of resurvey made at the instance and in the name of the respondent, are facts, of which the admissions and evidence in the cause have fully satisfied the Court.

The respondent, while he admits the execution of the agreement marked 'H,' denies any knowledge of Mr. Crisfield's having acted as agent for others in making said contract, and objects to the legal effect thereof, as set forth in the bill. He further denies the fraudulent intent with which he is charged to have begun and prosecuted his proceedings in the Land Office, and that the effect of those proceedings will be injurious to any of the rights of the complainants. The counsel seem to have properly divested the case, as far as possible, of all questions of fact, in order that the legal questions involved might be considered by the Court, with as little embarrassment as possible.

Three points were raised in the argument, and very ably discussed by the counsel on both sides, in the following order:

1st. What are the rights of the complainants to the premises in question?

2nd. How far is the defendant estopped by his contract of May 24th, 1867, and his acts in pursuance thereof, from controverting the complainants' title?

3rd. Has this Court jurisdiction in the premises?

Inverting the order of the discussion, we will consider the last proposition first.

On the part of the defendant, it was urged that he had applied to the Commissioner of the Land Office for a patent for the land in question, of which application the complainants had full notice, as appears from their bill, and that in fact they had filed a caveat against his application which is now pending. That the Commissioner of the Land Office is a Court of record, empowered to decide all disputes concerning the issuing of patents, according to equity and good conscience, and the principle established in Courts of Equity, from whose decisions an appeal lies to the Court of Appeals; and that in the case now pending there, the whole subject can be examined, and the questions involved in this case can be finally decided. In other words, that the complainants, by prosecuting their caveat before the Commissioner of the Land Office, can have all the relief to which they are entitled by this bill. Is this position tenable?

The Land Office has always been, and is now the general market in which all public lands have been offered for sale. Its function is to confer on its patentee all the title of the State to the property granted. By its action it cannot take away or prejudice the vested rights of others. Even after a caveat, in which questions of title are examined, a patent to the caveatee will confer no title as against the caveator; but the latter may again assert his title in a Court of Law or Equity, in the face of the patent. According to a well recognized rule of the Land Office, it was the practice in cases of reasonable doubt, to let the patent go, so that the rights of the parties might be settled in the proper tribunal, and in one case of cross-caveats, the Chancellor actually issued a patent to each claimant. Baltimore vs. McKim, 3 Bland, 455; Railroad vs. Hoye, 2 Bland, 263; Dorothy vs. Hillert, 9 Md., 570; Smith's Lessee vs. Devecmon, 30 Md., 473.

It is true, the reason for this rule was generally said to be that, as there was no appeal from the decision of the Chancellor as Judge of the Land Office, it was better in doubtful cases, to permit the party to perfect his legal title, so as to allow the matter to be brought before some tribunal where a more full and satisfactory investigation can be had, and a final decision by the Court of Appeals. But in the case of Dorothy vs. Hillert, above cited, the appeal was taken from a decision of the Commissioner of the Land Office, under the Act of 1853, ch. 415, which confers the right of appeal; yet the Court re-asserts the same rule, with the suggestion, that the reason upon which it is based, has not the same force since the passage of that Act as it had before. It is not now necessary for the Commissioner to be so cautious, but in proper ...