Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi

• Decision Date: 26 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-41084,98-41084
• Citation: 202 F.3d 730
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) WILLIAM W. GOODSON, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI; CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE DEPARTMENT; POLICE CHIEF; OFFICER B.J. GAINES; and OFFICER F.V. PEREZ, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 730

202 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2000)

WILLIAM W. GOODSON, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI; CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE DEPARTMENT; POLICE CHIEF; OFFICER B.J. GAINES; and OFFICER F.V. PEREZ, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

No. 98-41084

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

January 26, 2000

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 2000.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Appellant William W. Goodson ("Goodson") appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees City of Corpus Christi ("The City"), City of Corpus Christi Police Department, the Police Chief, and Officers B.J. Gaines ("Gaines") and F.V. Perez ("Perez") (collectively "Appellees") on his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The appellees also cross-appeal, asking for summary judgment, instead of remand to state court, on Goodson's state law claims. Because the district court drew conclusions of law from disputed facts, we reverse and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

At approximately 11:20pm, on April 23, 1995, Gaines heard a BOLO ("be on the look out") for a white male, approximately six feet tall, heavy-set, and dressed like a cowboy, possibly heading to a cowboy bar. The suspect had been involved in a family assault on Violet Road, in Corpus Christi, Texas.

When Gaines heard the BOLO, he was en route to investigate a complaint about loud music at a bar near Leopard and Main Streets. Perez accompanied him in a separate car as back-up. After hearing the BOLO, Gaines noticed the hapless Goodson walking along Leopard Street. Goodson, who is 5' 10" and weighed 260 pounds at the time,¹ wore a paint-splattered long-sleeve button-down shirt, khaki pants and a baseball hat. The parties dispute whether he wore boots and a belt; Goodson claims to have worn velcro tennis shoes and no belt. At this initial siting, Goodson was approximately 3 miles from Violet Road, about half a mile from the Whataburger-where he was heading to have a cup of coffee and call his brother for a ride home-and in the vicinity of The Frontier, a cowboy bar.

Gaines and Perez continued to their call on Leopard and Main Streets, determined that the music was within lawful decibel levels, and returned about 10 minutes later to the corner of Leopard and Rand Morgan Streets, where Goodson was crossing the median on his way to the Whataburger across the street.

The parties dispute virtually every aspect of the ensuing interaction. According to Gaines, he turned on the flashing lights on his police car, exited the vehicle and approached Goodson. Gaines says he asked Goodson for identification, which Goodson failed to produce. Instead, Goodson asked if he was under arrest. Gaines testified that he told Goodson that he was being detained because he matched the description of a suspect and again requested identification. Gaines alleges that Goodson again refused to show identification and spoke in a loud and belligerent tone. Gaines responded by telling Goodson to place his hands on the police car so Gaines could frisk him. To this, Gaines says Goodson responded, not by complying, but by asking, again, whether he was under arrest. Gaines states that he repeated that he was merely detaining Goodson and directed him to place his hands on the car. At this point, Gaines testified, Goodson began moving away, so Gaines grabbed his arm. Goodson yanked hisarm away,turned and fled about 40 feet before Gaines and Perez, who gave chase, tackled him.

Goodson, on the other hand, claims that he voluntarily walked toward Gaines' car as he headed to the Whataburger. He insists that Gaines at no point asked for identification or told Goodson that he was a suspect in an assault. Rather, Goodson maintains that as he approached Gaines, Gaines barked at him to put his hands on Gaines' car. Goodson claims he was startled and asked if he was under arrest. Goodson testified that Gaines told him that he was being detained and to put his hands on the car. Before Goodson could comply, he alleges, Gaines grabbed his arm. Goodson stated that he pulled his arm away from Gaines in surprise and stumbled back in an attempt to regain his balance and maintain a little distance from the police officers. At that point, Goodson claims, Gaines hit his body and Perez grabbed his legs, and the two felled him with their tackle.

The parties agree that Gaines and Perez broke Goodson's shoulder when they tackled him. Goodson testified that he knew his arm was broken immediately because he heard it crack when he hit the ground. Gaines and Perez rolled Goodson over to place him in handcuffs. Goodson told them his shoulder was broken, but they nevertheless jerked his arm back and cuffed him. While they were doing this, one of the officers yelled, "We'll teach you to run from us, you son of a bitch."

At 11:52pm, Gaines radioed the police station and reported that Goodson was hurt. Only a minute earlier, Officer Chris Lynch, who had issued the initial BOLO for a tall, heavy-set white man dressed like a cowboy, radioed that he had apprehended the suspect in question at The Cowboy, a bar approximately eight miles from the corner of Leopard and Rand Morgan Streets.

Goodson spent 8 days in the hospital, at a cost of almost $32,000. He needed a plate and screws inserted into his shoulder, and he will likely need his entire shoulder replaced in the future. As a result of his injury, he missed a year of work.

On May 16, 1995, through a letter written by his attorney, Goodson advised the City of his injury and claim. The City responded by prosecuting Goodson for evading detention or arrest.² The City filed its complaint on July 13, 1995. Police officers arrested Goodson for this crime on November 10, 1995, while he was at a job interview. The prosecutor eventually dismissed the case on February 24, 1997.

On April 7, 1997, Goodson filed this action in state court, alleging, inter alia, unlawful detention, illegal arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, improper training and supervision, and tolerance of a pattern and practice of excessive force in violation of 1983. The appellees removed this case to federal court on May 14, 1997. The district court issued its order granting summary judgment on July 31, 1998.

The district court found that Goodson met the description in the BOLO. It therefore held that Gaines and Perez had reasonable suspicion to stop Goodson, and granted Gaines and Perez qualified immunity on the unlawful detention claim.

The district court also found that Goodson pulled his arm away from Gaines and stepped away from the officers; thus, the officers had probable cause to believe that Goodson was evading a lawful detention, and qualified immunity likewise shielded Perez and Gaines from the illegal arrest claim.

The district court further held that Gaines and Perez did not use excessive force when they tackled or handcuffed Goodson so that qualified immunity protected them from liability for Goodson's injury in that respect as well.

Because the district court found that Gaines and Perez acted with probable cause when they arrested Goodson, the lower court granted the City summary judgment on that claim. It also granted the City summary judgment on Goodson's other claims because the City could not be liable for improper training and supervision or for tolerating a pattern and practice of excessive force if Gaines and Perez had committed no constitutional violations.

Goodson timely filed this appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We apply de novo review to summary judgment motions and evaluate the case under the same standards employed by the district court. See Shakelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999).

The district court should grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); see also Christopher Village, LP v. Retsinas, 190 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). "An issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1423, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2000). "Although we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial." Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1171, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2000).

III. Discussion

Goodson claims that the district court erred when it concluded that he had not produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue. Goodson also argues that the district court erred when it decided that Goodson had not shown a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of probable cause, which is critical to his malicious prosecution claim. Finally, Goodson maintains that the district court erred when it denied Goodson further discovery on his claims against City and, instead, dismissed those claims.

Gaines and Perez counter that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the arrest, and they did not use excessive force. The City argues that the district court correctly concluded that, because Gaines and Perez acted with probable cause, the malicious prosecution claim fails. Finally, the Appellees insist...