Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 81-1582

• Decision Date: 05 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-1582,81-1582
• Parties: , 2 O.B.R. 732 GOODSON et al., Appellees, v. McDONOUGH POWER EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 193

2 Ohio St.3d 193

443 N.E.2d 978, 2 O.B.R. 732

GOODSON et al., Appellees, v. McDONOUGH POWER EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellant.

No. 81-1582.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan. 5, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a requisite to collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. As a general principle, collateral estoppel operates only where all of the parties to the present proceeding were bound by the prior judgment. A judgment, in order to preclude either party from relitigating an issue, must be preclusive upon both. A prior judgment estops a party, or a person in privity with him, from subsequently relitigating the identical issue raised in the prior action. (Paragraph two of the syllabus in Whitehead v. Genl. Tel. Co. of Ohio, 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 , and the syllabus of Trautwein v. Sorgenfrei, 58 Ohio St.2d 493, 391 N.E.2d 326 , approved and followed.)

2. In the absence of mutuality there may be no issue preclusion in the relitigation of design issues relating to a mass-produced product, especially when the former adjudication arose out of a separate underlying incident.

In April 1977, appellees, Gwyn Goodson and her parents, initiated this action seeking damages for personal injuries suffered by Gwyn. Their complaint, setting forth a spectrum of products liability allegations, alleged that a riding lawnmower manufactured by appellant, McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., caused Gwyn's injuries.

The lawnmower was purchased in the latter half of 1972 by the Goodson's neighbor, Hayes Crapo. ¹ In April 1973, Esther I. Crapo was cutting her lawn with the mower. Gwyn, then four years old, and her sister, Teryle, approached Mrs. Crapo and asked for rides on the mower. Disregarding the instructions in the operator's manual, ² Mrs. Crapo consented. Gwyn received the first ride, then it was Teryle's turn. During her ride, Teryle was half standing and half sitting on the right side of the mower. Mrs. Crapo had her right arm around Teryle's waist. Gwyn ran alongside the left side of the mower. She slipped, and her left foot went under the left side of the mower. She received severe injuries to her left foot which later required amputation.

Appellees' complaint contained ten causes of action. Pertinent to this appeal is the sixth cause of action, in which appellees alleged that the negligent design of appellant's lawnmower enhanced or aggravated Gwyn's injuries. Specifically, appellees asserted that appellant was negligent in failing to provide a guard sufficient to prevent Gwyn's foot from slipping under the mower.

Prior to trial, appellees moved for a partial summary judgment. They argued that collateral estoppel principles preclude the relitigation of liability issues. In support of their position, appellees cited Harrison v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. (S.D.Fla.1974), 381 F.Supp. 926 ("Harrison" ). Like appellees' sixth cause of action, Harrison involved a suit against appellant for enhanced injuries caused by the negligent design of a riding lawnmower it manufactured. Similarly, the asserted negligence was a want of proper guarding of the rotary blade.

In Harrison, the reasonableness of design issue was tried to a jury and the case submitted with special verdict forms asking the jury to answer questions, among which was one as to whether the defendant was guilty of any negligence which aggravated the injury. The jury answered that question in the affirmative and found for the plaintiffs. ³

Upon the basis of the jury's finding in Harrison, the trial court in this case determined that collateral estoppel precluded appellant from relitigating its negligence. Consequently, the trial court entered judgment for appellees on the issue of liability and ordered a trial on the question of damages only. After that trial, the jury awarded appellees $355,000 in damages.

Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court held that while the appellant should have been estopped from relitigating the design issue, the trial court had improperly granted summary judgment on the enhancement of injury question in that this was a material disputed fact which required jury determination.

The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Alfred J. Weisbrod Co., L.P.A., and Alfred J. Weisbrod, Troy, for appellees.

Estabrook, Finn & McKee, Thomas L. Czechowski, John P. Rieser and Thomas H. Pyper, Dayton, for appellant.

Thompson, Hine & Flory, William H. Wallace, Cleveland, Paul W. Brown, Columbus, Barbara J. Arison, Cleveland, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and Robert E. Leach, Columbus, urging reversal, for amicus curiae Ohio Manufacturers' Assn Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, Mark L. Austrian and Thomas A. Hart, Jr., Washington, D.C., urging reversal, for amicus curiae Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, Inc.

William H. Crabtree and Edward P. Good, Detroit, Mich., urging reversal, for amicus curiae Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Ass'n of the U.S., Inc.

HOLMES, Judge.

This cause occasions the review and analysis of one aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, that of collateral estoppel, as it has been applied in Ohio, and whether the traditional general rules as previously enunciated and followed should be applied to cases involving claims of product defective design. Collateral estoppel within the context of res judicata has been explained by this court to be preclusion of the relitigation in a second action of an issue or issues that have been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action. Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 . ⁴

Case law in Ohio concerning the general doctrine of res judicata has long ago established the general principle that material facts or questions which were in issue in a former suit, and were there judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, are conclusively settled by a judgment therein so far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them. ⁵

As a requisite factor in the application of the principle of issue preclusion within the doctrine of res judicata, Ohio cases over the years in like manner have consistently held to the effect that a judgment can operate as collateral estoppel only where all of the parties to the proceeding in which the judgment is relied upon were bound by the judgment. Expressions are found within the cases that the record of a judgment, in order to preclude either of the party litigants, must be preclusive upon both. The operation of the rule must be mutual. If a judgment cannot be effective as res judicata against a particular person, he cannot avail himself of the adjudication and contend that it is available against others, as between them and himself. Therein lies the general rule of mutuality of estoppel which has long been applied by this court and other courts in Ohio. ⁶

There being the general requisite of an identity of persons and parties, or their privies, within the prior proceeding in order for the judgment or decree to operate as an estoppel, strangers to such a judgment or decree will not be affected thereby. Woodward v. Moore (1862), 13 Ohio St. 136, 143; State, ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Co. (1868), 18 Ohio St. 262, 299; Frank v. Jenkins Bro. & Chipman (1872), 22 Ohio St. 597, paragraph four of the syllabus; Burt v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co. (1884), 41 Ohio St. 204, 205. For all practical purposes, the mutuality rule is coextensive with the requirement that the plea of res judicata is available only to a party to the judgment and to his privies. See, generally, Annotation, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044.

In recent years there has been much discussion in case law and law journals as to the legal viability of the application of the strict doctrine of mutuality as a requisite to collateral estoppel. Some courts throughout the country have abandoned the doctrine in whole or in part. Some cases specifically reject mutuality as it might be used either offensively or defensively, and permit nonmutuality in the application of collateral estoppel. ⁷ There are also cases which only specifically allow, or the opinions seemingly allow, the application of nonmutuality in its defensive use. ⁸ Other states, including Ohio (which cases will be referred to hereinafter), have generally continued to adhere to the requirement of mutuality in the application of collateral estoppel, with varying exceptions. ⁹

Some writers have criticized the continued use of the mutuality principle, ¹⁰ while other commentators and writers disagree with the critics of the mutuality rule. ¹¹

There has been a differing view in the state and federal courts as to the offensive versus the defensive use of the "nonmutuality rule." Acceptance of the offensive use of the rule has been placed in much greater question by most courts. See Spettigue v. Mahoney (1968), 8 Ariz.App. 281, 445 P.2d 557, and Reardon v. Allen (1965), 88 N.J.Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26.

In Reardon, the court, arguing against permitting the offensive use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a nonmutuality situation, stated that rejecting mutuality exposes a defendant who is subject to multiple claims to considerable detriment; that one disadvantage is that he must evaluate the risk of the first case with an eye to those to come, including cases of adversaries not yet known; and that another disadvantage may be illustrated by the example of an accident involving a bus, train, or airplane in which a number of passengers are injured. In elaboration of the last argument it was said that if a judgment against the defendant in the first action can be used by all other claimants, the defendant must put up the most vigorous defense even when the first action presents a minor claim. Annotation, 31 A.L.R.3d, supra, at 1055-1056. See, also, 1B Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph...