Goodson v. Smith, s. 2529

Decision Date07 April 1952
Docket Number2530,Nos. 2529,s. 2529
Citation243 P.2d 163,69 Wyo. 439
PartiesGOODSON et al. v. SMITH et al. SMITH, v. GOODSON et al.
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Thomas A. Nicholas, Robert A. Burgess, Casper, for appellants.

Robert S. Lowe, Rawlins, Thomas M. McKinney, Basin, for respondents.

Before BLUME, C. J., RINER, J., and PARKER, District Judge.

BLUME, Chief Justice.

The controversy in these cases is, in the main, one as to the amount of oil and gas rights reserved in the lands here involved when the property was conveyed and agreed to be conveyed to Christy K. Smith. The two actions involve the identical transactions and were consolidated for trial. The first of these actions was brought on December 31, 1948, by Mary A. Goodson and Velma Jean Koski, hereinafter called plaintiffs or appellants, against Christy K. Smith and Preston T. McAvoy to cancel or construe a contract and deed involving the following ranch property situated in Weston County, Wyoming, and reservations for oil, gas and minerals therein, as follows:

'The North Half (N 1/2); the North Half of the South Half (N 1/2 S 1/2), the South Half of the Southeast Quarter (S 1/2 SE 1/4) of Section Two (2); the North Half of the Northeast Quarter (N 1/2 NE 1/4) of Section Eleven (11), Township Forty-three (43) North, Range Sixty-six (66); and West Half (W 1/2) of Section Ten (10); the South Half (S 1/2) of Section Fourteen (14); Section Fifteen (15); The Northwest quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NW 1/4 NE 1/4), the East Half of the Northeast Quarter (E 1/2 NE 1/4) of Section Twenty-one (21); the West Half of the Northwest Quarter (W 1/2 NW 1/4), the South Half (S 1/2) of Section Twenty-two (22); the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (NW 1/4 SW 1/4), The South Half of the South Half (S 1/2 S 1/2) of Section Twenty-three (23); Section Twenty-six (26); Section Twenty-seven (27); the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NE 1/4 NE 1/4) of Section Twenty-eight (28); the North Half of the North Half (N 1/2 N 1/2) of Section Thirty-five (35), Township Forty-four (44) North, of Range Sixty-six (66), West of the Sixth Principal Meridan, containing Four Thousand One Hundred Twenty (4120) Acres, more or less, according to the Government Survey thereof; and all State school land and individual land leases identified and owned under lease by the Parties of the First Part, approximating Four Thousand (4000) acres, which includes Federal leases under Taylor Grazing Act, also including the leases covered by Land Utilization.'

The allegations of the petition, slightly abbreviated, are as follows: 'Plaintiffs (that is to say appellants herein) are the owners in fee simple of the property here involved. On July 2, 1946, they made and executed an oil and gas lease to the property to R. V. Allen. Mary A. Goodson's husband died on or about May 5, 1942, and she operated the ranch after that time. Preston T. McAvoy was her attorney. On or about October 7, 1946, defendant Christy K. Smith desired to buy the property. She informed him that she wanted to retain the oil and gas in the property forever. She agreed to meet him at the office of McAvoy the following day to re duce the contract to writing. Smith took other persons to the office of Preston T. McAvoy the following day. These persons were men of large interests and of great statute and political and other influence and experience. After Smith and others met in the office of Preston T. McAvoy these persons interrupted and contradicted Mary A. Goodson by loud and boisterous talking and interruptions, prevented plaintiff from completely expressing herself, and presumed to dictate the language to appear in the agreement for the sale of the land here involved and pretended that the language was the exact language agreed upon with Christy K. Smith at her ranch; defendant, Christy K. Smith, and associates overreached plaintiff. Plaintiff Goodson was then 54 years of age, and a widow, and was unfamiliar with legal documents and phraseology. Defendant deprived her of independent counsel and advice and employed plaintiff's regular attorney. There was necessity for her to return to her ranch. Upon the representation of defendant and associates that the paper was as agreed at her ranch, she signed the agreement for a warranty deed on October 8, 1946, but it does not represent the language of Mary A. Goodson of her free will. No deed for the transfer of the lands was made. The agreement entered into provided that upon the death of Mary A. Goodson one-third of the oil and gas and other minerals should pass to Christy K. Smith, that after twenty-five years another one-third would pass to Christy K. Smith leaving one-third of the oil and gas in the lands permanently and forever in the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs learned that Preston T. McAvoy had in his possession a pretended deed which pretended to bear the signatures of plaintiffs for the purpose of transferring said premises to defendant, Christy K. Smith; that pretended deed does not contain the language stipulated in the agreement for a warranty deed.' Plaintiffs prayed that the court cancel and rescind the contract, but if it should not be cancelled that the court interpret the effect thereof; that the lease to R. V. Allen be declared to be valid; that the defendant McAvoy be enjoined from delivering the pretended deed; that plaintiff, Mary A. Goodson, be decreed to retain an interest in the oil and gas under said lands forever.

Christy K. Smith filed an answer denying the allegations of the petition generally and setting forth that the contract for a deed was made and executed on October 8, 1946, and that a deed for the property, which was in conformity with the agreement, was executed subsequently on January 4, 1947.

The defendant, Preston T. McAvoy answered in similar language including the allegations that a warranty deed for the premises was executed on January 4. The execution of the deed was denied in the reply of plaintiffs.

Thereafter on January 3, 1949, Christy K. Smith brought an action against Mary A. Goodson and Velma Jean Koski and M. J. Koski, the latter's husband, substantially setting forth the allegations which he had mentioned in the answers to the first action and also asked for a portion of the money paid to appellants under the R. V. Allen lease. A copy of the agreement for warranty deed was set forth, and a copy of the warranty deed, executed pursuant to the agreement, was attached. He prayed the court as follows:

'Wherefore, the Plaintiff Prays that this Court make a declaration of the rights of the respective parties in and to said lands; that it be ordered and decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to have said Warranty Deed so that he may place the same of record; that Plaintiff is entitled to have the Abstracts of Title for examination and to have full performance in accordance with the agreement of the parties and that the defendants be required to deliver said executed Warranty Deed to the Plaintiff with said Abstracts of Title to the lands covered thereby for examination by Plaintiff's attorneys and when said Plaintiff's attorneys have examined said title and if the title be found merchantable that then and in that event the Court order the payment of Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($8,500.00) in the hands of the Clerk of this Court to the said defendants and that the plaintiff have and recover from the defendants the sum of money or such sum of money in such amount as shall have been paid by the former lessees of said lands * * * which the plaintiff is justly entitled to receive and that the plaintiff have such other further and different relief as upon the trial hereof may be just and proper and recover his costs of suit herein expended.'

The answer of Mary A. Goodson and her associates contains substantially the same allegations as are contained in the action which she and Velma Jean Koski brought against Christy K. Smith and Preston T. McAvoy and stating among other things that the warranty deed theretofore mentioned is a spurious invention and in no way binding upon them.

The evidence shows that the property involved herein was for sale on and before October 7, 1946. Christy K. Smith and his uncle, John Christensen, went to the ranch in question about noon October 7, 1946, and it was then agreed that the purchase price of the property should be $35,000. The parties were to meet in the office of Preston T. McAvoy at Newcastle, Wyoming on October 8, 1946, in order to reduce the contract to writing. Velma Jean Koski lived with her husband at Newcastle. Mrs. Goodson drove to Newcastle on October 8, 1946. During the afternoon she consulted with her banker for the period of about two or three hours and met Christy K. Smith, the latter's brother and father in the office of McAvoy about five o'clock in the afternoon of that day. The contract was dictated by Preston T. McAvoy into a dictaphone in the presence of the parties to this action. It was then transcribed by Betty Jean Fowler; a copy was given to each of the parties herein; it was thereupon read by McAvoy in the presence of the parties and it was thereupon signed by them respectively. The purchase price of the property, as before stated, was $35,000; $100 was paid on that day. The deferred payments were as follows: $10,400 on January 3, 1947; $8,500 to be paid on January 2, 1948; $8,500 to be paid on January 2, 1949; and the balance of $7,500 was to be paid by an assumption of the mortgage against the property held by a Federal Land Bank. Pursuant to agreement possession of the premises was given to Christy K. Smith on November 15, 1946. The evidence further indicates, although disputed by appellants, that an escrow agreement, making McAvoy the agent, was executed on January 3, 1947, signed by Mary A. Goodson, Velma Jean Koski and Christy K. Smith, and that the warranty deed to the property was executed by the appellants herein and...

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24 cases
  • Williams v. Watt
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 30, 1972
    ...and Liabilities, § 136--Nature of the Legal Interest in Oil and Gas Created by Deed, Exception or Reservation. See also, Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, reh. denied 244 P.2d 805 (1952). See Krug v. Reissig, Wyo., 488 P.2d 150 (1971), where we recognized a life estate in the min......
  • Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hallmark Ins. Co.
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    • March 10, 1977
    ...To pray for declaratory relief is not, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a claim as one for declaratory judgment. Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, reh. den. 69 Wyo. 439, 244 P.2d 805.4 The citations are: Big Horn Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 67 Wyo. 300, 224 P.2d 172, 177; Wyo......
  • Fenrick v. Olson, 39100
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    • November 6, 1964
    ...to the contract. Thus there is no showing to justify reformation of the contract.' Authorities are collected in Goodson & Koski v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 460, 243 P.2d 163, 172, 244 P.2d 805; 13 Am.Jur.(2d) Cancellation of Instruments, § 34; Annotation, 59 A.L.R. 818; 3 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) §......
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    ...this view is correct. See Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206 (1931). We explained, however, in Goodson v. Smith, 69 Wyo. 439, 243 P.2d 163, reh. denied 69 Wyo. 439, 244 P.2d 805 (1952), that the requirement for a jury trial in a declaratory judgment action depends ......
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