Goodson v. Smith, s. 2529

• Citation: 69 Wyo. 439,244 P.2d 805
• Decision Date: 27 May 1952
• Docket Number: 2530,Nos. 2529,s. 2529
• Parties: GOODSON et al. v. SMITH et al. SMITH, v. GOODSON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 805

244 P.2d 805

69 Wyo. 439

GOODSON et al. v. SMITH et al.

SMITH, v. GOODSON et al.

Nos. 2529, 2530.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 27, 1952.

Thomas A. Nicholas, Robert A. Burgess, Casper, for appellants.

Before BLUME, C. J., RINER, J., and PARKER, District Judge.

BLUME, Chief Justice.

A petition for rehearing has been filed in the foregoing case. We considered what we thought to be the vital and important questions in the case fully in the original opinion. We stated at the end of that opinion that it was long; that other matters had been mentioned in the brief of counsel for appellant, but that none of them were of sufficient importance to deserve argument. We still think so. However, counsel had the right to file a petition for rehearing under our rules notwithstanding what we said, and freedom of thought and of expression is one of the heritages in our country, and far be it from us to desire to stifle that. So we have carefully read the brief in support of the petition. In the main, the various points heretofore decided have not been questioned, but counsel seem to think that on account of certain matters which they now argue the case ought to be reversed. We shall, in deference to counsel, briefly touch upon some of the matters argued in the present brief.

Counsel complain that Christy Smith was not compelled to answer interrogatory 9 submitted by the plaintiffs. That interrogatory was as follows: 'State what consideration was paid in connection with said deed, apart from the general consideration mentioned in the alleged agreement.' Respondent answered that plaintiffs were as well informed on that subject as he. That was obviously true. The interrogatory was submitted on the theory of appellants that the warranty deed in evidence enlarged the rights of respondent which were granted to him in the agreement for that deed. We have shown in the original opinion that that was not true. The foregoing point becomes accordingly wholly academic, and no possible prejudice resulted from the fact that the interrogatory was not fully answered. Counsel say that a large part of the time of the trial was lost because of respondent's answer. It should not have been. If it was, that was due to the wrong theory of counsel for appellants. Moreover, losing unnecessary time in a trial of a case cannot, of course, be ground for reversal of the judgment. Furthermore while appellants assigned the ruling of the court in connection herewith as error, we do not find that it was argued at the original hearing, either in the brief of appellants or on oral argument. The assignment of error was accordingly waived. It is quite apparent that counsel took the same view of the matter originally as we do now.

Counsel say in their brief that the preliminary agreement at the ranch was important. Just what conclusion they draw from that fact is not clear to us. In any event whatever the agreement at the ranch may have been, it was superseded by a written contract subsequently drawn. Appellants had a copy of it; it was read to them and they signed it. Courts do not easily overturn contracts which are voluntarily entered into by the parties as was true in this case according to the finding of the trial court.

Counsel again argue the question that there were numerous leading questions asked in the trial of this case by counsel for Christy Smith. The control in connection with leading questions in a case is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. 70 C.J. 524. Upon examination of the record, we do not think that appellants were in any way prejudiced in connection with this matter, particularly in view of the fact that the case was tried by the court...