Goodwin v. Bacon
| Decision Date | 15 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 62323-6,62323-6 |
| Citation | 896 P.2d 673,127 Wn.2d 50 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,258 Michael L. GOODWIN and Jonnie D. Goodwin, husband and wife, Respondents, v. Harry BACON and Sharon Bacon, husband and wife; and Sandoz Crop Protection Corporation, Appellants. |
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., Philip J. Van de Veer, H. Terrence Lackie, Spokane, for appellant Sandoz Crop Protection.
Hansen Law Firm, Nels A. Hansen, Ephrata, for respondents.
Stephen P. Larson, Seattle, amicus curiae, on behalf of Washington Defense Trial Lawyers.
Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Spokane, Gregg L. Tinker, First & Stewart, Seattle, amicus curiae, for respondents on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
We accepted certification of this case from the Court of Appeals to review a trial court ruling that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136v, does not preempt state negligence claims for failure to warn and inadequate label. We hold FIFRA does preempt state inadequate labeling and failure to warn claims to the extent they rely on a showing of inadequate labeling. We thus reverse the verdict of the trial court.
At issue are the FIFRA provisions permitting state regulation of sale and use of registered pesticides, but restricting state authority over labeling:
§ 136v. Authority of States
A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.
7 U.S.C. § 136v(a), (b).
FIFRA represents the primary federal tool regulating the effects of pesticides on health and the environment, including the use, sale, registration, and labeling of pesticides in both intrastate and interstate commerce. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-93, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2866-68, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). To achieve this purpose, FIFRA grants the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority over registration, labeling, and enforcement and mandates EPA registration of all pesticides distributed or sold in the United States. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C), (D); 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).
The EPA has created a detailed regulatory scheme of labeling requirements specifying color, placement, prominence, and certain content directives. 40 C.F.R. § 156. The manufacturer designs and formulates the content of the label according to these restrictions, then files with the EPA a statement including the pesticide name, a complete copy of the label, directions for use, all claims made, and a full description of tests and results underlying such claims. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(B)-(D). The EPA reviews the submitted label and accompanying data to determine whether registration is permissible according to statutorily mandated findings regarding manufacturer's claims, use, effects, and labeling. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5). The EPA retains the power to pursue civil and criminal penalties against a manufacturer for inadequate labeling after registration. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136g(c)(1) and 136j(a)(2)(G).
This case arose from a crop loss allegedly due to damage from Banvel, an herbicide manufactured by Defendant Sandoz Crop Protection Corporation (Sandoz). There is no dispute that Banvel is duly registered with an authorized EPA label. In 1989, Plaintiff Michael Goodwin leased 40 acres of land from Defendant/Cross Claimant Henry Bacon (Bacon) to grow potatoes. In January or February 1990, Bacon, with Plaintiff's consent, corrected a blowing problem on 6-to-10 acres of the leased plot by spreading 1-to-3 inches of manure and grass clippings from Bacon's cattle operation. After Plaintiff planted his first potato crop in April 1990, the plants exhibited defects consistent with phenoxy damage caused by Banvel. Tests of manure and grass clippings on the plot discovered Banvel residue.
Plaintiff subsequently entered into a litigation/settlement agreement with Farmers Insurance, Bacon's liability insurer, by which Farmers agreed to pay Plaintiff $50,000 and Plaintiff agreed to initiate litigation underwritten by Farmers against Defendants. On May 21, 1991, Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against Defendants alleging negligence, including failure properly to label the Banvel and failure to warn of the use and effect of Banvel on other crops. Bacon filed a cross claim against Sandoz for failure to label and failure to warn.
The trial court denied Sandoz's pretrial motion to dismiss the inadequate label and failure to warn claims as preempted by FIFRA. The court also granted Bacon's motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding the litigation/settlement agreement on the availability of insurance, Bacon's underwriting of the litigation pursuant to the settlement, and the fact that Bacon's expert was an investigator sent by Farmers to study Bacon's loss.
The jury found Sandoz solely negligent and awarded Plaintiff $200,000, ultimately reduced to $120,457.52. Sandoz then filed an appeal assigning error to the trial court's pre-trial rulings on FIFRA preemption and the insurance testimony. The Supreme Court accepted certification from the Court of Appeals as a companion to two other cases before the court addressing the preemptive scope of FIFRA: All-Pure Chem. Co. v. White, No. 61082-7, on review from Division Two, and Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., --- Wash.2d ----, 896 P.2d 682 certified from Division Three. Washington State Trial Lawyers Association has filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiff.
"Admission of evidence lies largely within the sound discretion of the trial court...." Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfr. Co., 102 Wash.2d 68, 76, 684 P.2d 692 (1984). An abuse of discretion occurs only where "exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." Davis, 102 Wash.2d at 77, 684 P.2d 692. Sandoz argues the trial court's granting of Bacon's motion in limine amounted to an abuse of discretion because the testimony regarding insurance was admissible on 2 bases: under Civil Rule (CR) 17 as necessary to show a real party in interest and under Evidence Rule (ER) 411 as relevant to an issue other than fault. We disagree and affirm the ruling of the trial court excluding such testimony.
CR 17(a) demands: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Sandoz contends the litigation/settlement agreement extinguished all of Bacon's liability, making Farmers the real party in interest. Preclusion of testimony regarding this agreement, claims Sandoz, deceived the jury as to the identity of the real party in interest and thereby prejudiced Sandoz. A close reading of the agreement, however, supports Plaintiff's characterization of its scope as limited to settlement of Plaintiff's claim against Farmers for dealing in bad faith while negotiating his losses: "WHEREAS, Farmers has denied that any such promise was extended to Goodwin, but has nevertheless agreed to pay to Goodwin the sum of $50,000...." (Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers, at 27. Likewise, the agreement cannot be said to extinguish Bacon's liability, nor did Plaintiff receive full payment, as he would receive any award beyond $50,000, whether from Bacon or Sandoz. Thus, Plaintiff remained the real party in interest, and CR 17 did not compel admission of the testimony.
Sandoz further submits ER 411 as a basis for admissibility. Evidence regarding availability of insurance is inadmissible on the issue of negligence pursuant to ER 411 unless relevant to an issue other than fault "such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness." ER 411. A court may allow testimony regarding insurance to overcome the bar of ER 411 only for a proper purpose, such as to rebut an element of a claim, Kubista v. Romaine, 87 Wash.2d 62, 69, 549 P.2d 491 (1976), or to show bias by advising the jury of a witness' relation to and interest in the case, Moy Quon v. Furuya Co., 81 Wash. 526, 531-32, 143 P. 99 (1914).
In the present case, Sandoz has not shown the disputed testimony to be relevant to any element of a failure to warn claim. Likewise, the adversarial relationship between the co-Defendants was evident from Bacon's cross claim against Sandoz, thereby advising the jury of the bias of all Bacon's and Plaintiff's witnesses against Sandoz. In addition, the likelihood of misleading the jury as to the nature of the agreement and unduly prejudicing Plaintiff's case outweighed any probative value. See ER 403. As a result, we conclude the trial court fairly exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony regarding insurance.
This court has not previously had the opportunity to address the preemptive scope of FIFRA's labeling provisions directly, nor has the United States Supreme Court. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 615, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2487, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991) (); Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124 Wash.2d 205, 207, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994) ().
We find persuasive the majority of courts, including the 7 federal circuits, that have addressed FIFRA preemption since the United States Supreme Court's explanation of express preemption analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), and that have held inadequate label and failure to warn claims are expressly preempted. See, e.g., Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887 (8th Cir.1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir.1994); King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st...
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