Goodwin v. Cnty. of Summit
| Decision Date | 08 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:14CV121. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.3d 692 |
| Parties | Keith GOODWIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Jaime U. Kolligian, Keith L. Pryatel, Kastner, Westman & Wilkins, Akron, OH, for Plaintiffs.
Stephen W. Funk, Roetzel & Andress, Linda M. Murphy, Akron, OH, for Defendants.
In this civil rights action, defendants,1 seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) and 12(c). (Doc. No. 8.) Alternatively, defendants seek a stay of the present proceedings pending resolution of a state court civil enforcement action. (Id. ) Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. No. 13), and defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 14). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff Keith Heating and Cooling, Inc. (“KH & C”) “is a commercial and residential heating, ventilation and air conditioning contractor” located in Tallmadge, Ohio. (Fed. Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5.) Tallmadge, Ohio is situated in Summit County. (Id. ) Plaintiff Keith Goodwin (“Goodwin”) is the president of KH & C and is a resident of Summit County. (Id. ¶ 4.)
On October 24, 2012, Summit County (“the County”) brought a civil enforcement action against plaintiffs in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. (State Civil Dkt., Doc. No. 8–1, at 100;2 see State Compl., Doc. No. 8–2.) The state complaint provides that the County has reasonable cause to believe that plaintiffs have breached county consumer protection and building code laws, engaged in unconscionable sales practices, and breached various express and implied contracts. (State Compl. ¶ 1.)
According to the state complaint, in December 2011, the Summit County Department of Community and Economic Development, Building Standards Division, notified plaintiffs that they had only obtained 45 building permits since 1996, and that they would be required to obtain building permits for all prior work done without the proper permits and pay the 200% civil penalty under Sections 1307.02 and 1305.04 of the Summit County Building Code. (Id. ¶ 11.) In the years that followed, plaintiffs allegedly pulled several hundred permits for previously performed work but failed to pay the corresponding fines. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14.)
Between December 2012 and early 2013, a series of articles appearing in the Akron Beacon–Journal accused plaintiffs of “unconscionable consumer sales practices and unfair and deceptive consumer sales practices.” (Fed. Compl. ¶¶ 32–36; see State Compl. ¶ 15.) The state complaint alleges that, following the publication of these articles, the Summit County Office of Consumer Affairs received over 46 consumer complaints regarding plaintiffs' sales practices. (State Compl. ¶¶ 17–18.) These complaints, summarized in the state complaint, ranged from engaging in high pressure sales tactics and performing unauthorized furnace safety checks to misrepresenting warranty information and locking consumers into installment financing contracts without disclosing material terms and conditions. 3
(Id. ¶ 20; see ¶¶ 34–54.) The County investigated these complaints and determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that plaintiffs had violated numerous Summit County Ordinances relating to consumer sales practices. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 55.)
The state complaint raised four claims: unconscionable consumer sales practices, in violation of Summit County Consumer Protection Code § 759.03; unfair or deceptive consumer sales practices, in violation of Summit County Consumer Protection Code § 759.04; failure to obtain permits, in violation of Chapter 13 of the Summit County Building Code; and failure to pay penalties due, also in violation of Chapter 13 of the local building code. (Id. ) In its prayer for relief, the County sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, and license fees. (Id. at 117–118.) Plaintiffs filed an answer denying the allegations contained in the complaint. (State Ans., Doc. No. 8–3; see State Dkt. at 99.) On March 28, 2013, plaintiffs filed an amended answer in which they raised, among other defenses, the defense that the local ordinances and codes under which the civil enforcement action was brought were unconstitutional. (State First Am. Ans., Doc. No. 8–5, at 148; see State Dkt. at 99.)
As is evident from the state court docket, the parties have engaged in extensive (and, at times, contentious) discovery and motion practice. (See State Dkt.) After several false starts, the state case has been set for a bench trial to take place on September 22, 2014. (Notice, Doc. No. 17, at 405.)
On January 17, 2014, over 14 months after the County filed its state civil enforcement action, plaintiffs filed the present action in federal court. In their federal complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants “acted purposefully, maliciously, and with deliberate indifference” to plaintiffs' constitutional rights by instituting the state court action against them. (Fed. Compl. ¶ 1.) They insist that the County has selectively chosen to enforce the permit penalty provision in the local building code against KH & C, a nonunion company, while failing to enforce the provision as to unionized heating and cooling companies. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 46.) They further allege that the County failed in its statutory duty to afford plaintiffs notice of the consumer complaints and an opportunity to participate in a mediation and name clearing hearing before it sought enforcement of the local ordinances and code. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 35, 40.)
With respect to the articles that appeared in the Akron Beacon–Journal and the resulting consumer complaints, the federal pleading alleges that defendants violated the County's “unannounced policy and practice” of not commenting on pending investigations by supplying the Akron newspaper with information for the stories. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 32, 34, 37.) The federal complaint charges that defendants, acting through the newspaper, actively solicited the “unfounded, unsubstantiated, meritless consumer complaints” against plaintiffs.
(Id. ¶¶ 33, 34, 37.) Plaintiffs insist that defendants' actions have caused substantial damage to KH & C's business, and “exposed KH & C and Goodwin to revocation of their business licenses by the Summit County Registration Board, and further exposed KH & C and Goodwin to debarment by the Summit County, Ohio Board of Control.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
While it is not entirely clear, the federal complaint appears to raise claims sounding in equal protection and due process violations, unlawful taking, civil abuse of process, and vindictive enforcement and vindictive prosecution. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 49–60.) Plaintiffs request a declaration that the county ordinances and code provisions at issue in the underlying state action are unconstitutional and that defendants' attempt to enforce them as against plaintiffs violates their constitutional rights. (Id. at 28–29.) Plaintiffs also seek an injunction prohibiting the County from pursuing its 2012 civil enforcement action in state court, and request compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. (Id. at 29.)
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), due to the pendency of the ongoing state civil enforcement action, and further suggest that dismissal without prejudice (and not a stay of proceedings) is the appropriate response under Younger because plaintiffs' claims are not ripe. Alternatively, defendants maintain that plaintiffs' federal complaint fails to state a cause of action and should be dismissed on the merits.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Although this pleading standard does not require great detail, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing authorities). In other words, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 556, n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6) ], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may “consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008) ; see Jones v. Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir.2008) ().
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) come in one of two main varieties:...
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