Goodwin v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 17 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-20976,99-20976
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) ALVIN URIAL GOODWIN III Petitioner - Appellant v. GARY L JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION Respondent - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 450

224 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000)

ALVIN URIAL GOODWIN III Petitioner - Appellant v. GARY L JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION Respondent - Appellee

No. 99-20976

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

August 17, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

KING, Chief Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Alvin Urial Goodwin III, a Texas death-row inmate, appeals from the district court's denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the lower court's finding that he had not invoked his right to counsel before confessing to the crime of which he was convicted is clearly erroneous. He also requests that we revisit an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). We decide that the lower court's finding is not clearly erroneous and deny Goodwin's request to revisit the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after remand. Petitioner-Appellant Alvin Urial Goodwin III ("Goodwin") argued in his first appeal that the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claim that admission of his confessions violated the U.S. Constitution as those confessions were obtained after he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. We held in Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1998), that Goodwin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve a factual dispute underlying his Fifth Amendment claim. See id. at 185. The district court has conducted that hearing, issued its findings, and entered judgment denying habeas relief. Having described much of the factual background of this case before, see id. at 167-68, we concentrate here only on those aspects relevant to the issues Goodwin raises on this appeal.

Suspecting they were involved in several burglaries and attempted burglaries, Burlington, Iowa police officers arrested Goodwin and Billy Dan Atkins, Jr. in the early morning hours of Saturday, January 17, 1987 after they were observed approaching numerous parked cars. Goodwin, who was found with a loaded, cocked weapon and a crowbar, was arrested for burglary and going armed with intent. At the time he was arrested, Goodwin told officers that his name was Bradley Douglas Murphy and that he did not have a social security number.

According to Goodwin's 1994 affidavit, after he was taken to the Burlington police station, he refused to sign a waiver of rights form and to give a statement, and instead, requested an attorney. His affidavit states further that between the time he requested an attorney and the time he was questioned by Texas law enforcement officers on January 21, he was not asked any incriminating questions. Goodwin also states that during that same period, he gave his real name and social security number, and was taken before a judge who informed him of the identity of his court-appointed attorney.

Other evidence corroborates some of Goodwin's affidavit. Goodwin was taken before a judge twice between his arrest and his questioning by Texas law enforcement officials. On January 17, 1987, Goodwin appeared before a judge and requested a court-appointed attorney. After setting bond at $25,000, the judge continued the matter until January 20, 1987, at which time he appointed Alan Waples to be Goodwin's counsel. Goodwin's investigator discovered in September, 1998 a copy of form entitled "Statement of Rights and Acknowledgment and Waiver." That document, which refers to Goodwin by the alias he had given, shows that approximately an hour and a half after Goodwin was arrested, Lieutenant Larry E. Walker of the Burlington Police Department presented Goodwin with a Statement of Rights form, on which Goodwin's rights to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney present during questioning were set forth. The document also shows that Goodwin refused to sign below the acknowledgment and waiver of the rights paragraph.

Iowa records do not indicate whether Goodwin was questioned by Iowa police between January 17 and January 21. An affidavit from Lt. Walker indicates that if Goodwin refused to sign the form, "no further conversation would have taken place." Iowa records do indicate that on January 17, Atkins was presented with a rights form at almost the exact time that Goodwin was. Atkins signed his acknowledgment and waiver of rights and was thereafter questioned by Iowa officers regarding the Iowa burglaries. Atkins was again questioned by Iowa officers on January 21, this time with counsel present. By January 21, Iowa officers had twice obtained warrants and searched the residence that Goodwin and Atkins shared.

The morning of January 21, two law enforcement officers from Texas interviewed Goodwin regarding the murder of Douglas Tillerson.¹ Goodwin was read his Miranda rights, and he acknowledged that he understood them. Officers described the evidence that they had assembled (e.g., they had found Tillerson's body, they had the murder weapon, they had recovered property taken from Tillerson's home the night he disappeared) and that they had a capital murder warrant for Atkins. This prompted Goodwin to state that he, Goodwin, was "on death row" because he was the one who had pulled the trigger.

Goodwin was then asked whether he wanted to make a statement, and he responded that he did because he wanted to tell what had happened. Goodwin was again read his rights, at which point he signed the waiver of rights form. Thereafter, Goodwin gave a video-taped confession. Officers read Goodwin his rights one more time at the conclusion of his video-taped statement. Later on January 21, Goodwin was flown back to Texas in the custody of the law enforcement officers.² The next day, after being brought before a magistrate, Goodwin was again read his rights, and he again agreed to waive those rights. Goodwin then gave a written confession. He subsequently also identified property stolen from Tillerson and the gun used by Atkins during the robbery and the murder.

In Goodwin, we assessed whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Respondent-Appellee Gary L. Johnson (hereinafter "the State"). See 132 F.3d at 169. We determined, inter alia, that evidence in the record indicated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Goodwin's Fifth Amendment right-to-counsel claim. See id. at 182 n.15. In remanding for an evidentiary hearing on the question whether Goodwin had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel prior to being interrogated by Texas law enforcement officials, we explicitly stated that the hearing "should not be a wide-ranging fishing expedition, but a brief adversarial hearing concerning a discrete factual issue." Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

The court below adhered to this directive. After the document indicating Goodwin's refusal to sign a waiver was discovered, and the parties had submitted the court-ordered joint chronology of events and had completed their pre-hearing investigation, Goodwin on December 9, 1998 filed a motion for summary judgment. Along with its opposition to this motion, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition under Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 9(a), arguing that Goodwin's use of the waiver form is barred by the doctrine of laches, and that his delay in presenting the form prejudiced the State's ability to respond to Goodwin's claim. The State contended that the passage of time made it impossible to disprove Goodwin's assertions, as Lt. Walker now has no recollection of any conversations with Goodwin and there is no alternative source for such information.

The district court denied Goodwin's motion for summary judgment, and ordered a video-taped deposition of Goodwin to take place. After completion of this deposition, the court heard oral argument on the evidence. It ultimately found that Goodwin did not invoke the right to counsel before he confessed to Texas law enforcement officials in Iowa. The court did not rule on the State's Rule 9(a) motion, but found that Goodwin's delay in raising the issue substantially prejudiced the State's ability to establish precisely the sequence of events. Judgment denying Goodwin's application for habeas relief was entered October 18, 1999. The district court also granted Goodwin a Certificate of Probable Cause ("CPC"). Goodwin timely appeals.

II. INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

We will not upset the district court's findings unless we find clear error. See Blackmon v. Johnson, 145 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1021 (1999). Goodwin points to six pieces of evidence as supporting his contention that the district court's finding that he had not invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel is clearly erroneous: (1) his refusal to sign his waiver form;³ (2) the extensive investigation into the Iowa burglaries conducted by Iowa police officers; (3) the interrogation of Atkins after he signed his waiver form; (4) the cessation of Atkins's interrogation shortly after he asserted his right to counsel; (5) the absence of any indication that Iowa police officers interrogated Goodwin; and (6) Goodwin's affidavit, video-taped deposition, and his chronology of events evidently prepared for his trial attorney, each of which indicates that he requested an attorney. Goodwin asserts that this evidence is uncontroverted and allows for only one conclusion: that he invoked his right to counsel before being interrogated by Texas law enforcement officials.

Because Goodwin's claim is based on events that...