Goodwin v. Oswald

Citation462 F.2d 1237
Decision Date19 June 1972
Docket NumberDocket 72-1307.,No. 776,776
PartiesRichard GOODWIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Russell G. OSWALD, Commissioner of Correctional Services of the State of New York, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Judith A. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N. Y., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Barbara A. Shapiro, New York City (William E. Hellerstein, The Legal Aid Society, Richard A. Greenberg, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Jack Greenberg and Stanley A. Bass, New York City, on the brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and National Office for the Rights of the Indigent as amici curiae.

Before FRIENDLY, Chief Judge, and SMITH and OAKES, Circuit Judges.

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises interesting and difficult questions concerning the balance to be struck between prisoners' sixth and fourteenth amendment rights and the need to allow prison officials discretion to exclude communications they feel will endanger their institutions. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles Tenney, Judge, granted a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs, prisoner-members of the Prisoners' Labor Union at Green Haven ("the union") holding that they must be allowed to receive a letter from their attorneys containing legal advice about the formation of the union and efforts to have it officially certified, and all letters from the Legal Aid Society, in accordance with the provisions of Administrative Bulletin No. 20 (January 31, 1972) of the Department of Correctional Services. The order was not given effect, as this court granted a stay and expedited the appeal of the Commissioner of Corrections and the Superintendent of Green Haven, who claim that the court below erred in his estimate of the effect the letters would have and abused his discretion in granting preliminary relief and allowing the letters to enter the allegedly tense prison. We find error only in the extent of relief granted and modify and affirm the grant of preliminary injunction.

The case presents three basic issues: (1) whether the court was incorrect in finding, on constitutional grounds, that the officials were unjustified in withholding the letters; (2) whether it was proper to require obedience to Administrative Regulation No. 20, which sets a standard for censorship of legal mail that is more lenient than constitutionally required; and (3) whether the conditions which justify issuance of a preliminary injunction exist. We are not faced on this appeal with the question of the constitutionality or legality of unions or other organizations of prisoners, but only with the right of prisoners to receive communications from counsel whose advice has been sought on that question. We do not therefore intimate any views as to the legality, desirability, dangers or possible benefits of any type of prisoner collective bargaining on prison working conditions or of any other organized representation of prisoners.

The inmates at Green Haven, a maximum security institution at Stormville, New York, holding 1900-2000 men, began during the summer of 1971 to organize a labor union to act on their behalf in connection with conditions of labor in the prison. They contacted the Legal Aid Society's Prisoners' Rights Project for assistance in this endeavor. The Project was told, when it inquired of the Commissioner, that prisoners are not in an employee-employer relationship with the Department of Corrections and that the Department would not recognize any inmate labor organization because "it would be contrary to the best interests of the Department and of the general welfare of the prison population." In December, 1971, the Project received the signatures of approximately 800 inmates requesting the attorneys to draft a union constitution and represent them in union-related matters. The constitution was sent to the inmates; though it may have been signed and become effective, by its own terms, the union has thus far taken no action. Legal Aid also provided authorization forms to sign up new union members.

The communication which is the subject of this suit was sent by Legal Aid during the week of February 7, 1972 to all those inmates who had signed up as members of the union but to no one else. In the packet sent to each inmate the main document was a seven-page letter detailing legal steps being taken on behalf of the union and giving legal advice on a number of union matters. A copy of the letter to the Commissioner requesting recognition of the union, the union constitution, and press releases issued February 7 announcing the formation of the union and commitments of support for it by prominent individuals, were included. On February 9, the Commissioner told Legal Aid that he would deny recognition to the union; a week later he informed the Society that he had not and would not deliver the February 7 letters to the 980 addressees. Apparently, fifteen of the letters had arrived unsealed and were examined by prison officials; on the basis of this scrutiny the authorities had decided to withhold the letters. The next day, the 18th, Legal Aid filed a petition with the Public Employees Relations Board requesting certification of the union as collective bargaining agent for the prisoners. The present complaint was filed on February 23; the action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional complement 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to deliver the communications from their attorneys.

Affidavits were submitted to the court by both sides; neither requested an evidentiary hearing. The defendants argued that their action was justified because the formation of a union was against prison policy and would jeopardize their control of the institution. They interpreted the letter as a declaration that the union was "operational" and as an incitement to "concerted activity" that would present a clear and present danger of disruption to the institution. They anticipated that if the letters were delivered, and they were then obliged to burst the balloon of rising expectations by proscribing union activity, they would subject themselves to danger.

The court found that the letter was a communication of legal advice, not a call to illegal action, and that its optimism about the formation of a union was carefully hedged with cautionary instructions to obey all prison rules in the interim, which might be lengthy, before the union was certified and could negotiate with prison officials. The court held that the letter came within the "legal mail" classification of Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, sub nom. Oswald, Correction Commissioner et al. v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1190, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972), and neither violated the standards applicable to such mail nor presented a clear and present danger to the security of the institution. The court felt that the resort to legal methods of challenging the prison's refusal to countenance unions and of improving the prisoners' status was a constructive and rehabilitative rather than a dangerous move. The withholding also violated the Commissioner's own Administrative Regulation No. 20, and the court ordered that rule followed in the future.1 He held the class of all inmates proper under Rule 23(b) (2). He was not entirely clear on the issues of irreparable injury and balance of hardships.2 The only issues for this court are whether the court made clearly erroneous findings of fact or abused his discretion in ordering the warden to deliver the letters from Legal Aid and to abide by his mail regulation in the future. The court's easy characterization of the Legal Aid letter as pure legal advice may be open to question, as it was somewhat more ambiguous than that, but we hold that he was quite correct in his assessment of the appropriate legal standard and his application of it to the facts of the case.

The main letter from the Prisoners' Rights Project attorneys is addressed to "Dear Union Member" and begins by remarking on the public announcement of that day and by noting the possibility of affiliation with already existing unions. The letter goes on: "Now that your union is ready to function we have been requested to provide further legal advice as to the role it can play, how it will operate, and how to deal with problems that may arise." The letter continues with a recitation of efforts to induce the Commissioner to recognize the union as the collective bargaining agent for the inmates; if he denies it recognition, the attorneys state that they will file a petition with the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB). The letter in general and the above sentences in particular had a positive tone about the probable outcome of the PERB proceeding and the chance that the union would be functional in the relatively near future that undoubtedly seemed unwarranted and threatening to the state. The letter advised inmates that it was crucial that they obey all institutional rules during the certification process before PERB and, if necessary, in the courts.

The letter goes on to describe the issues the union would treat were it certified; certain of these paragraphs have a note, once again, of confident assumption that the recognition of the union is an event whose occurrence is quite certain rather than merely marginally possible. Most of the sentences, however, use the verb "would" rather than "will," thus keeping the tone conditional. The letter mentions the fact that the prison officials have not objected to solicitation of union members over the preceding months and presents the Project's view on why a union would serve the interests of the inmates more effectively than a liaison...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Adams v. Carlson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • August 23, 1973
    ...and his counsel which relate to the legality of either his criminal conviction or the conditions of his incarceration. Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972); Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) ; McDonough v. Director of ......
  • Rhem v. Malcolm
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • January 7, 1974
    ...constitutional rights cannot be denied on the basis of "dire predictions" not supported by the evidence. Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1244-1245 (2d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134 (S. D.N.Y.1970). Although we recognize that the Department is closest to the situation, we ......
  • Miller v. Carson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • July 17, 1975
    ...constitutional rights cannot be denied on the basis of "dire predictions" not supported by the evidence. Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1244-1245 (2d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although we recognize that the Department is closest to the situation, we ......
  • Kahane v. Carlson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • November 26, 1975
    ...demands of a 'compelling government interest.' This court expressly adopted the 'compelling interest' formula in Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2 Cir. 1972). However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions, see Procunier v. Martinez, supra, use the language of an 'important or substant......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT