Goodyear Loan Co. v. Little

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JOSLIN
• Citation: Goodyear Loan Co. v. Little, 269 A.2d 542, 107 R.I. 629 (R.I. 1970)
• Decision Date: 16 October 1970
• Docket Number: No. 948-A,948-A
• Parties: GOODYEAR LOAN COMPANY v. Francis E. LITTLE, Jr., Guardian and Norwood Motor Company.

Page 542

269 A.2d 542

107 R.I. 629

GOODYEAR LOAN COMPANY v. Francis E. LITTLE, Jr., Guardian and Norwood Motor Company.

No. 948-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 16, 1970.

[107 R.I. 631] Anthony E. Grilli, Providence, for plaintiff.

Alfred E. Bollengier, Joel D. Landry, Warwick, for Norwood Motor Co.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This is a civil action for a declaratory judgment. The amended complaint sets forth the following. On or about January 7, 1969, Joseph G. Yates, an incompetent adult over whose person and estate Francis E. Little, Jr., a defendant herein, had been appointed guardian, purchased a 1969 Chevrolet Impala motor vehicle from Norwood Motor Company. Yates borrowed the purchase price of $3,300 from the plaintiff, Goodyear Loan Company, which was not then aware of the guardianship proceedings and did not learn of them until a few months later. That knowledge prompted it to demand payment of $3,300 from both the guardian and Norwood. Both demands were refused as was Goodyear's further request that Norwood accept return of the Chevrolet Impala, which by that time was being stored by Goodyear, having been placed in its possession for safekeeping by Yates. Thereupon Goodyear, by civil action naming Norwood and the guardian as defendants, petitioned the Superior Court under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, C.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) chap. 30 of title 9, for a declaration of the rights status and legal liabilities of the parties with relation to the transactions described. Norwood moved to dismiss under Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Its motion was granted. The amended complaint as to the guardian is still pending in the Superior Court. Goodyear has appealed from the order granting Norwood's motion to dismiss.

The case involves multiple parties. In such a case an order disposing of one or more but less than all of the claims is not appealable under Rule 54(b) Super.R.Civ.P. unless when the order appealed from is entered the trial justice expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that judgment shall enter. Neither that determination nor that direction were made in this case. Ordinarily, their absence would require dismissal of the appeal but where, as here, the trial justice was not requested to make the prerequisite rulings, we remand, not to dismiss, but with direction to make the prerequisite determination and direction. Calore Rigging Corp. v. Sterling Engineering & Constr. Co., R.I., 250...