Gooley v. Moss
| Decision Date | 31 December 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-579A127,1-579A127 |
| Parties | Cathy Jean GOOLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. C. MOSS, M. D., Wayne A. Stanton, John U. Keating, M. D., Glenn H. Speckman, M. D., and Voluntary Sterilization Association of Indiana, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Kenneth C. Kern, Hart E. Meyer, Kenneth C. Kern & Associates, Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard L. Fairchild, Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellees H. C. Moss, M.D. and Glenn H. Speckman, M.D.
Franklin I. Miroff, David L. Dunlap, Ancel, Friedlander, Miroff & Ancel, P. C., Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee Wayne A. Stanton.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee John U. Keating, M.D.
Thomas A. Withrow, Henderson, Daily & Foxworthy, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee Voluntary Sterilization Association of Indiana, Inc.
Plaintiff-appellant Cathy Jean Gooley filed this action against defendants-appellees H. C. Moss, M.D., Glenn H. Speckman, M.D., John U. Keating, M.D., Wayne A. Stanton, and the Voluntary Sterilization Association of Indiana, Inc. to recover for her alleged wrongful subjection to surgery which left her incapable of bearing children. The Boone Circuit Court granted the motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment filed by the various defendants. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Cathy Gooley, who was born on May 1, 1958, was made a ward of the Marion County Department of Public Welfare by order of the Marion County Juvenile Court dated August 6, 1965, after that court found that she was a neglected child. Cathy stayed in several different foster homes during the next few years.
On February 22, 1969, Cathy was admitted to Central State Hospital, where Dr. Keating served as superintendent. A form entitled Consultation and Request for Sterilization was signed May 11, 1970, by Dr. Moss, who expressed his opinion that Cathy Gooley Dr. Speckman signed the form as consulting physician on June 15, 1970, and placed a check mark beside a paragraph which read, "I have reviewed the indications for sterilization of this patient and am satisfied they are as stated; furthermore, I am of the opinion that sterilization is justified and consistent with the indications as set forth in the bylaws of this hospital." Both Wayne A. Stanton, as Director of the Marion County Department of Public Welfare, and Cathy's natural father signed a form entitled Release and Permission for Sterilization. On June 18, 1970, Dr. Moss performed the hysterectomy.
Cathy Gooley filed this action on April 3, 1978, and asked for two million dollars in compensatory damages "on account of her physical and mental pain resulting from the destruction of her reproductive system, on account of battery during the surgery and on account of her false imprisonment." She also asked for one million dollars in punitive damages "because of the total disregard of the law by defendants in destroying her reproductive system, the unpermitted surgery, and the false imprisonment in Central State Hospital." The Boone Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Moss and Dr. Speckman and granted summary judgment in favor of Wayne Stanton, Dr. Keating, and the Voluntary Sterilization Association of Indiana, Inc.
1. Does IC 1971, 34-1-2-5 (Burns Code Ed.) extend the time in which to file a claim which is otherwise governed by IC 1971, 16-9.5-3-1 and 2 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1979)?
2. Is Cathy Gooley's action against the superintendent of Central State Hospital barred by IC 16-9.5-3-1 and 2?
3. Is Cathy Gooley's action against Dr. Moss and Dr. Speckman barred by IC 16-9.5-3-1 and 2?
4. Is Wayne Stanton personally liable for those acts and omissions with which Cathy Gooley charges him?
5. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Voluntary Sterilization Association of Indiana, Inc.?
The issues presented by this appeal require consideration of certain sections of the Medical Malpractice Act.
IC 1971, 16-9.5-1-1 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1979) offers this definition of "health care provider":
IC 16-9.5-1-1 provides these additional definitions which are relevant to the case at bar:
"(b) 'Physician' means a person with an unlimited license to practice medicine in this state under IC 25-22.5(25-22.5-1-1.1 25-22.5-9-14).
(c) 'Patient' means a natural person who receives or should have received health care from a licensed health care provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(g) 'Tort' means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.
(h) 'Malpractice' means any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient.
(i) 'Health care' means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement.
(n) 'Psychiatric hospital' means a private institution licensed under IC 16-13-2-3, and public institutions under the administrative control of the commissioner of the department of mental health as designated by IC 16-13-1-9."
Cathy Gooley contends that IC 34-1-2-5 extends the period of time in which she can file a claim which would otherwise be governed by IC 16-9.5-3-1 and 2.
IC 34-1-2-5 reads as follows:
"Any person, being under legal disabilities when the cause of action accrues, may bring his action within two (2) years after the disability is removed."
IC 16-9.5-3-1 provides:
IC 16-9.5-3-2 further explains:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of IC 1971, 16-9.5-1-7, 1 any claim by a minor or other person under legal disability against a health care provider stemming from professional services or health care rendered, whether in contract or tort, based on an alleged act, omission or neglect which occurred prior to the effective date (July 1, 1975) of this article (16-9.5-1-1 16-9.5-9-10), shall be brought only within the longer of:
(a) Two (2) years of the effective date of this article; or
(b) The period described in section 1 (16-9.5-3-1) of this chapter." (Our footnote)
Cathy Gooley relies upon City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron, (1977) Ind., 370 N.E.2d 338, in arguing that IC 34-1-2-5 prevents her lawsuit from being barred by IC 16-9.5-3-1 and 2. In Cameron IC 34-1-2-5 was considered in conjunction with a statute which at that time required that a city be given notice of a claim within sixty days of the occurrence. That statute was not a statute of limitations; it was a procedural precedent to the bringing of an action. In the case at bar, however, IC 16-9.5-3-1 and 2 are statutes of limitation and they specifically address the situation of persons who are minors or who are under some other legal disability. 2 We hold that Cathy Gooley cannot rely upon IC 34-1-2-5 for an extension of time beyond that date determined by applying IC 16-9.5-3-1 in conjunction with IC 16-9.5-3-2.
Cathy Gooley was born on May 1, 1958. She entered Central State Hospital on February 22, 1969. Dr. Keating served as superintendent of Central State Hospital from April 1, 1968, through April 30, 1974. The surgery was performed on Cathy on June 18, 1970. She filed this lawsuit on April 3, 1978.
All acts and omissions for which Cathy Gooley seeks recovery occurred at a time when she was more than six years old and at a time prior to July 1, 1975. Accordingly, Cathy Gooley was required to file her lawsuit within two years of July 1, 1975, in order to recover from any health care provider for acts or omissions encompassed by the Medical Malpractice Act. She failed to do so.
According to Cathy Gooley, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Keating because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Keating's alleged actions "in keeping her in Central State Hospital without proper authority and in permitting her to be sterilized in disregard of the statute governing sterilization of inmates of that Hospital" are encompassed by the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act.
Central State Hospital is a public institution under the administrative control of the commissioner of the department of mental health. IC 1971, 16-13-1-9 (Burns Code Ed.). Keating, as superintendent, served as the chief medical officer and general director of Central State Hospital. IC 1971, 16-14-5-8 (Burns Code Ed.). 3 In particular, IC 1971, 16-14-9-4 (Burns Code Ed.) and IC 1971, 16-14-9-20 (Burns Code...
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