Goolsby v. Derby

• Decision Date: 09 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54315,54315
• Citation: 189 N.W.2d 909
• Parties: Floyd GOOLSBY, Plaintiff, v. Zella M. DERBY, administrator of the Estate of Carl W. Derby, a/k/a W. Carl Derby, deceased, Defendant. Zella M. DERBY, administrator of the Estate of Carl W. Derby, a/k/a W. Carl Derby, deceased, Cross-Petitioner-Appellant, v. E. G. STAATS & COMPANY, Inc., Defendant to Cross-Petition-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 909

189 N.W.2d 909

Floyd GOOLSBY, Plaintiff, v. Zella M. DERBY, administrator of the Estate of Carl W. Derby, a/k/a W. Carl Derby, deceased, Defendant.

Zella M. DERBY, administrator of the Estate of Carl W. Derby, a/k/a W. Carl Derby, deceased, Cross-Petitioner-Appellant, v. E. G. STAATS & COMPANY, Inc., Defendant to Cross-Petition-Appellee.

No. 54315.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 9, 1971.

Dull, Keith & Beaver, Ottumwa, and Hugh W. Lundy, Albia, for cross-petitioner-appellant.

John N. Moreland, Ottumwa, for defendant to cross-petition-appellee.

MASON, Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's ruling sustaining the motion for directed verdict made by E. G. Staats & Company, Inc., defendant to a cross-petition, at the close of the evidence of cross-petitioner, Zella M. Derby, administrator of the estate of Carl Derby, her deceased husband. It presents the question whether this court should make an exception to the general rule now followed in Iowa that a judgment operates as a bar to relitigation of the particular facts or issues in a different cause of action only where parties to the litigation are identical or in privity.

Around 8:45 a.m. January 9, 1966, a collision occurred on U.S. Highway No. 34 approximately four and a half miles west of Albia in Monroe county between an automobile owned and operated by Stanley Van Dyke Swan in which Floyd Goolsby was riding as a passenger and an automobile owned and operated by Carl W. Derby. At the point in question highway 34 is intersected at right angles by a gravel road. Immediately before the accident Derby had been proceeding west from Albia on highway 34 followed some distance by the Swan car. At the intersection Derby left the paved highway, made a 'U' turn on the graveled road and came back onto the pavement evidently to return east to Albia. As he approached the intersection, Swan pulled to the left of the center line. The impact occurred in the south half of highway 34.

Goolsby and Swan, employees of E. G. Staats & Company, Inc., en route on a business trip for their employer at the time of the accident were both injured. Derby sustained injuries which resulted in his death within a few minutes.

Two law actions for damages grow out of the accident. The initial proceedings were instituted by Floyd Goolsby against the administrator of the Derby estate for injuries resulting from the impact. He predicated his right to recover on the theory Derby's alleged negligence as specifically set out was the proximate cause of the accident.

Derby's administrator in answer admitted some allegations, denied others and in separate divisions set forth two affirmative defenses. In one she alleged Goolsby's negligence as specified was a proximate cause of the collision, injuries and damages of which he complains. In the other, she asserted Swan's negligence in specified particulars was the sole proximate cause of the collision, injuries and damages for which Goolsby seeks recovery.

In reply Goolsby denied those allegations bearing on his negligence as a proximate cause and those in which it was asserted Swan's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

This phase of the litigation will be referred to as suit I.

The administrator filed counterclaim against Goolsby which is not involved in the issue before us. She also moved for leave to bring in E. G. Staats & Company, Inc. as a new party defendant to the estate's proposed cross-petition. Rule 33, Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was granted.

In the cross-petition the administrator alleged specific acts of negligence against Swan as a proximate cause of the collision; Swan was an employee of Staats and in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident; and his alleged negligence proximately causing the collision was imputable to the employer. In one division she sought damages for loss to her husband's estate and in another, asked indemnification or contribution against Staats.

Staats in answer to the cross-petition admitted some allegations and denied others. In amendment the company alleged as an affirmative defense specified acts of Derby's negligence asserted to be the proximate cause of the collision and his death.

The aspect of the litigation involving the issue presented by the estate's cross-petition and Staats' answer will be referred to as suit II.

At pretrial conference the estate's motion for a separate and later trial of the issues presented in suit II was sustained without resistance. Rule 186, R.C.P.

Trial to a jury in October 1967 in suit I resulted in a plaintiff's verdict of $12,643.

January 26, 1968, Staats in answer to the estate's amended cross-petition alleged return of the favorable plaintiff's verdict in suit I and that no appeal was taken and the judgment satisfied. The company also alleged that the jury by its verdict found the sole and proximate cause of the accident was Derby's negligence and therefore the administrator is estopped from pursuing further satisfaction against either Goolsby or Staats.

Derby admitted the trial and verdict in suit I, that no appeal was taken, and satisfaction of the judgment.

November 28, 1969, before trial in suit II, Staats filed 'admission of law point' admitting the negligence of Swan, if any, was chargeable to and imputable to it as his employer. Rules 127 and 128, R.C.P.

After selection of the jury and completion of the opening statements in suit II, Staats moved the court to rule that The finding made by the jury in suit I had determined the decedent, Carl Derby, negligent as a matter of law in the operation of his motor vehicle at the time and place alleged in the petition and cross-petition. Staats asserted in this motion such jury determination of Derby's negligence was the law of the case since the jury verdict necessitated a finding such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and therefore his estate could have no recovery against Staats. It further alleged the matter was res judicata, the administrator estopped from attempting to show in this proceeding her decedent's freedom from negligence and therefore, her action should be dismissed.

At some stage in the proceedings, not entirely clear from the record, it had been stipulated that the court take judicial notice of the complete file of the proceedings in suit I--Goolsby's action against the Derby estate.

The court reserved ruling until the close of cross-petitioner's evidence. At that time Staats renewed its motion asserting again by reference the ground alleged in motion made before trial and added as an additional ground the contention The evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff showed as a matter of law decedent, Carl Derby, was negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle at the time of the accident in question.

The foregoing is a fair description of the state of affairs in which we consider the administrator's assignment of errors. Summarized, she contends the trial court erred, (1) in sustaining Staats' motion for directed verdict made at the close of cross-petitioner's evidence on the ground the administrator's decedent was negligent, as a matter of law, if the court so held and (2) in directing a verdict on the ground the administrator was precluded from litigating anew in suit II the question of her decedent's negligence; she was estopped from further pursuing satisfaction from defendant, E. G. Staats & Company, Inc; and the estate was bound by the decisions of the jury in suit I finding the accident in question was proximately caused by Derby's negligence.

In giving this detailed description we have used 'a proximate cause' and 'the proximate cause' interchangeably, not by selection but in accordance with the use of the term in various portions of the pleadings and motions.

I. In connection with the estate's first assignment of error the administrator points out Staats had urged two grounds as a basis for a directed verdict--one in motion before trial and one in motion at the close of Derby's evidence. She maintains in written argument, 'it is not clear that the court's ruling is based on that portion of the motion to direct the verdict urging contributory negligence as a matter of law.' For this reason she argues this is not a case where a directed verdict resting on contributory negligence of plaintiff's decedent (Derby) is justified from a review of the evidence in the record since the most favorable construction that could be placed on the evidence from Staats' standpoint is that a jury question is generated on this issue.

The administrator's uncertainty may be predicated to some extent on the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to direct as provided in rule 118, R.C.P. We set out the rule:

'A motion, or other matter involving separate grounds or parts, shall be disposed of by separate ruling on each and not sustained generally.'

This is a portion of the Advisory Committee's comment following the rule: '* * * Both the appellate court and the parties should be entitled to know what grounds are upheld, thus shortening the later phases of the matter. No one is harmed by this.'

Trial courts would be well advised to follow the rule even though we have not, as yet, reversed any case for noncompliance.

Perhaps another reason for the administrator's expressed uncertainty is Staats' contention asserted in motions and in written argument here that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the administrator shows as a matter of law the decedent was negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident in question. Staats' contention in this regard is without merit and is neither the basis for the trial court's ruling nor our decision in this matter.

We quote from the trial court's ruling:

'It is the holding and order of this court that plaintiff, Zella M. Derby, administrator of the estate of Carl W. Derby, is now precluded from litigating anew in this suit...