Goossens v. Goossens

Citation829 N.E.2d 36
Decision Date08 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 20A03-0411-CV-509.,20A03-0411-CV-509.
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Gerard GOOSSENS, Appellant-Respondent, v. Penny GOOSSENS, Appellee-Petitioner.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Nancy A. McCaslin, McCaslin & McCaslin, Elkhart, for Appellant.

Christopher C. Crawford, Stevens Crawford Garcia & Schweinzger, Elkhart, for Appellee.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Appellant-Respondent, Gerard Goossens ("Husband"), appeals the trial court's decree in the dissolution of his marriage with Appellee-Petitioner, Penny Goossens ("Wife"). Upon appeal, Husband presents four issues, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the value the trial court assigned to a house owned by the parties was supported by the evidence;

II. Whether the trial court erred in calculating the value of the marital estate;

III. Whether the trial court should have awarded Husband post-judgment interest on the judgment the court awarded to him; and

IV. Whether the trial court erred in failing to list and distribute marital debts other than the mortgages on their real property.

We affirm.

The record reveals that the parties were married in 1993 and separated in 2000. The parties had one child, H.G. After a hearing held on October 5, 2004, the trial court on the following day entered a decree dissolving the parties' marriage.

Husband complains that the trial court erred in assigning value to the parties' house located at 818 East Jackson Boulevard in Elkhart. Wife filed a verified financial statement on September 24, 2004, wherein the value of this house was listed as $97,500. At the hearing, Wife submitted into evidence as Exhibit C the tax assessment for the Jackson Boulevard house, which also listed an assessed value of $97,500. Upon direct examination by her counsel, the following colloquy occurred:

"Q. Do you have a particular value in your mind as to what this particular piece of real estate is worth?

A. No.

Q. [Do you] [h]ave any estimate as to what your think it might be worth?

A. Ninety thousand (90,000.00).

Q. If you indicated ninety-seven thousand, five hundred (97,500), would you have any dispute over that amount?

A. No.

Q. That's what you had indicated you had thought it was worth?

A. Okay. Yeah.

Q. That's the only information you had concerning the value of that property? A. Yes.

Q. You had no additional information?

A. No." Transcript at 39.

In the dissolution decree, the trial court assigned the Jackson Boulevard house a value of $90,000, stating:

"The court finds that the value of the property located at 818 E. Jackson Blvd. is $90,000.00 (Wife's testimony) and has a mortgage balance of $33,000.00 for a net equity of $57,000.00." Appellant's Appendix at 10.

Husband now complains that the trial court's finding is contrary to the evidence.

We review the trial court's decision in ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action for an abuse of discretion. Sanjari v. Sanjari, 755 N.E.2d 1186, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Where the trial court's valuation of property is within the range of values supported by the evidence, the court does not abuse its discretion. Id. at 1191-92.

Wife argues that the trial court's finding was not an abuse of discretion in that Wife testified that she believed the Jackson Boulevard house was worth $90,000. We agree. Although the evidence presented by Wife would support a finding that the Jackson Boulevard house was worth $97,500, there was evidence that Wife believed the house to be worth $90,000. Whether or not we would have come to the same conclusion as the trial court had we been the finder of fact, the fact remains that the trial court's finding was within the range of values supported by the evidence. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning value to the Jackson Boulevard property.

Husband also argues that the trial court's calculation regarding the total value of the marital assets is erroneous. In its findings, the trial court stated:

"12. In summary, the following are the assets of the parties and the values found by the court:

                  818 E. Jackson    $57,000.00
                  50600 CR 7         28,000.00
                  1992 Toyota           100.00
                  1990 Chevy S10        100.00
                  401(k) plan         6,295.74
                  Tools               1,000.00
                                     _________
                  Total              84,500.00 "Appellant's App. at 11
                

Husband correctly notes that the correct sum of the values listed by the trial court is $92,495.74, not $84,500. We are unable to explain this difference of $7,995.74 and assume it to be a simple mathematical oversight. We are unable to agree, however, with Husband's claim that this error is not harmless because of the trial court's finding number thirteen, which reads:

"To effect an equal division, the court will grant each party $42,250.00 [i.e., half of the erroneous $84,500 total]. To accomplish that result, the court grants the husband the residence at 50600 CR 7 (net value $28,000.00), the 401(k) account ($6,295.74), the 1992 Toyota ($100.00), the 1990 Chevy S10 ($100.00), and his tools ($1,000.00) for a total of $35,495.74. The court grants the wife the residence at 818 E. Jackson Blvd (net value $57,000.00). To equalize the division of assets, the husband is granted a judgment against the wife in the sum of $10,752.13. The judgment is payable without interest at the emancipation of the child of the parties, the remarriage or death of the wife or the sale of the residence whichever first occurs." Appellant's App. at 11.

Husband argues that if the total value of the assets of the marital estate were increased, then the trial court's "equalization" of the division should be adjusted accordingly to ensure that he receives one-half of $92,495.74, the correct sum of the marital assets. According to our calculations, this is precisely what the trial court did in finding number thirteen.

Despite the erroneous sum listed in finding twelve, finding thirteen awards to Husband property worth a total of $35,495.74. To equalize the division of assets, the trial court also awarded to Husband a money judgment worth $10,752.13. Thus, Husband's total award is worth $46,247.87, an amount precisely one-half of $92,495.74, the amount Husband claims the marital estate was actually worth.1 Despite the error in finding number twelve, the trial court awarded the proper amount to Husband in finding thirteen. The error in calculation is therefore harmless.

Husband next argues that he is entitled to post-judgment interest on the "money judgment" awarded to him in finding number thirteen. Both parties rely upon cases interpreting Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-101 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1996), which provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by statute, interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at:

(1) The rate agreed upon in the original contract sued upon, which shall not exceed an annual rate of eight percent (8%) even though a higher rate of interest may properly have been charged according to the contract prior to judgment; or

(2) An annual rate of eight percent (8%) if there was no contract by the parties."

Husband, citing Tincher v. Davidson, 784 N.E.2d 551 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), claims that post-judgment interest is required on money judgments. In Tincher, the court stated that Section 101 "requires post-judgment interest from the date of the `verdict' in a jury trial or the `finding of the court' in a bench trial." Id. at 553. First, we note that Tincher was not a dissolution case but instead involved a personal injury claim. Moreover, the question at issue in Tincher was from what date should interest accrue, not whether interest was to accrue at all. Specifically, the question was whether interest was due from the date of the original jury verdict as opposed to the date of the trial court's entry of judgment upon remand following an appeal. See id. Citing Section 101, the Tincher court concluded that interest was due from the date of the original jury verdict. Id. at 553-54.

Wife claims that the decision to award post-judgment interest is within the trial court's discretion, citing Van Riper v. Keim, 437 N.E.2d 130 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). The main case relied upon by the Van Riper court was Winemiller v. Winemiller, 114 Ind. 540, 17 N.E. 123 (1888), wherein the wife was awarded the "gross sum of $2,250" as alimony in the dissolution decree, to be paid in installments. 17 N.E. at 123. To secure this obligation, the trial court further ordered that the husband "giv[e] a bond in the penal sum of $3,000, payable to the [wife], with sufficient surety conditioned for the payment of the installments, and interest thereon, as they severally became [sic] due...." Id. at 123-24. Although the husband paid the first two installments when they fell due, he refused to pay interest. Upon appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the "sole question involved [was] whether or not the deferred payments dr[e]w interest from the date of the order or decree of the court." Id. at 124. The court wrote, "The [trial] court, undoubtedly, within its discretion, could have provided by its decree that the several installments should be payable with interest. But it made no such decree." Id. The court then addressed the predecessor statute to our current Section 101, "which declare[d], in effect, that interest on judgments for money shall be at the rate of 6 per cent. from the return of the verdict or finding of the court, if there be no contract...." Id. The court stated that this statute:

"[was] not controlling when applied to a case like the present, in which specific sums of money are ordered to be paid upon the date or dates fixed by the court. That the court ordered the bond to be conditioned for the payment of the several installments, and interest thereon, does not make the installments draw interest before they become due. The obligation of the bond would only become...

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