Goppert v. Saul

• Decision Date: 05 February 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-1019
• Parties: DARYL JON GOPPERT, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

DARYL JON GOPPERT, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL,COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-1019

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

February 5, 2021

Judge Richardson / Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security finding that Plaintiff was disabled once he reached an advanced age on May 10, 2012, which granted Plaintiff supplemental security income ("SSI"), but denied Plaintiff disability insurance benefits ("DIB") because the Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), as amended, at any time through December 31, 2008, the date last insured. The case is currently pending on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Based on the Administrative Record. Docket No. 22. Plaintiff has filed an accompanying Memorandum. Docket No. 22-1. Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Docket No. 23. Plaintiff has filed a Reply. Docket No. 24.

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Based on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed his applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") on September 5, 2013, alleging that he had been disabled since August 1, 2008, due to panic attacks, memory loss, depression, PTSD, anxiety, and sleep problems. Docket No. 16, Attachment ("TR"), TR 181, 174, 199. Plaintiff's applications were denied both initially (TR 70, 71) and upon reconsideration (TR 106, 107). After the denial of his applications for benefits, Plaintiff subsequently requested (TR 7) and received (TR 31) a hearing. Plaintiff's hearing was conducted on May 27, 2015, by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Angele Pietrangelo. TR. 31. Plaintiff and vocational expert ("VE"), Chelsea Brown, appeared and testified. Id.

On August 14, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that the Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR 13. On January 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Brown issued a Report and Recommendation urging the ALJ's decision be remanded under sentence four of 42 U. S. C § 405(g). Case No. 3:16-cv-02739, Docket No. 18. On March 1, 2018, Chief District Judge Crenshaw issued an order remanding the case to the Commissioner. Case No. 3:16-cv-02739, Docket No. 19. Plaintiff subsequently received a new hearing. TR 414. Plaintiff's second hearing was conducted on May 15, 2019, by ALJ Angele Pietrangelo. Id. Plaintiff, vocational expert, Bob Hammond, and Plaintiff's wife, Rebecca Goppert, appeared and testified. Id.

On August 6, 2019, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision to Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations once he reached an advanced age on May 10, 2012. TR 406. Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2008.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. Since the alleged onset date of disability, August 1, 2008, the claimant has had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; left wrist tenosynovitis; obesity; anxiety disorder; posttraumatic stress disorder; and major depressive disorder (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. Since August 1, 2008, the claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR §§404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that since August 1, 2008, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) that is limited to lifting and carrying twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sitting for six hours in an eight- hour workday; standing and/or walking for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasional performing of all postural activities, i.e., climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; performing only simple and detailed tasks; maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace for two hours at a time for those tasks only; frequently interacting with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors; and adapting to routine workplace changes.

6. Since August 1, 2008, the claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR §§ 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was an individual closely approaching advanced age. On May 10, 2012, the claimant's age category changed to an individual of advanced age (20 CFR §§ 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (CFR §§ 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Prior to May 10, 2012, transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled" whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. Beginning on May 10, 2012, the claimant has not been able to transfer job skills to other occupations (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Prior to May 10, 2012, the date the claimant's age categorychanged, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a [sic], 416.969, and 416.969a [sic]).

11. Beginning on May 10, 2012, the date the claimant's age category changed, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform (20 CFR §§ 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).

12. The claimant was not disabled prior to May 10, 2012 but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

13. The claimant was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time through December 31, 2008, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.315(a) and 404.320(b)).

TR 397-98; 404-06

On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the hearing decision. TR 605. On August 22, 2016, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case (TR 517), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a whole, then these findings are conclusive. Id.

II. REVIEW OF THE RECORD

The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and testimonial evidence of record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties' arguments.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standard of Review

This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the record made in theadministrative hearing process. Jones v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 945 F. 2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). The purpose of this review is to determine: (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's decision, and (2) whether any legal errors were committed in the process of reaching that decision. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F. 2d 211,213 (6th Cir. 1986).

"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F. 3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999), citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" has been further quantified as "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance." Bell V. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. 3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996), citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NL.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938). The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings and inferences. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F. 2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different conclusion, the decision of the ALJ must stand if substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached. Her, 203 F. 3d at 389, citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F. 3d 270,273 (6th Cir. 1997). If the Commissioner did not consider the record as a whole, however, the Commissioner's conclusion is undermined. Hurst v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 753 F. 2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985), citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F. 2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980). In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence: (1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff's condition; (2) diagnoses and opinions of medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff's condition; and (4) Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F. 2d 361, 374 (6th Cir. 1965).

B. Proceedings at the Administrative Level

The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving his "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason...