Goral v. Dart

• Decision Date: 22 October 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 125085
• Citation: 2020 IL 125085,181 N.E.3d 736,450 Ill.Dec. 384
• Parties: Matthew GORAL et al., Appellees, v. Thomas J. DART et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2020 IL 125085
181 N.E.3d 736
450 Ill.Dec. 384

Matthew GORAL et al., Appellees,
v.
Thomas J. DART et al., Appellants.

Docket No. 125085

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed October 22, 2020.
Rehearing denied November 16, 2020

181 N.E.3d 740

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Mona Lawton, Lyle K. Henretty, and Jay Rahman, Assistant State's Attorneys, and Stephanie A. Scharf, Sara R. Marmor, and George D. Sax, Special Assistant State's Attorneys, of Scharf Banks Marmor LLC, of counsel), for appellants.

Cass Thomas Casper, of Talon Law, LLC, and Christopher Cooper, of Law Office of Christopher Cooper, Inc., both of Chicago of Chicago, for appellees.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Mark A. Flessner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson R. Griffis, Assistant Attorney General, and Benna Ruth Solomon, Deputy Corporation Counsel, of counsel), amici curiae.

OPINION

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

450 Ill.Dec. 388

¶ 1 Defendant, Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County (Sheriff), instituted employment disciplinary proceedings against plaintiffs, Matthew Goral, Kevin Badon, Michael Mendez, Milan Stojkovic, David Evans III, Frank Donis, and Lashon Shaffer, who were employed as officers for the Sheriff. The disciplinary charges against plaintiffs were filed with the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board (Merit Board) pursuant to section 3-7011 of the Counties Code (Code). 55 ILCS 5/3-7011 (West 2012). Plaintiffs filed motions with the Merit Board to dismiss the disciplinary charges against them. While the administrative proceedings were pending, plaintiffs filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Sheriff, Cook County, the Merit Board, and Toni Preckwinkle, president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners (collectively, defendants). In that lawsuit, plaintiffs asserted that the Merit Board was not legally constituted because several of its members had been appointed to and/or served terms that did not comply with the statutory requirements set forth in section 3-7002 of the Code. Id. § 3-7002. On defendants' motions, the circuit court of Cook County

181 N.E.3d 741

450 Ill.Dec. 389

dismissed plaintiffs' action on the ground that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The appellate court reversed in part, holding inter alia that, since plaintiffs had challenged the authority of the Merit Board to address the charges, the "authority" exception to the exhaustion requirement applied. See 2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 39, 436 Ill.Dec. 869, 143 N.E.3d 698. We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiffs are employees of the Cook County Sheriff whom the Sheriff charged with disciplinary infractions and placed on unpaid administrative leave pending decisions by the Merit Board. From the beginning of their disciplinary proceedings, plaintiffs have challenged the authority of the Merit Board to hear their cases on the ground that the Merit Board was illegally constituted.

¶ 4 On September 16, 2016, the Sheriff filed disciplinary complaints against plaintiffs Goral, Badon, Mendez, and Stojkovic, seeking to terminate their employment.

¶ 5 On September 23, 2016, the appellate court issued its first decision in Taylor v. Dart , 2016 IL App (1st) 143684, ¶¶ 7-8, 407 Ill.Dec. 745, 64 N.E.3d 123, which held that Taylor's termination as a Sheriff's employee was void because the Merit Board's composition was illegal on the ground that a Merit Board member (Rosales) had been appointed on an interim basis in violation of section 3-7002 of the Code ( 55 ILCS 5/3-7002 (West 2012) ).

¶ 6 The Sheriff appealed that decision, and on January 25, 2017, this court entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and decide an issue it had declined to address regarding Cook County's home-rule authority. See Taylor v. Dart , No. 121507, 412 Ill.Dec. 918, 77 N.E.3d 86 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2017) (supervisory order).

¶ 7 On February 22, 2017, the Sheriff filed a disciplinary complaint against plaintiff Evans with the Merit Board seeking his termination.

¶ 8 On May 12, 2017, the appellate court issued its second decision in Taylor v. Dart , 2017 IL App (1st) 143684-B, 414 Ill.Dec. 735, 81 N.E.3d 1. The appellate court again held that the interim appointment of Rosales violated the Code and that the termination of Taylor's employment was void because the Merit Board lacked statutory authority to issue that decision. Id. ¶¶ 37, 46. The court also addressed the home-rule issue and held that it did not alter the result in its prior ruling. Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 9 On July 20, 2017, the Sheriff suspended plaintiff Shaffer without pay and filed a disciplinary complaint with the Merit Board seeking his termination.

¶ 10 During the preliminary stages of their administrative proceedings, all plaintiffs raised arguments challenging the Merit Board's statutory authority to hear their cases, based in part on the appellate court's decision in Taylor . These challenges were raised in motions to dismiss, which the Merit Board declined to address on the ground that such motions were not authorized in its administrative rules.

¶ 11 On November 27, 2017, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Sheriff.¹ The complaint challenged the legal composition of the Merit Board and, therefore,

181 N.E.3d 742

450 Ill.Dec. 390

the Merit Board's statutory authority to address the disciplinary charges against plaintiffs.

¶ 12 After that lawsuit was filed and in response to Taylor , the legislature amended the Code provision governing Merit Board appointments. In particular, the amendment to section 3-7002 of the Code, which became effective December 8, 2017, made the following changes: (1) permitted the Sheriff to make interim appointments to the Merit Board; (2) abolished all existing terms of each member of the Merit Board; and (3) created a new schedule for staggered terms of Merit Board members. See Pub. Act 100-562, § 5 (eff. Dec. 8, 2017) (amending 55 ILCS 5/3-7002 ).

¶ 13 On December 13, 2017, the Sheriff appointed a new Merit Board. The composition of the new Merit Board included six of the seven members of the previous board but with varying terms.

¶ 14 On January 23, 2018, the Sheriff filed with the new Merit Board "amended" charges against each plaintiff. The amended charges simply restated the allegations that had been filed previously.

¶ 15 On February 26, 2018, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against defendants. That complaint, which is at issue in this appeal, challenged the legal composition of both the previous Merit Board and the new Merit Board appointed after December 8, 2017. The complaint's allegations relating to the previous Merit Board asserted that some members had been appointed to illegal interim terms; the Merit Board was composed of only five members, not the required seven members; some of the member's terms were not staggered as required by the Code; and the Merit Board's chairperson and secretary held their positions longer than permitted under the Code.

¶ 16 The complaint's allegations against the new Merit Board asserted that the prior board's lack of authority could not be "cured" by filing amended charges with a new Merit Board, the Merit Board's political composition violated the Code, the chairperson and secretary continued to hold their positions longer than permitted under the Code, the Merit Board created "fatal due process problems" by now requiring plaintiffs to pay the costs of disciplinary hearing transcripts, and the Merit Board is biased against the plaintiffs.

¶ 17 On July 26, 2018, the circuit court granted defendants' section 2-619(a)(1) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2018)) motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking relief outside the context of administrative review. The circuit court noted that the amended disciplinary charges against plaintiffs were still pending before the Merit Board. The court determined that, since the administrative proceedings were ongoing and plaintiffs could exhaust their claims for relief before the Merit Board, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's dismissal of their complaint.

¶ 18 While the appeal was pending, the Merit Board issued decisions on the charges against Shaffer and Evans. In an order dated December 14, 2018, the Merit Board found that Shaffer should be separated from the Cook County Sheriff's Office, effective July 25, 2017. The Merit Board found in favor of Evans and ordered that he be reinstated, effective...