Gordon v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Gordon)

Decision Date20 February 2014
Docket Number12–1143.,Nos. 12–1140,s. 12–1140
Citation743 F.3d 720
PartiesIn re Edward Leon GORDON; Doris Jean Gordon, Debtors. Edward Leon Gordon; Doris Jean Gordon, Appellants, v. Bank of America, N.A., Appellee. In re Stephen Lindsey Pahs, Debtor. Stephen Lindsey Pahs, Appellant, v. Douglas B. Kiel, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stephen E. Berken, Law Offices of Stephen E. Berken (Thomas M. Mathiowetz, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado for Appellants.

Danielle Spinelli, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C. (Deanna L. Westfall and Britney Beall–Eder, Castle Stawiarski LLC, Denver, Colorado, and Craig Goldblatt, Shivaprasad Nagaraj, and Allison Hester–Haddad, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief) for Appellees.

Before GORSUCH, EBEL and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

In these consolidated appeals from two Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, Debtorschallenge the district court's order reversing confirmation of their reorganization plans and remanding their cases to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider these appeals, we dismiss them.

I. BACKGROUND

In two separate bankruptcy proceedings, Debtors Doris and Edward Gordon and Stephen Pahs sought Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. That court requires Chapter 13 debtors, when they file their plans for reorganization, to use the court's model Chapter 13 plan. See L.B.R. 3015–1.1. In this case, although Debtors used the model plan, they modified it. The bankruptcy court confirmed Debtors' modified plans.

On appeal, however, the district court held that Debtors could not modify the plan and, therefore, reversed confirmation of Debtors' plans and remanded these cases to the bankruptcy court “for the entry of plan confirmation orders and any related orders consistent with [the district court's] opinion.” (Aplt.App. at 405.) Debtors appeal that determination to this court.

II. PAHS' APPEAL NO. 12–1143 IS MOOT

After Pahs filed his appeal with this court, he and the Chapter 13 trustee agreed, during a hearing before the bankruptcy court, that Pahs would continue to make the payments required by the originally confirmed Chapter 13 plan while this appeal remained pending. When Pahs failed to make those payments, however, one of his creditors moved for the dismissal of Pahs' bankruptcy. See11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6). After no one objected to the motion, the bankruptcy court granted it, dismissing Pahs' bankruptcy and undoing any action taken during the bankruptcy proceedings. In light of that dismissal, this court can no longer grant Pahs any relief and his appeal is, therefore, moot. See Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir.2013), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 164, 187 L.Ed.2d 41 (2013). For that reason, we dismiss Pahs' appeal and remand his case to the district court with directions for that court to vacate its decision as moot to the extent it addressed Pahs' confirmation plan. We further direct the district court then to remand the case to the bankruptcy court so that that court, too, can vacate its decision regarding Pahs' modification of the model plan. See Dais–Naid, Inc. v. Phoenix Res. Cos. (In re Tex. Int'l Corp.), 974 F.2d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (applying, e.g., United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950)); see also Camreta v. Greene, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2035, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011).

III. WE LACK JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE GORDONS' APPEAL, NO. 12–1140

Because the Gordons' bankruptcy case remains pending, their appeal is not moot. But we, nevertheless, have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal because it is not taken from a final appealable decision and the parties have not invoked any mechanism that might permit an interlocutory appeal.1

As a starting point, the district court had jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), to consider Bank of America's appeal from the bankruptcy court's order confirming the Gordons' plan. Section 158(a)(1) gives a district court jurisdiction to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts' “final judgments, orders, and decrees.” The bankruptcy court's order confirming the Gordons' reorganization plan was such a final, appealable order. See Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1268–69 (10th Cir.2012). “Indeed, in the world of bankruptcy proceedings—a world where cases continue on in many ways for many years and lack the usual final judgment of a criminal or traditional civil matter—confirmation of [a] ... plan ‘is as close to the final order as any the bankruptcy judge enters.’ Id. (quoting Interwest Bus. Equip., Inc. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Interwest Bus. Equip., Inc.), 23 F.3d 311, 315 (10th Cir.1994)).

28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) similarly gives this court jurisdiction to hear appeals from “all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by the district court in appeals taken from a bankruptcy court. (Emphasis added.) But, because the district court's order which the Gordons challenge on appeal reversed confirmation of their reorganization plan and remanded their case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings, the district court's order was not a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).

As a general rule, when a district court remands a case to the bankruptcy court for “significant further proceedings,” that order is not final and appealable to this court. HealthTrio, Inc. v. Centennial River Corp. (In re HealthTrio, Inc.), 653 F.3d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir.2011); see also Strong v. W. United Life Assurance Co. (In re Tri–Valley Distrib., Inc.), 533 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir.2008) (per curiam). On the other hand, when the district court remands a case to the bankruptcy court for a “purely ministerial function,” such as entering judgment for a party, or to “conduct additional proceedings involving little judicial discretion,” that will not preclude the district court's decision from being final and appealable to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). Colo. Judicial Dep't v. Sweeney (In re Sweeney), 492 F.3d 1189, 1190–91 (10th Cir.2007); Balcor Pension Investors V v. Wiston XXIV Ltd. P'ship (In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. P'ship), 988 F.2d 1012, 1013 (10th Cir.1993).

Here, the district court remanded the Gordons' case to the bankruptcy court “for the entry of plan confirmation orders and any related orders.” (Aplt.App. at 405.) Although the district court's decision requires the Gordons, in proposing a new reorganization plan, to use the model Chapter 13 plan without modification, they would be free to revise the substantive portion of their plan. And, in any event, the bankruptcy court will have to give creditors notice of the new amended plan, permit time for any objections, and then conduct another confirmation hearing. All of which is to say, the district court remanded the Gordons' case to the bankruptcy court for “significant further proceedings,” In re HealthTrio, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1159.

We reached a similar conclusion in Simons v. F.D.I.C. (In re Simons), 908 F.2d 643 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam). In Simons, we held that a district court's decision, affirming the bankruptcy court's order rejecting confirmation of a reorganization plan and remanding the case to the bankruptcy court in order to enable debtors to seek confirmation of a new plan, was not a final decision appealable under § 158(d)(1). In re Simons, 908 F.2d at 644–45.Simons noted that its conclusion

is entirely consistent with two general principles regarding finality well-settled in this circuit, i.e., (1) an order is not final unless it ends the litigation on the merits, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment, and (2) a district court order is not final if it contemplates significant further proceedings in the bankruptcy court.

Id. (citation omitted). [S]o long as the bankruptcy proceeding itself has not been terminated, the debtor, unsuccessful with one reorganization plan, may always propose another plan for the bankruptcy court to review for confirmation, a prospect which negates any determination of finality under both principles cited above.” Id. at 645 (citations omitted). [T]he rejection of debtors' proposed plan may yet be considered on appeal from a final judgment either confirming an alternative plan, or dismissing the underlying petition or proceeding.” Id. (citations omitted).

The parties concede that, under Simons, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. But they argue that this court should overrule Simons because it “is incorrectly decided and in conflict with the law of other circuits.” (Aple. Juris. Br. at 1.) This panel, however, cannot overrule Simons. See Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir.2013). 2

The parties argue that it would be a waste of judicial resources for this court not to hear the merits of their appeals now. However, this court “cannot take jurisdiction where none is to be had.” S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Leavitt, 564 F.3d 1198, 1209 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted). Debtors could have sought this court's immediate review of the district court's interlocutory remand order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 252, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1268. However, the Gordons did not seek § 1292 certification and we cannot certify on our own. See In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1268 (in dicta, rejecting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as a source of appellate jurisdiction because the parties did not invoke that procedure); Crossingham Trust v. Baines (In re Baines), 528 F.3d 806, 809 n. 2 (10th Cir.2008) (same).

The parties now request that, if this court dismisses this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we remand this case to the district court so the parties can seek...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • In re Anderson, 17-3073
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • February 26, 2019
    ...particular, would not have been final. See, e.g., In re Rockford Products Corp ., 741 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2013) ; In re Gordon , 743 F.3d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 2014). But when an interlocutory decision by a bankruptcy judge is reversed by a ruling that leaves no more work for either the b......
  • Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard)
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • May 14, 2014
    ...new plan. “Nothing about these tasks is mechanical or ministerial....” Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 859; see also Gordon v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Gordon), 743 F.3d 720, 723 (10th Cir.2014) (“[T]he bankruptcy court will have to give creditors notice of the new amended plan, permit time for any ob......
  • In re Ronald Lloyd Robbins Tori Dawn Robbins
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Wyoming
    • July 14, 2014
    ...make required payments, such that his bankruptcy was dismissed and any action taken during the bankruptcy proceeding was undone.)(See 743 F.3d 720 (2014)). 3. § 1322(a). 4. § 1322(b). 5. Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (Apr. 20, 2005). 6. Butcher citing, In re Williams, 385 B.R. 468, 473 (Bankr......
  • Neidich v. Salas
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • April 17, 2015
    ...See In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir.2001) ; Belda v. Marshall, 416 F.3d 618, 620–21 (7th Cir.2005) ; In re Gordon, 743 F.3d 720, 722 (10th Cir.2014) ; Melo v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 496 B.R. 253, 256 (1st Cir. BAP 2013) ; In re Spencer, 301 B.R. 730, 733 (8th Cir. BAP 2003).The truste......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT