Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 66-C-9-H.,66-C-9-H.
• Citation: 268 F. Supp. 210
• Parties: William J. GORDON, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

268 F. Supp. 210

William J. GORDON, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

No. 66-C-9-H.

United States District Court W. D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.

March 24, 1967.

J. Sloan Kuykendall, Douglas M. Swift, Jr., Kuykendall & Whiting, Winchester, Va., for plaintiff.

W. Glen Harlan, Gambrell, Harlan, Russell & Moye, Atlanta, Ga., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., E. Milton Farley, III, Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, Va., for defendant.

OPINION

MICHIE, District Judge.

William J. Gordon was formerly a pilot for Eastern Airlines. On April 12, 1963 he was discharged as a result, according to the letter which terminated his employment, of his "overall employment record and lack of responsibility as an employee." One of the things that brought about the investigation by Eastern Airlines which resulted in Gordon's discharge was his handling of Flight 526 of April 4, 1963 at a Philadelphia airport. He now asks this Court to reinstate him without loss of seniority and with the benefit of back pay from the date of his discharge. Defendant Eastern Airlines has moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, among other things, the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint shows on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations.

A brief examination of the facts surrounding plaintiff's discharge reveals that shortly after receiving his letter of discharge, plaintiff filed a grievance under § 29 of the Agreement between Eastern Airlines and the Air Lines Pilots Association International. Two preliminary hearings were then held but neither resulted in reinstatement. Gordon appealed to the Eastern Air Lines Pilots' System Board of Adjustment where the majority decision of a three member board was delivered on November 25, 1963. The decision upheld Gordon's discharge for reasons set forth as follows:

Due to the over-all employment record and lack of responsibility as an employee, it is the majority opinion of the Board to uphold the discharge of W. J. Gordon.

The primary reasons for the Board's decision is (sic) based on the employee's sub-standard record (rather than his flying record), which the employee himself recognized by signing a resignation in 1955, and his subsequent failure to improve to the necessary standards.

The lone dissenter, in a letter dated December 2, 1963, objected to the majority decision because he thought it resulted from two unexpressed and actual reasons —the main one of which, according to the dissenter, was Captain Gordon's general appearance and demeanor as observed during the course of the hearings following his discharge.

The essence of plaintiff's complaint apparently is that any misconduct on his part which the Board could consider was not serious enough to justify his dismissal. He also claims that certain alleged irregularities in the administrative procedure—the improper admission of his past employment record and the failure to advise him of his right to counsel in the original hearing on his discharge—were tantamount to a denial of due process.

The pivotal issue upon which this case turns is whether the two year statute of limitations provision or the requirement that decisions of Boards of Adjustment be "final and binding", both contained in Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. Section 153), apply to the Airlines System Boards of Adjustment. If these provisions are applicable to the airlines system boards as they are to the NRAB (National Railway Adjustment Board), not only will the two year statute of limitations preclude the bringing of the instant action but case law concerning the finality of board decisions, growing primarily out of railroad litigation, will dictate a refusal of review by this Court except for an examination of Gordon's due process allegation.

If isolated and read superficially, § 201 of the Railway Labor Act (hereinafter 45 U.S.C. § 181) would indicate that § 3 of the same Act (45 U.S.C. § 153) should not be construed as having any effect on minor labor disputes, like this, which arise in the airlines industry. However, when § 181 is read in the light of the expressed and implied intent of the entire Railway Labor Act (the intent to minimize interruption in the nation's rail and air transportation services caused by strikes and labor disputes) and in the light of the Act's legislative history, the meaning of § 181 takes on a somewhat different perspective. See Intern. Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 685-696, 83 S.Ct. 956, 10 L.Ed.2d 702 (1963) for a general discussion of the intent and history of the Railway Labor Act.

The opening portion of § 181 reads as follows:

All of the provisions of Sections 151, 152, and 154-163 of this title are extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce * * *

It will be noted that § 153, which established the National Railroad Adjustment Board, was not made applicable to air carriers expressly by § 181. But § 184 of Title 45, enacted as part of the same bill, specifically provides for systems, groups or regional boards of adjustment for air carriers with express authority to enforce §§ 151-163 which, of course, includes § 153.

Plaintiff argues that by not including § 153 in the above-quoted enumeration of provisions in § 181, Congress intended that § 153 should not apply to the airline industry. Defendant contends that numerous decisions have held or assumed, because of the unity of purpose in the Railway Labor Act with respect to both the National Railway Adjustment Board and the Airlines System Boards of Adjustment that the Airlines System Boards are the equivalent of the Railway Adjustment Board for all material purposes. If the latter contention is correct, then it would be reasonable to apply § 153's statute of limitations provision § 153(r) and finality provision § 153(m) & (p) to decisions of the Airlines System Board of Adjustment.

From an examination of the case authority cited by the parties, it appears that defendant's position, while not completely unassailable, is more persuasive. The 1966 amendment to the Railway Labor Act (P.L. 89-456, 80 Stat. 208), if anything, strengthens his position. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1966) discussing the amendment and how it restrains the scope of judicial review. Not only would the stated purpose of settling disputes in the airlines industry in a prompt and orderly manner be severely hampered by not applying most of the provisions of § 153 to these disputes, but refusal to make such an application would be a refusal to recognize why § 153 was not originally extended to airlines. As I read the Railway Act and the judicial decisions construing it, this initial omission of § 153 in 1936 was merely to postpone the establishment of a National Air Transport Adjustment Board while the airlines industry grew. It was not intended to provide an...