Gordon v. Feldman

• Citation: 325 A.2d 247,164 Conn. 554
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 04 April 1973
• Parties: Gail S. GORDON et al. v. Herbert FELDMAN et al.

Page 247

325 A.2d 247

164 Conn. 554

Gail S. GORDON et al. v. Herbert FELDMAN et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

April 4, 1973.

Francis A. Smith, Jr., Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, were Edward M. Sheehy, Bridgeport and Louis M. Altman, Stamford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

William F. Gallagher, New Haven, with whom was John R. McGrail, New Haven, for the appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff Gail S. Gordon, while seated in the defendants' sailboat, suffered personal injury when the boat's center-board fell on her hand. She and her mother brought suit against the defendants charging them with negligence and seeking to recover damages. The case was tried to a jury in the Superior Court where, on March 23, 1971, a verdict was returned for the defendants. On the same day the plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the verdict. On July 12, 1971, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a mistrial on the claim that the motion to set aside the verdict had not been 'argued or decided during the session of court in which the trial was held or the next session but one. Therefore, the court has lost jurisdiction to decide the matter.' On the same date, they also filed a motion claiming to be entitled to a new trial for the same reason as given in their motion for a mistrial. Both motions of July 12, 1971, were denied by the court on August 12, 1971. On August 26, 1971, the court rendered judgment for the defendants based on its denial of the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict. The judgment also included reference to the court's denial of the plaintiffs' motions for a mistrial and for a new trial. From that judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.

The plaintiffs' assignments of error include claims that the court erred in rendering judgment after the time limited by § 51-29 of the General Statutes had expired; in denying their motions; in making a limited finding when the time limited by §§ 51-29 and 52-231 had expired; and in finding that 'at no time between March 23, 1971, and July 9, 1971, did counsel request that the motion (to set the verdict aside) be assigned for argument.'

The basic issue on this appeal is whether the court erred in rendering judgment on the verdict for the defendants in violation of the time limitation imposed by General Statutes § 51-29. The statute provides: 'Any judge of the superior court or the court of common pleas, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and render judgment after the expiration of the term or session of the court at which such trial was commenced; but such trial shall be ended and judgment rendered therein before the close of the next term or session.'

The statute was recently interpreted in Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 532, 536, 294 A.2d 573, 575, in which we reaffirmed the decision of this court in Hurlbutt v. Hatheway, 139 Conn. 258, 263, 93 A.2d 161. 'The proper interpretation of General Statutes § 51-29 requires a judge to decide a case before the end of the session of the court next succeeding the session at which it is tried and a judgment, . . . rendered after that time, is erroneous absent a waiver or consent by the parties.' (Emphasis added.) Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. The purpose of the statute and a review of the cases in which the statute has been before this court lead to the conclusion that § 51-29 does not apply to jury cases. The statute was designated to ensure that, in a case tried to the court, the judge consider and decide the controversy expeditiously and within a reasonably brief period after trial. The sanction imposed on a judgment rendered beyond the time limitations set by § 51-29 is that a party may avoid the judgment and move that the case be reassigned for trial. In Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals,supra, 538, 294 A.2d 573, and in Spelke v. Shaw, 117 Conn. 639, 646, 169 A. 787, we observed that, as a practical matter, there is nothing that counsel can do to require the trial judge to comply with the statute. In a case tried to the court, the most that can reasonably be required of counsel is objection seasonably made after the filing of the court's decision. Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. The salutary effect of the statute is to compel diligence and a prompt decision on the part of the judge who tried the case, and to avoid the manifest disadvantages attendant on long delay in rendering judgment. On the other hand, however, judicial economy dictates that the parties will be deemed to have consented to the delay if they fail to take timely and appropriate advantage of it. See Borden v. Westport, 112 Conn. 152, 154, 151 A. 512. Thus the statute, as have have construed it, attempts to balance judicial expediency with fairness to the parties and to reduce delays over which counsel have little, if any, control. Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 537, 294 A.2d 573; Hurlbutt v. Hatheway, supra; Spelke v. Shaw, supra, 644, 169 A. 787; see also Dime Savings Bank v. Pomeranz, 123 Conn. 581, 583-584, 196 A. 634; Cheshire Brass Co. v. Wilson, 86 Conn. 551, 560, 86 A. 26.

The fact that all the cases previously decided under § 51-29 have been court cases does not mean merely that the case before us, which was tried to a jury, is one of first impression. The absence of such a precedent may be easily explained, because an entirely different situation obtains in a case, such as the one before us which was tried to a jury. Procedurally, there are available to counsel for the prevailing and losing sides opportunities to secure or to delay judgment on the verdict. See Practice Book §§ 254, 255 and Form 252. Section 258 of the Practice Book provides that the court shall render judgment on the verdict unless the verdict is set aside. Thus, unless the motion is granted, judgment will be rendered on the verdict as a matter of course. Tough v. Ives, 159 Conn. 605, 606, 268 A.2d...