Gordon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

Decision Date03 January 2022
Docket Number5:21-cv-1097
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
PartiesDAVID W. GORDON, SR., PLAINTIFF, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., et al., DEFENDANTS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND

SARA LIOI, JUDGE.

Before the Court is the report and recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Carmen E Henderson, recommending that the Court grant the motion of plaintiff David Gordon, Sr. (Gordon) to remand this matter to state court. (Doc. No. 123 (R&R); see Doc. No. 13 (Motion to Remand [“MTR”]); Doc. No. 43 (MTR Opposition); Doc. No 68 (MTR Reply).) Defendants, The Hallstar Company and Hallstar Ester Solutions Company (collectively “Hallstar[1], separately “Hallstar Co.” and Hallstar Ester), filed timely objections to the magistrate judge's R&R (Doc. No 125), and Gordon filed a response to the objections (Doc. No. 126).

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602- 03 (6th Cir. 2001), this Court has made a de novo determination of the matters objected to in the magistrate judge's R&R. For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules the objections, accepts the R&R, and grants the motion to remand.

I. Background

On May 21, 2021, Gordon filed the present action in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against Hallstar and twenty other corporations and entities, raising state law tort claims related to Gordon's alleged exposure to asbestos during his employment with defendant Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) in Akron, Ohio and Houston, Texas. (Doc. No. 1-1 (Complaint).) On May 27, 2021, Hallstar removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1 (Notice of Removal) at 1.) In its notice, Hallstar averred that [t]his Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and [p]laintiff and Hallstar are completely diverse.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2 ¶ 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b)(2)).) It further represented that, at the time of removal, there was complete diversity because: (1) Gordon filed the case in Ohio and is an Ohio Citizen, (2) Hallstar Co. is an Illinois corporation, (3) Hallstar Ester is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, and (4) “any [defendant who is a citizen of Ohio has not been served and joined-Hallstar is informed of the lack of service on such [defendants at the time of removal from a contemporaneous review of the Summit County Clerk's docket-and/or the [c]omplaint fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted against such [defendants.” (Id. 3-4 ¶ 6(b)(iv).)

The Court referred this matter to the magistrate judge for general pretrial supervision and the preparation of R&Rs on any dispositive motion. (Doc. No. 117 (Order or Referral).) On June 7, 2021, Gordon filed the present motion to remand, arguing that diversity jurisdiction was lacking owing to the fact that at least eleven defendants were Ohio residents and further arguing (with supporting documentation) that at least three Ohio defendants were served on May 25, 2021 prior to removal. (Doc. No. 13 at 3; see Doc. No. 13-2 (Affidavit of Brennan T. Osborn) at 2 ¶ 3, see also Id. at 3, 4.) Alternatively, Gordon suggested that Hallstar's attempt to quickly remove this action before any Ohio defendant could be served represented gamesmanship and should be rejected as a “snap removal.” (Doc. No. 13 at 3.) The motion sought remand to state court but did not request an award of attorneys' fees. (Id. at 6.)

In opposition to remand, Hallstar argued that it was unaware at the time of removal that any Ohio defendant had been served because the May 25, 2021 service of three of the Ohio defendants was not docketed by the state court until May 28, 2021. (Doc. No. 43 at 2; see Doc. No. 43-1 (Affidavit of Nathan F. Studeny) at 2 ¶¶ 5-6.) Hallstar insisted that it was justified in removing this action because it was unclear from the face of the complaint whether any defendants were Ohio residents and because, at the time of removal, Hallstar held “a good faith understanding that no other Ohio [defendant had been served[.] (Doc. No. 43 at 1, 3.)

On August 25, 2021, the magistrate judge issued her R&R recommending that the Court grant the motion to remand because there was a lack of complete diversity. At the outset, the magistrate judge rejected Hallstar's argument that it was unclear from the complaint that numerous defendants were Ohio residents. (Doc. No. 123 at 4-5.) She further inferred that Hallstar should have been aware that at least one defendant-Goodyear-was an Ohio resident as it is well-known that the corporation was founded and headquartered in Akron, Ohio. (Id. at 5.) She observed that [i]n fact, it is more likely that Hallstar was fully aware that certain defendants are Ohio corporations, but swiftly removed the matter in an effort to take advantage of the ‘properly joined and served' language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) prior to service on any forum defendants.” (Id.) Nevertheless, because the magistrate judge determined that several forum defendants had, indeed, been served prior to removal, she did not reach the question of whether the removal was impermissible as a “snap removal.”[2] (Id. at 6.)

II. Standard of Review

When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on a dispositive matter, the district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and recommendation to which a proper objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”); Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d 1499 (Table), 1994 WL 532926, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (“Any report and recommendation by a magistrate judge that is dispositive of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo review by the district court in light of specific objections filed by any party.”). After review, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).

A general objection-[a]n ‘objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before”-is not considered a proper objection for the district court's de novo review. Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also LR 72.3(b) (stating that any objecting party shall file “written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections[ ]). A general objection to an R&R has the same effect as a failure to object: a general objection waives de novo review by the district court and appellate review of the district court's decision. Aldrich, 327 F.Supp.2d at 747-48.

III. Objections

This Court has original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75, 000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996); Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 1999). The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that there was complete diversity at the time of removal. Coyne, 183 F.3d at 492; see also Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 948-49 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The burden to establish federal jurisdiction in this case is clearly upon the defendants as the removing party.”) (citing Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1993)).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), cases originally filed in state court must be remanded if, at any time before trial, it appears that the federal court to which they were removed lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 913 (6th Cir. 2007); see Coyne, 183 F.3d at 493 ([I]n a removed action, upon determination that a federal court lacks jurisdiction, remand to state court is mandatory[.]). Because the determination of federal diversity jurisdiction is made at the time of removal, Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1996), a court's ruling on a motion to remand will rest on whether the case was properly removed to federal court in the first place. Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871-72 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Ahearn, 100 F.3d at 453). Additionally, “because they implicate federalism concerns, removal statutes are to be narrowly construed.” Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)); see also Coyne, 193 F.3d at 493 (“All doubts as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.”) (citation omitted).

Hallstar does not specifically object to the magistrate judge's recommendation that this action be remanded to state court due to the lack of diversity and, in fact, concedes that “information that came after removal apparently showed that three forum defendants turned out to be served prior to removal[.] (Doc. No. 125 at 6.) Because the record is clear that complete diversity was lacking at the time of removal, and Hallstar has not suggested that the forum defendants were fraudulently joined, the Court accepts the magistrate judge's recommended disposition of plaintiff s motion and will remand this...

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