Gordon v. Jones
| Decision Date | 08 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-04-00656-CV.,01-04-00656-CV. |
| Citation | 196 S.W.3d 376 |
| Parties | Ronald X. GORDON, Appellant, v. Mildred JONES and James Albro, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ronald X. Gordon, The Woodlands, pro se.
Mildred Jones, Kendleton, pro se.
Charles R. Slone, Richmond, for Appellees.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices ALCALA and BLAND.
Appellant, Ronald X. Gordon, appeals pro se to challenge dismissal with prejudice of his claims against appellees, Mildred Jones and James Albro, in response to Albro's motion. Appellant's five points of error present the following two issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice based on Albro's contention that a different court had acquired dominant jurisdiction over appellant's claims and (2) whether the trial court erred by not filing findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree that the trial court erred by dismissing appellant's cause with prejudice. Because that issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not address appellant's second issue. We reverse and remand.
Quinn E. Gordon (appellant's father's cousin) died testate in 1981. His estate consisted of approximately 26 acres of land, and his will devised one acre of this land to Burton Gordon, who is appellant's deceased father (father). When father's cousin's will was probated in Wharton County, the application for probate stated that father's cousin was a resident of Wharton County, and that the location of the 26 acres was in Wharton County. Appellant's father died on December 22, 1988, about eight years after father's cousin's will was probated. Father died intestate, and appellant survived him.
On August 13, 2001, in Fort Bend County Court at Law No. 1 (county court), appellant filed an application to determine the heirships of his father's and father's cousin's estates. Appellant's pleadings alleged that he was the sole heir of father, who was the sole heir of father's cousin, and further alleged that father's cousin's will had been fraudulently probated because the application for probate of the will misrepresented that father's cousin's principle residence and the 26 acres were located in Wharton County, when they are actually in Fort Bend County. On May 3, 2002, the county court dismissed appellant's applications to determine heirship for want of jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, on May 21, 2002, appellant filed a petition to reopen father's cousin's 1981 probate case in Wharton County.
Less than a week after the county court dismissed appellant's applications to determine heirship, appellant filed a trespass-to-try-title action in the 400th Judicial District of Fort Bend County, which is the trial court from which this appeal arises. In addition to allegations to quiet title to the Fort Bend County land, appellant's pleadings in the trial court also allege fraud and attorney misconduct related to the probate of father's cousin's will. Albro's May 20, 2002 answer includes a general denial to appellant's claims and a request that appellant take nothing on those claims.1 On June 25, 2002, however, Albro moved to abate the trial-court litigation pending outcome of (1) appellant's appeal of the county court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and (2) appellant's petition to reopen the 1981 probate case in Wharton County. The record before us shows no ruling by the trial court on Albro's motion to abate.
On June 19, 2002, appellant perfected an appeal to this Court to challenge the county court's May 3, 2002 dismissal, for want of jurisdiction, of appellant's application to determine his father's heirship.2 See Gordon v. Albro, No. 01-02-000681-CV, slip op. at 3 & n. 2, 2003 WL 2002543, at *1 & n. 2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 2003, no pet.).3 This Court's May 1, 2003 opinion states that although appellant's assertions of fraud and attorney misconduct were improper in an heirship determination, that impropriety "did not divest the [county court] of subject matter jurisdiction." Id., slip op. at 6; 2003 WL 2002543 at *2. Accordingly, "the Fort Bend County Court improperly held that it lacked jurisdiction over [appellant's] claims." Id.
After our May 3, 2003 opinion issued, appellant continued the county-court litigation on remand. Having previously filed the trespass-to-try-title action and related claims in the trial court, appellant proceeded in county court solely on the determination-of-heirship proceeding. The county court tried appellant's application to determine his father's heirship on December 16, 2002 and, on January 21, 2003, signed an amended judgment that disposed of the disputed property and awarded appellant 100% of his father's real and personal property.
On November 12, 2003, while appellant's county-court litigation was proceeding, but not yet tried, Albro filed a motion in the trial court in which he requested that the trespass-to-try title action and pending claims be transferred to the county court because the two matters referred to in his earlier motion to abate had been resolved: specifically, appellant had succeeded in his appeal of the county-court dismissal, and his suit to reopen the 1981 probate case in Wharton County had been dismissed. Albro further stated that the county court had "jurisdiction to hear and resolve all matters involved in these pending proceedings with one trial."
On November 25, the trial court reset Albro's motion to transfer to December 15, 2003. This date was one day before the trial date set for appellant's county-court case. On December 12, 2003, however, Albro filed a "Motion to Pass Scheduled Hearing." In this motion, Albro alleged that he and appellant had "agreed to proceed with" the heirship determination in county-court "without the requested transfer of the case."
On February 5, 2004, after the county-court litigation had proceeded to judgment, Albro moved to dismiss the pending litigation in the trial court on the grounds that the county-court judgment had left "nothing . . . to litigate." Albro argued that the parties had resolved claims of title "to the same land" in the probate litigation in county court, which awarded "title to the same land." Albro's motion did not address appellant's related claims of fraud and attorney misconduct.
One week later, on February 12, 2004, Albro filed an additional motion to dismiss appellant's lawsuit. In this motion, Albro argued, for the first time, that dismissal was appropriate because the county court, which had already rendered judgment, had "dominant jurisdiction" over appellant's lawsuit. On February 27, 2004, the trial court granted the motion and ordered appellant's cause of action "dismissed with prejudice." The trial court's order states that Albro's motion "should be granted" because (1) the trial court and the county court had "concurrent jurisdiction," (2) the county-court action was filed first, and (3) the county court had "dominant jurisdiction." Although nothing in the record before us shows that Albro requested dismissal "with prejudice," the trial court nonetheless rendered that ruling.
Until the trial court dismissed appellant's claims with prejudice, Albro took the following positions, through the following filings, with respect to appellant's trespass-to-try-title action and its related claims for fraud and attorney misconduct:
(1) General Denial on the Merits: May 20, 2002.
(2) Motion to Abate: On June 25, 2002, Albro moved to abate the litigation pending outcome of (a) appellant's challenge to the county-court's dismissal and (b) appellant's petition to reopen the 1981 probate case in Wharton County.
(3) Motion to Transfer to County Court: On November 12, 2003, after this Court issued its May 1, 2003 opinion, but before the county court tried the heirship determination, Albro moved to transfer appellant's claims to the county court, which, Albro contended, had "jurisdiction to hear and resolve all matters involved in these pending proceedings with one trial." Albro also stated that appellant's claims to reopen the 1981 probate in Wharton County had been dismissed. A hearing was set on this motion for December 15, 2003, the day before the county-court trial setting.
(4) Motion to Pass [December 15, 2003 Hearing on Motion to Transfer to County Court]: Three days before the hearing set for the motion to transfer, Albro moved to pass the hearing on the grounds that he and appellant had "agreed to proceed with" the heirship determination in county court "without the requested transfer of the case" and thus without transfer of appellant's trespass-to-try-title claims and related claims for fraud and misconduct;
(5) Motion to Dismiss on the Merits: On February 5, 2004, after the county court issued its January 21, 2003 judgment, Albro moved to dismiss appellant's claims on the grounds that the county-court probate litigation had resolved title and left "nothing . . . to litigate."
(6) Motion to Dismiss—Dominant Jurisdiction: On February 12, 2004, Albro amended the motion to dismiss by claiming that the county court had dominant jurisdiction over all of appellant's claims.
In his first issue for review, appellant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice on dominant-jurisdiction grounds because the ruling precludes any trial of appellant's fraud and misconduct claims in the heirship proceeding. Analysis of appellant's issue requires that we...
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