Gordon v. Justice Court

Citation12 Cal.3d 323,525 P.2d 72,115 Cal.Rptr. 632
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date14 August 1974
Parties, 525 P.2d 72, 71 A.L.R.3d 551 Lewis GORDON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The JUSTICE COURT FOR the YUBA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SUTTER COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Sac. 7995.

Burton D. Fretz, Santa Maria, William D. Farber, Burton Danziger, Jr., Al H. Meyerhoff, Edgar A. Kerry, Marysville, James D. Lorenz, San Francisco, Philip J. Jimenez and Charlotte M. Fischman, Santa Maria, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Marshall J. Hartman and Nancy E. Goldberg, Chicago, Ill., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James and Doris H. Maier, Asst. Attys. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Nelson P. Kempsky, and Charles P. Just, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and respondents and for real party in interest and respondent.

BURKE, Acting Presiding Justice.

We are confronted here with the question whether the current practice of allowing non-attorney judges to preside over criminal trials of offenses punishable by a jail sentence, as is the situation in over sixty percent of the justice courts in California, violates the constitutional rights of the defendants in those proceedings. We have decided that this practice does violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that henceforth defendants in such courts are entitled to have an attorney judge preside over all criminal proceedings involving charges which carry the possibility of a jail sentence, unless such right is waived by the defendant or his counsel.

Petitioner Gordon was brought before a non-attorney judge of the Yuba City Justice Court to stand trial for disturbing the peace and failing to disperse (Pen.Code, §§ 415, 416). Similarly, petitioner Arguijo was brought before a non-attorney judge of the Grover City Justice Court to stand trial for driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh.Code, § 23102, subd. (a)). Both petitioners sought extraordinary pretrial relief, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, contending that it is unconstitutional to compel them to stand trial on criminal charges before non-attorney judges. The superior court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and petitioners have appealed. 1

Presently in California each county is divided into municipal court and justice court districts with districts of more than 40,000 residents having a municipal court and those of 40,000 or less having a justice court. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 5.) The Legislature is vested with complete authority over the organization and jurisdiction of the justice courts (id.), and has provided that these courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by a fine of $1,000 or less or a maximum term of one year in county jail or both (Pen.Code, § 1425). 2

The judges of justice courts are elected in their counties or districts at general elections (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 16, subd. (b)) to serve for a six-year term (Gov.Code, § 71145). The Legislature, which also prescribes the necessary qualifications of justice court judges, has declared that to be eligible for such a position the candidate must either (1) be a member of the State Bar or (2) have passed a qualifying examination prescribed by the Judicial Council or (3) have been an incumbent in a justice court or a predecessor court at the time the Reorganization Act of 1950 became operative and have retained that position continuously. (Gov.Code, § 71601.) 3

Petitioners assert that to require a defendant to stand trial before a non-attorney judge in any case in which the defendant faces a potential jail sentence violates his right to due process of law. 4 We agree.

The justice of the peace judicial system, from which our current justice courts trace their ancestry, originated in England under Edward III in the early part of the 14th century. In that period and throughout the early part of this country's history, compelling reasons existed for allowing laymen to act as judges in the few simple matters that came within the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. There were not enough attorneys in rural areas to serve as justices of the peace, and a prohibition against non-attorney judges might have deprived many areas of any eligible judges. Travel and communication were slower and more burdensome, making it harder and even impossible for an attorney judge who normally resided and heard cases in a more populous urban area to preside over matters which arose in rural areas. (See generally Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Cal.L.Rev. 118.) Furthermore, it is likely that the trial of a criminal case was far less complex than in modern times. Even misdemeanor trials are now apt to involve complicated issues of law and procedure, requiring an expertise which a layman can not be assumed to possess.

Whatever the justification for permitting laymen to preside over criminal trials in the 1800's, it is a well-recognized principle that even long-standing practices are subject to constitutional scrutiny and must meet the advancing standards of due process. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782, 'Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.' (See also Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 551--552, 96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13; Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 279, fn. 13, 96 Cal.Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242; cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212; Zeilenga v. Nelson, Supra, 4 Cal.3d 716, 94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578; In re Antazo, 3 Cal.3d 100, 89 Cal.Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999.)

The practice of allowing a layman to be a judge in a criminal proceeding must be scrutinized in the light of modern standards and conditions. There has been a vast increase in the number of attorneys in all areas of the state and substantial improvement in roads, highways and transportation. Furthermore, as discussed more fully below, the increased complexity of criminal law and criminal procedure has greatly enhanced the probability that a layman will be unable to deal effectively with the complexities inherent in a criminal trial.

We note at the outset that we are dealing with a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial, 5 a right which extends to All criminal trials, regardless of the nature of the crime with which defendant is charged. (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530.)

In determining in advance of trial if a particular procedure or proceeding comports with the demands of due process, the courts have sought to ascertain whether in the absence of relief a Reasonable likelihood exists that a fair trial cannot be had. (Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372; Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.3d 287, 95 Cal.Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600.) 6

Moreover, with respect to post-trial review, the United States Supreme Court has recognized for many years that the very character of certain procedures make it impractical to establish the degree of prejudice which has resulted therefrom. (See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114, and cases cited Infra.) In these circumstances the defendant need not show that he was Actually prejudiced during his trial in order to establish a denial of due process of law; it is enough if he can show there was a reasonable Probability of prejudice. (See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (traffic offender tried before a mayor of town which was heavily dependent on traffic fines); Sheppard v. Maxwell, Supra, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (pretrial publicity); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (televised trials); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (use of same deputy sheriffs as both jury custodians and as key prosecution witnesses); In re Murchison, Supra, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (contempt trial before same judge who presided at the grand jury hearing during which alleged contempt occurred); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (judge receiving compensation from fines he imposed).)

We do not suggest that a fair criminal trial is impossible in a court presided over by a non-attorney judge, but only that the likelihood of such a trial would be substantially diminished. As mentioned above, a layman who is not an incumbent justice court judge may qualify as a candidate for election to that court by passing the threehour examination given by the Judicial Council. We have scrutinized the most recent Judicial Council examination and, although it extends over a wide area of the law, the examination is far less rigorous than the two-and-one-half days State Bar examination required of one seeking to become an attorney. We also note the absence of any requirement of college or law school education 7 in order to qualify as a...

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