Gordon v. Mobile Greyhound Park
| Decision Date | 20 December 1991 |
| Citation | 592 So.2d 208 |
| Parties | Johnnie Mae GORDON, et al. v. MOBILE GREYHOUND PARK. 1901631. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Michael G. Huey and D.A. Bass-Frazier, Mobile, for appellants.
Alton R. Brown, Jr., William H. Sisson and Charles H. Hillman of Brown, Hudgens, P.C., Mobile, for appellee.
The plaintiffs in this case sued Mobile Greyhound Park ("the Park"), alleging that they were injured when the bus in which they were riding was struck by a pickup truck at the intersection of Theodore-Dawes Road and the entrance to the Park. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages under a general negligence theory, arguing that their alleged injuries were the proximate result of the negligence of a Park employee who was directing traffic at the intersection at the time of the collision. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the Park, and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.
The summary judgment in this case was proper if there was no genuine issue of material fact and the Park was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. The burden was on the Park to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If that showing was made, then the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, so as to void the entry of a judgment against them. In determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and we must resolve all reasonable doubts against the Park. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, 590 So.2d 205 (Ala.1991). Because this case was pending on June 11, 1987, the applicable standard of review is the "scintilla of evidence" rule. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, shows the following: At the time of the collision, Maurice Lofton, a security officer employed by the Park, was in charge of controlling the flow of traffic at the intersection of Theodore-Dawes Road and the entrance to the Park. The entrance to the Park has one incoming and two outgoing lanes for traffic and forms a "T" when it intersects with Theodore-Dawes Road. Lofton's job was to control the flow of traffic at the intersection during the Park's peak traffic hours by manually operating the three-stage traffic signal (red, yellow, green) located at the intersection. Lofton did this by pushing a button on a hand-controlled device that was attached to a long cord connected to a control box. Immediately before the collision, Lofton had changed the signal to green for the vehicles exiting the Park and, after looking in both directions on Theodore-Dawes Road to make sure that no vehicle was about to...
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...There are, however, certain circumstances in which a summary judgment may be proper in a negligence action. Gordon v. Mobile Greyhound Park, 592 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala.1991); Morrison v. City of Ozark, 575 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Ala. 1991); see also, Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So.2d 1363, (Ala.1994) (su......
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...There are, however, certain circumstances in which a summary judgment may be proper in a negligence action. Gordon v. Mobile Greyhound Park, 592 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala. 1991); Morrison v. City of Ozark, 575 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Ala.1991); see also, Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So.2d 1363, (Ala.1994) (su......
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