Gordon v. Nicoletti

• Decision Date: 10 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:97CV1417(GLG).,3:97CV1417(GLG).
• Parties: Carolyn GORDON, Plaintiff, v. Robert NICOLETTI, Nancy Greene, Eugene Horrigan, Charles Sweetman, and Regional School District 12 Board of Education, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

84 F.Supp.2d 304

Carolyn GORDON, Plaintiff, v. Robert NICOLETTI, Nancy Greene, Eugene Horrigan, Charles Sweetman, and Regional School District 12 Board of Education, Defendants.

No. 3:97CV1417(GLG).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

February 10, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William M. Laviano, Laviano Law Offices, Ridgefield, CT, for Plaintiff.

Richard D. O'Connor, Siegel, O'Connor, Schiff & Sangari, Hartford, Peter D. Clark, Shelton, CT, Dana Shaw MacKinnon, Hartford Life Insurance Co., Law Dept., Simsbury, for Defendants.

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Pending before this Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all six counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Doc. # 58], and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment as to Liability Only on Counts One and Four [Doc. # 47].

Background

The facts underlying plaintiff's claims are largely undisputed. At all relevant times, plaintiff was, and in fact still is, a tenured teacher with the Regional School District No. 12 Board of Education. By reason of her tenure and annual contracts of employment, plaintiff was not terminable at will. In 1996, defendant Nicoletti, Superintendent of Schools for Regional School District No. 12, notified plaintiff that termination of her contract of employment was under consideration. Plaintiff requested a statement of the reasons for this action, to which defendant Nicoletti responded in writing that she was being terminated for "inefficiency or incompetence" and "other due and sufficient causes," two of the reasons for termination enumerated in Connecticut's Teacher Tenure Act, C.G.S.A. § 10-151(d).¹ In accordance with statutory procedures, plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before an impartial hearing panel, consisting of an attorney chosen by the Superintendent, an attorney chosen by plaintiff, and a third member chosen by the first two panel members. See C.G.S.A. § 10-151(d). Hearings commenced on August 12, 1996, and by stipulation of the parties were continued several times. After 28 days of hearings, on March 3, 1997, the Hearing Panel issued its decision. A majority of the Panel found no basis to terminate plaintiff for incompetency, inefficiency or any other due and sufficient cause. See Decision of Hearing Panel dated Mar. 3, 1997 at ¶¶ 115—117, 128, 129, 134 (hereinafter "Panel Decision"). The Panel further found that the Administration had failed to comply with its legal obligation to formally evaluate plaintiff in accordance with its written teacher evaluation plan, the Intensive Assistance Plan ("IAP"), and that the Administration was grossly negligent in terminating plaintiff without making any substantial attempt to evaluate, assist and remediate her as required by the IAP. Panel Decision, Conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 3-7. The third panel member issued a dissenting opinion, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to find that plaintiff was incompetent and, therefore, that plaintiff should be terminated. See Panel Decision at 41. The Panel's Decision was then submitted to the Board of Education, which voted to reinstate plaintiff.² No appeal of the Panel Decision was filed.³

The following school year, the School Board transferred plaintiff from her position as a seventh grade language arts teacher at the Middle School to the High School, where she was assigned to teach math and writing classes, for which she was certified but which she had not taught for some time. During the termination process, plaintiff was suspended from her position as a seventh grade language arts teacher at Shepaug Middle School, but during the entire suspension, plaintiff received her full salary and all benefits, seniority, and tenure. In March of 1997, when she resumed teaching, plaintiff's pay and benefits remained the same.

Plaintiff then commenced this action. Her amended complaint invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and sets forth six counts. The two federal claims are for defendants' intentional violation of plaintiff's due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count One), and for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (CountSix).⁴ Plaintiff also has asserted state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Two), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Three), breach of contract against the Board of Education (Count Four), and tortious interference with contractual relations (Count Five).

Discussion

I. Plaintiff's Federal Claims

A. Section 1983 — 14th Amendment Due Process Violation

Count One of plaintiff's complaint is for defendants' alleged violation of plaintiff's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of their retaliation against her and their attempts to deprive her of her property rights and liberty interest. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants affiliated with the Region 12 Board of Education "engaged in a course of conduct which was intentional, malicious and grossly negligent to deprive plaintiff of her teaching position and to cause her to spend large sums of money in defending a baseless termination proceeding pursuant to C.G.S. 10-151 which resulted in a decision ... in plaintiff's favor and finding that the conduct of certain of the defendants was malicious, grossly negligent and without basis in law or fact." (Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2). She further alleges that the defendants "and in particular defendant Sweetman, the current superintendent of schools beginning on April 3, 1997 has [sic] since conspired and acted as set forth below, to harass and deprive plaintiff, under color of state law, of her teaching position, and to retaliate for her success in the 10-151 proceedings." Id. at 2. The alleged harassment included reassigning plaintiff from her teaching position at the Middle School to teach courses at the High School that she had not taught for many years. Id. She further alleges that, upon hearing of the Panel's Decision, defendants Sweetman, Greene, and the Board of Education retaliated against her and attempted to deprive her of a property right and liberty interest by intimidating a student, who had testified on her behalf before the Panel, by subjecting him to discriminatory discipline, thus causing plaintiff great stress and pain;⁵ by intentionally reassigning plaintiff to the High School in an attempt to force her to resign; by depriving her of the support of her colleagues at the Middle School and to provide an example for other teachers that those who exercise their rights will be "dealt with" regardless of the outcome of the proceedings; and by causing her emotional pain by making her transition back to teaching more difficult. (Pl.'s Compl. at 7-8, ¶ 16).

Defendants argue that plaintiff was never deprived of a property interest since plaintiff never suffered any pecuniary loss and was reinstated without any loss of pay or benefits. Additionally, defendants maintain that plaintiff's alleged liberty interest in her reputation and good name is not a protectible liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Finally, defendants assert that plaintiff was afforded procedural due process.

Plaintiff asserts that this Court is bound by the Panel's findings, "which are res judicata and collateral estoppel as to these defendants," and which establish "irrefutable liability" for the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights under section 1983.

Due process claims may take one of two forms: procedural due process or substantive due process. Procedural due process claims concern the adequacy of the procedures provided by the governmental body for the protection of liberty or property rights of an individual. Substantive due process claims concern limitations on governmental conduct toward an individual regardless of the procedural protections. DeLeon v. Little, 981 F.Supp. 728, 734 (D.Conn.1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not specify whether she is alleging a denial of her substantive or procedural due process rights, or both. However, to establish a violation of either substantive or procedural due process, plaintiff must initially show that she was deprived of a property or liberty interest. Id. Thus, our threshold inquiry is whether plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. If so, we will then consider whether there was a deprivation of that interest.

1. Property Interest

No one disputes that plaintiff, a tenured teacher, had a property interest in her continued employment. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (holding that public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (same); DeMichele v. Greenburgh Central School Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir.1999) (same); Rado v. Board of Educ., 216 Conn. 541, 555, 583 A.2d 102 (1990) (recognizing a tenured teacher's property interest in continued employment, entitled to due process protection); Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy, 199 Conn. 231, 234, 506 A.2d 139 (1986) (holding that, under Connecticut law, a tenured teacher's right to continued employment is a property right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Although plaintiff was tenured and had a protectible property interest in continued employment, she was never deprived of that interest since she was never terminated and never suffered a loss of pay or benefits. Plaintiff does not claim otherwise.

Instead, plaintiff asserts that defendants "attempted to deprive her of her property rights" in remaining at the same school, in teaching the same subjects, in working with the same colleagues. None of these aspects of plain...