Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 93-SC-414-D,93-SC-1020-DG,s. 93-SC-414-D |
| Citation | 887 S.W.2d 360 |
| Parties | Bryan GORDON, Appellant, v. NKC HOSPITALS, INC., Appellee. NKC HOSPITALS, INC., Cross-Appellant, v. Bryan GORDON, Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Joseph L. White, Louisville, Anne McAfee, Shepherdsville, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Wesley P. Adams, Jr., Russell H. Saunders, A. Andrew Draut, Edward J. Smith, Weber & Rose, P.S.C., Louisville, for appellee/cross-appellant.
The decisive issue here is whether a potential, but unasserted, defense under the exclusiveness of liability provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342.690, deprives a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction of a claim otherwise properly before it, thus rendering its final judgment subject to vacation upon motion pursuant to CR 60.02. Despite appellee's failure to raise any Workers' Compensation defense until after a notice of appeal had been filed from an adverse final judgment, the Court of Appeals held that raising the issue pursuant to CR 60.02 was a sufficient challenge to the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction requiring remand for a determination of the facts. This Court granted discretionary review to decide whether the possibility of a defense under the Workers' Compensation Act deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction so that even an untimely allegation requires evidence and a factual determination.
Appellant was employed by Norris, a painting contractor. Norris entered into a contract with appellee, NKC, for painting upon its premises. On January 15, 1988, while so employed, appellant was grievously injured in a fire. Appellant received Workers' Compensation benefits from his employer, Norris, and brought a civil action for damages against appellee in the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Appellant's complaint alleged negligence with respect to appellee's use of its business premises. In its answer, appellee admitted that appellant had been injured, denied its own negligence, and alleged that appellant or his fellow servants caused or contributed to the injury-producing accident. Neither the complaint nor the answer could be construed as providing even a clue that the Workers' Compensation Act had anything to do with the case. Certainly there was no objection to jurisdiction. Appellee concedes that at no time prior to its notice of appeal from the adverse final judgment did it raise any such question. Not until after filing its notice of appeal did appellee seek relief by means of a CR 60.02 motion which, on June 8, 1992, was denied as untimely. Appellee then appealed from that final order.
The Court of Appeals held the appeal from the underlying final judgment in abeyance, and upon the appeal from denial of CR 60.02 relief, vacated and remanded. It expressed the view that the Workers' Compensation Act deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on KRS 342.690(1), KRS 342.610(2), and CR 12.08(3), the Court of Appeals held that
... if NKC was appellee's statutory employer, it is immune from tort liability to appellee and any tort judgment against it arising out of the events related to appellee's injury would be void.
The court quoted with approval from 6 Bertelsman and Philipps, Kentucky Practice, CR 12.08, cmt. 4 (4th ed. 1984).
This Court's decision in Duncan v. O'Nan, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 626 (1970), and cases cited therein, provides a proper analysis of subject matter jurisdiction under Kentucky law. Among the stated principles are that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by waiver or conferred by agreement; and that in general, "subject matter" does not mean "this case," but "this kind of case." Duncan v. O'Nan makes it clear that a court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction only in cases "where the court has not been given any power to do anything at all." Id. at 631. To determine subject matter jurisdiction, the pleadings should be taken at face value and so long as the "kind of case" identified in the pleadings is within the court's jurisdiction, one claiming a legal bar must plead it affirmatively. See Wood v. Wingfield, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 899 (1991). With the foregoing in mind, we will examine the constitutional and statutory grants of circuit court jurisdiction and the relevant parts of the Workers' Compensation Act to determine whether the defense now claimed to have deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction should be so regarded.
The circuit court exists by virtue of Section 109 of the Constitution of Kentucky and in it is vested general jurisdiction. By Section 112(5) of the Constitution, the circuit court is granted "original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court." See also KRS 23A.010 and Commonwealth v. Prall, 141 Ky. 560, 133...
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...249, 766 P.2d 598 (1988); Messner v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 120 Wis.2d 127, 139, 353 N.W.2d 363 (1984); but see Gordon v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 887 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Ky., 1994); Ammons v. Hood, 288 S.C. 278, 281, 341 S.E.2d 816 (1986); Turner Constr. Co. v. Hebner, 276 Pa.Super. 341, 345-348, ......
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..."employee," is not, as the FSMA argues, an affirmative defense for which the City bears the burden of proof. Cf. Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 360, 362-63 (Ky. 1994) (exclusivity of liability provision under the Workers' Compensation statute amounts to affirmative defense); Curr......
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