Gordon v. United States, No. 20126.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
Writing for the CourtBASTIAN, Senior Circuit , and BURGER and WRIGHT, Circuit
Citation383 F.2d 936
Decision Date18 September 1967
Docket NumberNo. 20126.
PartiesMorris W. GORDON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

383 F.2d 936 (1967)

Morris W. GORDON, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20126.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 22, 1966.

Decided September 18, 1967.

As Amended October 12, 1967.

Petition for Rehearing Denied October 27, 1967.


383 F.2d 937
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383 F.2d 938
Mrs. Zora F. Hostetler, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant

Miss Carol Garfiel, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Robert Kenly Webster, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before BASTIAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BURGER and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied October 27, 1967.

BURGER, Circuit Judge:

Appellant was convicted of robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon. On appeal this Court remanded the case to the District Court without considering the merits when it appeared that the District Court had indicated willingness to grant a new trial1 because of newly discovered evidence. The new evidence was that the complaining witness, the sole government witness at the first trial, had been convicted of larceny,2 a factor relevant to his credibility and which was unknown at the time of trial. A new trial followed our remand, and the second trial also resulted in conviction.

On this appeal only one issue raised by Appellant bears comment. Appellant claims that the District Court Judge abused the discretion vested in him by Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965), when he permitted the government to impeach Appellant's testimony by showing prior convictions. However, the record reveals that Appellant did not present the issue to the trial judge in the manner contemplated by Luck, although on the whole record we are satisfied that the trial judge did consider the point and exercise his discretion concerning the prior convictions which Appellant now argues should be excluded; as we have said before, absent plain error we will not find an abuse of discretion where there has been no meaningful invocation of that discretion. See Hood v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 365 F.2d 949 (1966).2a Nonetheless, we are moved by the arguments of counsel here as well as by the need for clarification relating to the problem of prior-crimes impeachment, see, e. g., Stevens v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 370 F.2d 485 (1966) (Fahy, J., dissenting), to set forth some observations about our decision in Luck.

Because of the direct conflict in the evidence the verdict necessarily turned on how the jury resolved the credibility contest between the complainant and the defendant. Appellant's argument now is that while it was appropriate for him to impeach the complaining witness with a prior criminal record, it was improper

383 F.2d 939
to allow impeachment of his own credibility by asking him about his criminal convictions, notwithstanding his failure to raise the issue

The rationale of our Luck opinion is important; it recognized that a showing of prior convictions can have genuine probative value on the issue of credibility, but that because of the potential for prejudice, the receiving of such convictions as impeachment was discretionary. The defendant who has a criminal record may ask the court to weigh the probative value of the convictions as to the credibility against the degree of prejudice which the revelation of his past crimes would cause; and he may ask the court to consider whether it is more important for the jury to hear his story than to know about prior convictions in relation to his credibility. We contemplated the possibility of allowing some convictions to be shown and some excluded; examples are to be found in those which are remote and those which have no direct bearing on veracity, and those which because of the peculiar circumstances at hand might better be excluded. The Luck opinion contemplated an on-the-record consideration by the trial judge whose action would be reviewable only for abuse of discretion, and that once the exercise of discretion appeared, the trial court's action be "accorded a respect appropriately reflective of the inescapable remoteness of appellate review."3 This is a recognition that the cold record on appeal cannot present all facets and elements which the trial judge must weigh in striking the balance.4

Luck also contemplated that it was for the defendant to present to the trial court sufficient reasons for withholding past convictions from the jury in the face of a statute which makes such convictions admissible. See Hood v. United States, supra. The underlying assumption was that prior convictions would ordinarily be admissible unless this burden is met. "The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense."5

The standard to be applied by the District Judge was stated in terms of whether he "believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility."6 The impact of criminal convictions will often be damaging to an accused and it is admittedly difficult to restrict its impact, by cautionary instructions, to the issue of credibility. The test of Luck, however, is that to bar them as impeachment the court must find that the prejudice must "far outweigh" the probative relevance to credibility, or that even if relevant the "cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction."7

The burden of persuasion in this regard is on the accused; and, once the issue is raised, the District Court should make an inquiry, allowing the accused an opportunity to show why judicial discretion should be exercised in favor of exclusion of the criminal record.8

383 F.2d 940
This, admittedly, places a very difficult burden on trial judges and some added guidelines are needed even at risk of adding to the burdens of the trial courts

In considering how the...

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529 practice notes
  • United States v. Holland, Criminal Action No. 13–cr–33RC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • May 30, 2014
    ...[and] generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.’ ” Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617–18 (citing Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967) ). In essence, this Circuit stated in Gordon that “convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whe......
  • U.S. v. Jackson, No. 78-1768
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • February 8, 1980
    ...decisions in Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968), which governed consideration of the admissibility of pr......
  • State v. Askew, No. 15674
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 14, 1998
    ...for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a [person's] honesty and integrity." Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968). Consequently, "[c]onvictions of this sort obviously......
  • People v. Beagle, Cr. 15794
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • January 5, 1972
    ...trial courts. Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger discussed these factors at length in Gordon v. United States (1967) 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940--941: 'In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
529 cases
  • United States v. Holland, Criminal Action No. 13–cr–33RC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • May 30, 2014
    ...[and] generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.’ ” Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617–18 (citing Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967) ). In essence, this Circuit stated in Gordon that “convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whe......
  • U.S. v. Jackson, No. 78-1768
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • February 8, 1980
    ...decisions in Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968), which governed consideration of the admissibility of pr......
  • State v. Askew, No. 15674
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 14, 1998
    ...for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a [person's] honesty and integrity." Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968). Consequently, "[c]onvictions of this sort obviously......
  • People v. Beagle, Cr. 15794
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • January 5, 1972
    ...trial courts. Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger discussed these factors at length in Gordon v. United States (1967) 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940--941: 'In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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