Gordy v. State, No. 871S242
Docket Nº | No. 871S242 |
Citation | 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362 |
Case Date | August 01, 1974 |
Page 362
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
[262 Ind. 276]
Page 363
Max Cohen, Cohen & Thiros, Gary, for appellant.Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., of Ind., A. Frank Gleaves, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
The defendant (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of Second Degree Murder under an indictment charging First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, hence we will not burden this record with a recital of the facts.
We are here concerned with: (I) four issues concerning jury instructions, (II) the court's ruling denying a motion for mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct, (III) the effect of the submission to the jury of a 'death penalty' verdict form, the case having been tried before Furman v. Georgia (1972), 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 and Adams v. State (1972), Ind., 284 N.E.2d 757, and (IV) the effect, if any, of a commissioner's having served as judge at the trial.
ISSUE I--Instructions:
(1) The trial court's fifteenth instruction dealt with the elements of first degree murder and properly advised that [262 Ind. 277] to be
Page 364
murder in the first degree it must be established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was unlawful and done with premeditated malice. The instruction continued, 'Malice may be implied or presumed from the nature of the act, as where an act resulting in death of another is done purposely, in a state of cool blood, without excuse or justification; therefore, malice may be implied when it is shown that the killing was done purposely and without a legal excuse or unreasonable provocation, also from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in such a manner as was likely to and did produce death; also from any deliberate and cruel act against another, however sudden, which shows an abandoned and wicked heart. The presumption of malice is rebuttable and is removed by facts tending to show, or which do show excuse or justification for such act, and when this presumption or inference of malice fails, then you must look to all the facts and circumstances of the case to determine whether malice existed or not.'The defendant's objection was that the instruction permitted the jury to presume malice from the nature of the act and relieve the State of the burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, a material fact of the indictment and of the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree and further that it cast upon the defendant the burden of coming forward with evidence to negate the erroneous presumption of malice.
Defendant has cited us to a number of cases distinguishing between an inference and a presumption. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Lynn (1911), 177 Ind. 311, 95 N.E. 577, 98 N.E. 67; Zearing v. Walters (1954), 125 Ind.App. 202, 122 N.E.2d 625; Kaiser v. Happel (1941), 219 Ind. 28, 36 N.E.2d 784. It appears that in earlier cases the two terms were used interchangeably, whereas more recently we have reserved the word 'presumption' to denote matters of law and the word 'inference' to denote matters of fact. Defendant urges the recent case of Young v. State (1972), Ind., 280 N.E.2d 595 to support his contention that the word 'presumption' [262 Ind. 278] in the instruction placed a burden upon him to prove the absence of malice. In Young v. State (supra) we were dealing with insanity as a defense, and we held that sanity is presumed, in the absence of the defendant presenting some evidence to the contrary. Thus, by the use of the word 'presume' or 'presumption' some slight burden is placed upon a defendant pleading insanity. The Young case, however, dealt with the function of the presumption and the extent of the defendant's burden created by it. It did not deal with the distinctions drawn between the words 'presumption' and 'inference.'
The instruction could have better omitted the word 'presumed' in the first instance and used the word 'inference' thereafter in lieu of the word 'presumption.' However, the first use of the term complained of was 'malice may be implied or presumed * * *.' Later the word 'presumption' was used in the disjunctive with the word 'inference.' It is clear to us that the words 'imply', 'inference', and 'presumption' were to be understood as synonyms, and we see nothing about the instruction that would misinform the jury as urged by the defendant. This is particularly true when we view the instruction in context with the other instructions regarding the burden of proof.
(2) The third instruction advised of the lesser included offenses of first degree murder, and the trial court properly refused to include assault and battery with intent, assault and battery and assault. This is well established by Barker v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 271, 150 N.E.2d 680; Shack v. State (1972), Ind., 288 N.E.2d 155; and Gatchett v. State (1973), Ind., 300 N.E.2d 665. Sullivan v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 446, 139 N.E.2d 893 is inapplicable, because here there was no charge of manslaughter.
Page 365
(3) The thirteenth instruction dealt with accomplice testimony, and the defendant objected to it because it did not advise the jury that testimony of an accomplice should be weighed with great care. Additionally, the defendant requested[262 Ind. 279] and was refused cautionary instructions advising that the testimony of informers and of persons who have been convicted of crimes must be examined with greater care than that of ordinary witnesses.
We find no error in the refusal of such instructions and reaffirm our position taken in Turner v. State (1972), Ind., 280 N.E.2d 621 and Cherry v. State (1972), Ind., 280 N.E.2d 818.
(4) By pre-trial stipulation, the State had provided the defendant with copies of the statements of the witnesses it intended to call. Two of such witnesses were subpoenaed by neither the State nor the defendant and did not appear at the trial. The defendant requested and was refused the following instruction:
'You are instructed...
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Salt Lake City v. Ohms, No. 930580
...officer within the court [i.e., the commissioner] who conducted the trial." 721 F.2d at 926 (emphasis added); see also Gordy v. State, 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362, 366-67 (1974) ("We agree that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. However, the qualificati......
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Floyd v. State, Nos. 49S02-9412-PC-1282
...880, 881). Survance, 465 N.E.2d 1076, 1082. Accord, Skipper v. State (1988), Ind., 525 N.E.2d 334, 335. See also Gordy v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 275, 283, 315 N.E.2d 362, 367 (collecting As these precedents demonstrate, it has been the long-standing policy of this court to view the authorit......
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Short v. State, No. 381S86
...to the Master Commissioner's authority to try this case until this appeal began. We faced a similar situation in Gordy v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362. In that case we observed there was a difference between an appeal based on a trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdictio......
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State v. White, No. CR-86-0389-AP
...grounds. The defendant's argument here is completely meritless. Not only has he waived this argument by failing to object, Gordy v. State, 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362 (1974) (if court in which matter was tried has subject matter jurisdiction, then challenges to a particular judge's qualifi......
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Salt Lake City v. Ohms, No. 930580
...within the court [i.e., the commissioner] who conducted the trial." 721 F.2d at 926 (emphasis added); see also Gordy v. State, 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362, 366-67 (1974) ("We agree that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. However, the qualifica......
-
Floyd v. State, Nos. 49S02-9412-PC-1282
...880, 881). Survance, 465 N.E.2d 1076, 1082. Accord, Skipper v. State (1988), Ind., 525 N.E.2d 334, 335. See also Gordy v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 275, 283, 315 N.E.2d 362, 367 (collecting As these precedents demonstrate, it has been the long-standing policy of this court to view the authorit......
-
Short v. State, No. 381S86
...to the Master Commissioner's authority to try this case until this appeal began. We faced a similar situation in Gordy v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362. In that case we observed there was a difference between an appeal based on a trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdictio......
-
State v. White, No. CR-86-0389-AP
...grounds. The defendant's argument here is completely meritless. Not only has he waived this argument by failing to object, Gordy v. State, 262 Ind. 275, 315 N.E.2d 362 (1974) (if court in which matter was tried has subject matter jurisdiction, then challenges to a particular judge's qualifi......