Gore v. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-3963-M-BN,3:15-cv-3963-M-BN |
| Parties | TERRENCE M. GORE, Plaintiff, v. CEDAR HILL INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn. The undersigned issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons and to the extent explained below, the Court should deny Defendants' motion to strike, grant Defendants' amended motion to dismiss, and deny without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend.
Plaintiff Terrence M. Gore, a pro se litigant, filed this suit, asserting various employment-related causes of action against Defendants Cedar Hill Independent School District ("Cedar Hill ISD"); its superintendent, Orlando Riddick; and its Board of Trustees (the "Board"). See Dkt. No. 22.
Plaintiff was granted leaved to proceed in forma pauperis, see Dkt. No. 5, and following judicial screening, see Dkt. Nos. 6 & 8, his complaint was ordered served on December 16, 2015, see Dkt. No. 9.
Defendants responded by simultaneously answering and moving to dismiss (and, alternatively, for a more definite statement as to certain claims) the complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 13 & 14. Because Defendants indicated in their motion that, if the Court were to grant their motion to dismiss in its entirety, only "Plaintiff's 'adverse employment action' claim under the Family and Medical Leave (except as to punitive damages) [would] remain[]," Dkt. No. 13 at 10 n.1, the Court required the parties to submit a joint status report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) (the "Rule 26(f) report") and scheduled an initial Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) scheduling conference, see Dkt. No. 19.
Before the Rule 26(f) report was filed, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint [Dkt. No. 22], to which Defendants responded by filing their amended motion to dismiss also seeking, in the alternative, a more definite statement, which is now pending before the Court. See Dkt. No. 25. According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff was employed as an elementary teacher at Cedar Hill ISD from July 1, 2007 until January 5, 2015. See id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that, on January 30, 2013, he suffered a work-related injury, for which he had to undergo multiple surgeries. See id. Plaintiff also indicates that the principal incident giving rise to his claims, which are outlined below, was Cedar Hill ISD's termination of his employment in January 2015.
The Court entered an initial scheduling order on February 29, 2016, see Dkt. No. 32, and, although the Court abated all discovery "until the Court issues a decision onDefendants' amended motion to dismiss and, alternatively, motion for definite statement," id., ¶ 5, March 14, 2016 was set as the deadline to amend the pleadings and join additional parties, see id., ¶¶ 2 & 3.
To address the onslaught of motions filed before Defendants' amended motion became ripe, the Court conducted a status conference on March 23, 2016 to consider and, where possible, dispose of multiple non-dispositive motions. See Dkt. Nos. 55 & 56. Defendants then filed an amended answer [Dkt. No. 57], and the parties filed an agreed motion to dismiss the Board [Dkt. No. 59], which the Court granted on March 30, 2016, see Dkt. No. 60.
These findings, conclusions, and recommendations are entered to address the three pending motions: Defendants' amended motion to dismiss/alternative motion for a more definite statement [Dkt. No. 25]; Defendants' motion to strike or exclude exhibits attached to Plaintiff's response to that motion [Dkt. No. 63]; and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint [Dkt. No. 72].
In their amended motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 25], Defendants attack many of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and attack other claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The undersigned addresses below each of Plaintiff's claims and Defendants' arguments regarding them in the order that they are presented in the amended motion [Dkt. No. 25].
But, before turning to that motion, the undersigned has treated Defendants'motion to strike [Dkt. No. 63] as an objection to the evidence that the Court may consider in making findings, conclusions, and a recommendation as to the amended motion to dismiss. Accordingly, although the substance of the motion to strike has been considered in the analysis below, it should be denied as submitted.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). "When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
The Court must dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "'when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.'" Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognizes a distinction between a "facial" attack to subject matter jurisdiction, which is based solely on the pleadings, and a "factual" attack to jurisdiction, which is based onaffidavits, testimony, and other evidentiary material. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981); accord Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (). Regardless of the nature of the attack, the plaintiff seeking a federal forum "constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. Where, as here, a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the attack is presumptively facial, and the Court need look only to the sufficiency of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint, or on the complaint as supplemented by undisputed facts, all of which are presumed to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1989); Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. On a factual attack, however, the Court "is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute," Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161, and, to oppose the Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction," Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523.
In deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs must plead"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, Plaintiffs must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the Plaintiffs' allegations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, "to survive a motion to dismiss" under Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that Plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV.P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)). The United States "Supreme Court has made clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the sufficiency of the 'factual allegations' in the complaint." Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App'x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johns...
To continue reading
Request your trial