Gorenc v. Proverbs

• Decision Date: 28 May 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 18-2403-DDC-JPO
• Citation: 462 F.Supp.3d 1137
• Parties: Julie GORENC, Kara Winkler, and Midwife Partners in Women's Wellness, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Janetta PROVERBS, M.D., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

462 F.Supp.3d 1137

Julie GORENC, Kara Winkler, and Midwife Partners in Women's Wellness, LLC, Plaintiffs,

v.Janetta PROVERBS, M.D., Defendant.

Case No. 18-2403-DDC-JPO

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Signed May 28, 2020

Keith N. Williston, The Williston Law Firm, LLC, Blue Springs, MO, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daniel D. Crabtree, United States District Judge

Before the court is defendant Janetta Proverbs, M.D.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 39). Plaintiffs Julie Gorenc, Kara Winker, and Midwife Partners in Women's Wellness, LLC have filed a Response (Doc. 42). Defendant never filed a Reply and the time to do so has expired. For reasons explained below, the court grants defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

I. Factual Background

The court takes the following facts from plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) and views them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. S.E.C. v. Shields , 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Julie Gorenc and Kara Winkler are certified nurse-midwives holding active advance practice registered nurse ("APRN") licenses issued by the Kansas State Board of Nursing ("KSBN").¹ Doc. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 7–8). Ms. Gorenc and Ms. Winkler practice through Midwife Partners in Women's Wellness, LLC, a Kansas limited liability company ("Midwife Partners in Women's Wellness," and together with Ms. Gorenc and Ms. Winkler, "plaintiffs"). Id. (Compl. ¶ 9).

KSBN and Adventist Health Mid-America, Inc. ("Adventist") required plaintiffs to have a collaborative practice agreement (a "CPA") with a private physician as a condition to attending births at Shawnee Mission Medical Center Health ("SMMCH"), a hospital owned and operated by Adventist. Id. at 4–5 (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 22). Sometime in 2016, plaintiffs entered into a CPA with defendant, permitting plaintiffs delivery privileges at SMMCH. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–25). Defendant informed plaintiffs that she would terminate the CPA, effective February 2018. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 23–25). Plaintiffs sought CPAs with other OB/GYNs employed at SMMCH without avail.² Id. at 5–6 (Compl. ¶¶ 26–30). Without a CPA with a physician employed or holding privileges at SMMCH, plaintiffs could not attend the deliveries of their clients at SMMCH, causing clients to leave plaintiffs’ practice. Id. at 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 33–34).

By terminating the CPA, plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Janetta Proverbs has: (1) "deprived [p]laintiffs of their liberty and property interests in contracting and practicing in their chosen profession without due process of law," (2) "interfered with [p]laintiffs’ contracts with current clients," and (3) "interfered with [p]laintiffs’ business expectancies." Doc. 1 at 2 (Compl. ¶ 35); see also id. at 5–6, 15–17, 23, 24 (Compl. ¶¶ 17–18, 35, 87, 92–94, 129, 139) (alleging a property and liberty interest in "practicing [in] their chosen profession free from unreasonable restraint," "a liberty interest in entering private contracts," impairment of plaintiffs' "freedom to contract," and damage to plaintiffs’ reputation). So, plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant, arguing that she "knowingly, willfully[,] and maliciously deprived [p]laintiffs of their liberty and property interests in practicing their chosen profession and their freedom to contract" without due process, violating plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count III). Id. at 5, 23, 24 (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 129, 139). Plaintiffs also assert two state law claims against defendant: (1) tortious interference with plaintiffs’ contracts with their clients (Count IV) and (2) tortious interference with a business expectancy (Count V), i.e. , plaintiffs expected they would continue to have admitting privileges at SMMCH, the growth of their practice was tied to this privilege, and defendant interfered with this privilege, halting their expected business growth. Id. at 25–28 (Compl. ¶¶ 143–165). Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings for all claims against her under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

II. Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is treated as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita , 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). So, the legal standards that apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions also apply to a Rule 12(c) motion.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). But this requirement does not extend to every assertion made in a complaint.

The court is " ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). " ‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice’ " to state a claim for relief. Bixler v. Foster , 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). Also, the complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see also Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd. , 555 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The question is whether, if the allegations are true, it is plausible and not merely possible that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the relevant law." (citation omitted)). Essentially, "the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). This plausibility standard reflects the requirement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 that pleadings must provide defendants with fair notice of the nature of the claims as well as the grounds upon which each claim rests. See Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2012) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (providing a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (explaining Rule 8 "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than ... [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ " which, " ‘will not do’ " (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )).

III. Analysis

Defendant Dr. Janetta Proverbs asserts three main arguments why plaintiffs’ federal law claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: (1) she is not a state actor; (2) even if the court concludes defendant is a state actor, she is entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) plaintiffs have not been deprived of any constitutionally protected right or property interest. Defendant also argues that, if the court dismisses the federal law claim against defendant, it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims plaintiffs have asserted against her. Alternatively, defendant argues, plaintiffs have failed to state plausible tortious interference with contracts and tortious interference with a business expectancy claims.

As explained below, the court considers only defendant's state actor argument. Because the court concludes plaintiffs cannot advance a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against defendant because she is not a state actor, the court need not consider defendant's remaining arguments for judgment on the pleadings against plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. And, without any federal law claims surviving defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims against defendant.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

A defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if, acting under color of state law, she deprives a plaintiff of " ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ....’ " Marin v. King , 720 F. App'x 923, 934 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1893 ). To state a viable § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiffs must allege that: (1) they have been deprived of a federally protected right and (2) "the person who has deprived [them] of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Wittner v. Banner Health , 720 F.3d 770, 773 (10th Cir. 2013) (reciting elements for § 1983 claim).

Defendant argues plaintiffs cannot establish either element—(1) deprivation of any...