Gores v. Miller

• Decision Date: 03 February 2016
• Docket Number: Nos. 27438,27446.,s. 27438
• Citation: 875 N.W.2d 34
• Parties: Dawn GORES, individually and as conservator of Haley Gores, and Haley Gores individually, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Lisa A. MILLER, M.D., and Yankton Surgical Associates, P.C., Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

875 N.W.2d 34

Dawn GORES, individually and as conservator of Haley Gores, and Haley Gores individually, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.Lisa A. MILLER, M.D., and Yankton Surgical Associates, P.C., Defendants and Appellees.

Nos. 27438

27446.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Nov. 30, 2015.

Decided Feb. 3, 2016.

Timothy L. James of James & Larson Law, Yankton, South Dakota and Dan Rasmus of Hovland & Rasmus, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota, Attorneys for plaintiffs and appellants.

Melissa C. Hinton of Evans Haigh & Hinton LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees.

ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] A minor child sustained physical injuries in an auto accident. The minor and her parent-conservator signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with the driver, insured, and insurer of the auto. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released all other claims that might develop from the accident. The minor and her parent subsequently filed a malpractice suit against the clinic and the physician who treated the injuries the minor sustained in the accident. The circuit court ruled that the release discharged the malpractice claims, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical providers. The parent and minor appeal. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 2.] On July 28, 2010, fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a van driven by Steven Smith. Smith lost control of the van, and Haley suffered lacerations to her right arm. Dr. Lisa Miller debrided Haley's wounds

at the hospital. The next day, Dr. Miller performed an excisional debridement and closed the lacerations. On August 13, Dr. Miller performed a second excisional debridement. Haley continued to see Dr. Miller for her care until October 21, 2010, when Dr. Miller determined that Haley's arm had completely healed. Haley's last contact with Dr. Miller was in December 2010.

[¶ 3.] In March 2011, a court appointed Haley's mother, Dawn Gores, as Haley's conservator for the purpose of prosecuting and settling claims arising from the accident. In April 2011, Dawn asked the conservator court to approve a settlement with Smith's insurer for the policy limit of $25,000 in exchange for Dawn and Haley's general release.¹ The conservator court approved the settlement, and Dawn and Haley (Appellants) executed the release.²

[¶ 4.] In April 2013, Haley and Dawn (in her individual capacity and as Haley's conservator) sued Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller's practice group. Appellants claimed that Haley received substandard medical care for the arm injury Haley suffered in the auto accident. More specifically, they alleged that Haley would have healed faster and required less treatment if Dr. Miller had done a skin graft and properly instructed Haley on how to dress her wounds

.

[¶ 5.] Dr. Miller and YSA moved for summary judgment, contending that the release discharged Appellants' claims against them. Appellants moved for additional time to conduct discovery to ascertain the intent of the parties to the release, including the intent of the judge who approved the settlement. The discovery motion was denied. The court determined that Appellants signed a general release that was unambiguous. The court further determined that because the release was unambiguous, the release expressed the intent of the parties. Based on the language of the release, the court concluded that the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Miller and YSA.

[¶ 6.] Appellants raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the release was intended to discharge Appellants' claims against Dr. Miller and YSA; (2) whether Dr. Miller and YSA were "independent tortfeasors," who were beyond the scope of the release; (3) whether the circuit court should have allowed additional time for discovery to ascertain the intent of the parties; and (4) whether res judicata barred the release defense.

Decision

[¶ 7.] In their first issue, Appellants argue that the release was not intended to discharge the claims against Dr. Miller and YSA. Appellants point out that the release did not mention Dr. Miller and YSA and that Appellants were not fully compensated through the settlement. In their second issue, Appellants argue that the release did not apply to the medical providers because they were "independent tortfeasors" who caused injuries in addition to those caused by Smith. Because the scope of the release often controls the questions raised in these issues, the first two issues are discussed together.

[¶ 8.] A release is a contract, and if a contract is unambiguous, we rely on the language of the contract to ascertain and give effect to the parties' intent. Fenske Media Corp. v. Banta Corp., 2004 S.D. 23, ¶ 8, 676 N.W.2d 390, 393. If the language is unambiguous, neither the releasor's subjective intent nor the failure to obtain full satisfaction in the settlement governs: the terms of the release control. Flynn v. Lockhart, 526 N.W.2d 743, 746 (S.D.1995) ; see also Aggregate Constr., Inc. v. Aaron Swan & Assocs., Inc., 2015 S.D. 79, ¶ 13, 871 N.W.2d 508, 512 (concluding that broad language of a release controlled even though the defendants were different entities subject to different claims). Contract interpretation is a legal question we review de novo. Tri–City Assocs., L.P. v. Belmont, Inc., 2014 S.D. 23, ¶ 9, 845 N.W.2d 911, 915.

[¶ 9.] The release in this case provided in relevant part:

[T]he undersigned hereby releases, and forever discharges Lori Smith and her heirs, executors, administrators, agents, insurers, and assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known and unknown, both to person and property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an incident which occurred on or about the 28th Day of July, 2010, at or near Springfield, South Dakota....

The undersigned hereby represents that the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the aforesaid accident ....

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 10.] This language is broad and unambiguous. Under it, Appellants released all "additional claims" of "any kind or nature whatsoever" against "all other persons" for "all injuries" that had or might "result from," "develop" from, or "arise out of" the accident. Applying this language, we note that Dr. Miller treated Haley for the injuries she sustained in the accident, and the damages Appellants seek from this malpractice claim are for a suboptimal recovery from those same injuries. Because the alleged malpractice damages developed from the injuries Haley sustained in the accident, the language of the release covers the malpractice claim. We have previously held that this type of broad language in general releases discharges additional claims against third parties not named. See Aggregate Constr. Inc., 2015 S.D. 79, ¶ 13, 871 N.W.2d at 512 ; Flynn, 526 N.W.2d at 746.³

[¶ 11.] Appellants, however, contend that the release does not apply because the medical providers were "independent tortfeasors" who caused injuries separate and distinct from those inflicted by the auto accident. This contention fails to acknowledge that in actions for malpractice involving treatment of an injury caused by a prior wrongdoer, the act of the prior wrongdoer is a legal cause of the damages flowing from subsequent, negligent medical treatment. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (Am. Law Inst.1965)⁴ ; W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 47, at 309 (5th ed.1984). Therefore, even if Dr. Miller and YSA are "independent tortfeasors" who caused distinct injuries—a question we do not decide in this case—the law regards all of these injuries as causally related to the accident See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 cmt. a.⁵ Because Smith is responsible for both injuries as a matter of law,⁶ Appellants have no argument that their claim against Dr. Miller and YSA is not causally related to the auto accident. This result is contemplated in such releases. As we have previously noted, "the defendant who originally procures the release gains nothing if the plaintiff can [still] sue other joint or concurrent tortfeasors. In such a case, the original defendant is left open to claims for contribution and/or indemnity and may wind up having to litigate the case anyway." Flynn, 526 N.W.2d at 746. And that is what would happen in this case. Although Smith obtained a full release, he would wind up having to litigate the accident and defend a contribution and indemnity claim by Dr. Miller and YSA.

[¶ 12.] Appellants released all persons from all claims that developed from the accident. Because Haley's malpractice damages developed from the injuries sustained in the auto accident, we conclude that the release applied to the suboptimal recovery allegedly caused by the medical treatment of the accident injuries. The circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Appellants' claims as a matter of contract. In light of our interpretation of the contract, Appellants' other arguments need not be addressed.⁷

[¶ 13.] In their third issue, Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for a continuance to conduct additional discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded...