Gorham v. Robinson
Decision Date | 14 August 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 1285-1288.,1285-1288. |
Citation | 186 A. 832 |
Parties | GORHAM v. ROBINSON, and three other cases. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted material omitted.]
[Copyrighted material omitted.]
Four original proceedings in equity in nature of quo warranto under Gen.Laws 1923, c. 379, by Howard B. Gorham against Maurice Robinson; by Charles R. Easton against Luigi De Pasquale; by Amos Lachapelle against George F. Treanor, and by James L. Taft against Charles A. Kelley.
Petitions denied and dismissed.
Ira Lloyd Letts, of Providence, for petitioners.
Philip S. Knauer and Thomas F. Cooney, both of Providence, for respondents.
John P. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Michael De Ciantis, Third Asst. Atty. Gen., and John E. Mullen, Fourth Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.
These are four petitions in equity, in the nature of quo warranto, brought in this court under Gen.Laws 1923, c. 322, to determine as between the respective petitioners and respondents the titles to certain state offices.
The petitioners in the first two cases were on January 12, 1932, by the Governor appointed respectively the justice and associate justice of the district court of the Sixth judicial district of the state. Within a few days later their appointments were confirmed by the Senate and they duly qualified. The petitioners in the third and fourth cases were on January 13 and 12, 1932, by the Governor appointed the clerks of the district courts of the Tenth and Eighth judicial districts, respectively. Within a few days later their appointments were confirmed by the Senate and they duly qualified. All these appointments were made under the provisions of Gen.Laws 1923, c. 330, Public Laws 1931, c. 1690. From the establishment of these district courts by the General Assembly in 1886 to the passage of this amending act in 1931, the terms of their justices and clerks had been for 3 years, except during a transition period of a few months. By the amending act, they had been changed to 6 years. The petitioners assumed their respective offices on February 1, 1932, the beginning of their terms, and continued until June 21, 1935, to perform the duties of these offices, to which they claim to be still entitled.
The respondents were appointed by the Governor to these respective offices on June 18, 1935. Having duly qualified therefor according to law, they entered on the performance of the duties of such offices on June 21, 1935, and excluded the petitioners therefrom. The appointment of the respondents and their entry upon such offices were according to the provisions of Pub. Laws 1935, c. 2253, enacted at the May session. Section 1 of that act purported to so amend the abovementioned Pub.Laws 1931, c. 1690, that, beginning with February 1, 1932, the terms of the justices and clerks of all the district courts would be for three years, just as they had been before 1931. In other words, this section, if valid, in effect merely repealed that part of chapter 1690 which changed the terms of such justices and clerks from 3 years to 6 years. That such was the intent of the General Assembly in enacting that section is clear from its language, when compared with the chapter of the Public Laws being amended, although such language was not well chosen.
Section 2 of this act of 1935 provided that the term of office of every justice and clerk of a district court then holding office should terminate on May 31, 1935, but that they should continue to hold office and perform their duties until their respective successors were appointed and qualified. It also provided that the rights of any of the justices to retirement pay should not be impaired, and provided for the appointment by the Governor of persons to fill the vacancies in these offices until the end of January, 1938. Some of the former justices were reappointed; the others and all the clerks were replaced by new appointees.
The ultimate issue before us is the constitutionality of this act, which by repealing a part of the act of 1931 restored the terms of the justices and clerks of the district courts to what they had been for 45 years, and as a result thereof reduced the terms actually enjoyed by the justices and clerks appointed in 1932 to 3 years, 4 months, and 20 days.
Each petitioner asserts in his petition that the act is invalid because contrary to the clear intent of article 3 of the Constitution of Rhode Island, wherein it is declared that: "The powers of the government shall be distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive and judicial"; and also because the General Assembly is powerless, under the Constitution of Rhode Island, to remove such justice (or clerk) during his term of office, except by impeachment.
The respondents, besides opposing these petitions on their merits, also moved that they be dismissed on the ground that they are too general and indefinite, in that they do not point out any section or article of the Constitution which restricts or prohibits the General Assembly from cutting short, as it did, the existing terms of the petitioners. They cite and discuss several opinions of this court in which are stated strict requirements of definiteness and particularity in the specification of the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated, for bringing a constitutional question before this court.
This court has held that it will not pass upon the question of the unconstitutionality of an act of the General Assembly, unless the party raising the issue specifically designates the particular portion of the Constitution which he claims is violated by the legislative act. It is necessary to particularize to the fullest extent possible. Blais v. Franklin, 30 R.I. 413, 75 A. 399. We are unanimously of the opinion that the present petitions fail to comply with these requirements, but the question raised is of such public importance, and the arguments and authorities have been so fully presented, that we deem it advisable to decide it now upon its merits. Our leniency in this instance, however, is not to be taken as a precedent. We therefore deny the motions to dismiss.
For the purposes of this opinion, we shall assume, without, however, deciding the question, that the petitioners who are clerks of district courts have the same status in law as the petitioners who are justices of said courts, and that their cases rest on the same foundation as those of the justices.
Before entering upon the discussion of the contentions presented to us in support of the petitions, we deem it proper to state certain fundamental rules which are well settled as being those which should be applied when any court is performing its supreme and most solemn function of deciding whether a legislative act passed by the legislative department of the same government is invalid, because it violates the higher law enacted directly by the people in the Constitution.
The first of these rules is that the courts "approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." 6 R.C.L. 74.
The petitioners in these proceedings have the burden of establishing their contentions beyond a reasonable doubt. All laws regularly enacted by the Legislature are presumed to be constitutional and valid. Fritz v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 207, 116 A. 419. It is the duty of this court to uphold the validity and constitutionality of legislative acts until the contrary clearly appears. La-Plante v. State Board of Public Roads, 47 R.I. 258, 131 A. 641. Every intendment in favor of such validity is made by this court unless the repugnancy of the act to the Constitution appears upon its face. Manufacturers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 41 R.I. 277, 103 A. 931. In the language of Shaw, C. J., in Re Wellington et al. Petitioners, 16 Pick.(Mass.) 87, 95, 26 Am. Dec. 631, this court, in the performance of so solemn a duty, "will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light on the subject, and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed * * * beyond reasonable doubt." This requirement that the court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute in question is repugnant to some provision in the Constitution is stated and applied in many other Rhode Island cases. It is clearly the correct rule, and will be applied by us.
The next fundamental principle which must be kept in mind by us in deciding the present question of constitutionality is that the question is purely one of legislative power and not at all one of sound policy.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Hughes, J, in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, at page 569, 31 S.Ct. 259, 263, 55 L.Ed. 328, says:
That we do not believe that any law, the constitutionality of which is brought in question before us, is in accordance with sound principles of good...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), In re
...vacant without a showing of cause, was a legislative function, still entrusted to the General Assembly. In Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 24-25, 186 A. 832, 844-45 (1936), the late Justice William A. Moss, in expressing the sentiments of the majority, wrote that if the framers of the consti......
-
Moreau v. Flanders
...and we do not declare a statute void unless we find it to be constitutionally defective beyond a reasonable doubt. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 7, 186 A. 832, 837 (1936). Moreover, we will attach to the enactment every reasonable intendment in favor of constitutionality. Gem Plumbing & He......
-
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
...ratified as article 9, section 6, of the Constitution, a section that did not prohibit dual office holding. Cf. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 15-16, 186 A. 832, 841 (1936) (Landholders Constitution rejected rigid separation of powers Although the complete commingling of governmental duties......
-
Mosby v. Devine
...1 ("This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void."); Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 10, 186 A. 832, 838 (1936) (the constitution vests all legislative power in the General Assembly, save that which the constitution expressly limit......