Gorman v. Fitts

• Citation: 80 Conn. 531,69 A. 357
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 14 April 1908
• Parties: GORMAN v. FITTS.

69 A. 357

80 Conn. 531

GORMAN

v. FITTS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 14, 1908.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Action for breach of marriage promise by Bridget Theresa Gorman against Thomas K. Fitts. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Arthur F. Eggleston and William A. King, for appellant. Charles E. Perkins and Joseph L. Barbour, for appellee.

BALDWIN, C. J. On the trial it was undisputed that the plaintiff and defendant became first acquainted in 1869, when she was a girl of 16 and he a man of 38, both being in the service of one Clark in Hartford, she as a housemaid, and he as a gardener; that in 1872 she married one Gorman, who separated himself from her in 1888, returning after four years, leaving her again in 1901, and dying in April, 1903; and that in the latter year the defendant was a farmer in Ashford, having represented his town three times in the General Assembly and also in the constitutional convention of 1902, and owning considerable property. He denied having made any offer or promise of marriage. The action was brought in 1906.

In connection with testimony from the plaintiff that he had made her such a promise early in November, 1903, she was permitted to state that, while they were in Mr. Clark's service, the defendant paid her special attentions, made her presents, and took her to drive and to the theater, and on an excursion to New London; that in 1872, after publication of the banns of her marriage, the defendant told her that he felt very badly about it, had meant to marry her, and, if he had been more forward, would have been in Mr. Gorman's place; that, when this was said, both fell into tears; and that, while her husband was living apart from her, the defendant told her that, when the desertion had continued long enough to enable her to get a divorce, he would marry her. The evidence thus admitted tended to show that during certain periods in the past the parties had been in relations of intimacy and affection. Had the acts and conversations described taken place shortly before the time when, as the plaintiff asserted, an offer of marriage was made by the defendant, proof of them would plainly have been admissible, as tending to show that such an offer was a natural consequence. That some of them occurred when the plaintiff had a husband living was immaterial. Smith v. Hall, 69 Conn. 631, 664, 38 Atl. 386. Their remoteness detracted from their weight; but it was well within the discretion of the trial court to admit proof that they took place. Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154, 166, 33 Atl. 998; Leonard v. Gillette, 79 Conn. 664, 668, 66 Atl. 502. For similar reasons there was no error in receiving the plaintiff's testimony that, after her husband left her the second time, the defendant expressed to her his regret that he had not built her a house and given it to her, as a residence for herself and her children. Having further testified, without objection or exception, that in November, 1903, she was keeping about 20 boarders in Hartford, and upon and in consequence of her engagement to marry the defendant gave them. each notice to go, and broke up her establishment, she was allowed to testify against objection that in giving these notices she informed one of her boarders, a Miss Welch, that she did not intend to keep boarders any longer, as sue was engaged to be married to the defendant in the following spring. Miss Welch was also allowed, against objection, to testify to the same point. It was not claimed that the defendant was present when these remarks were made. No averment was made in the complaint that the plaintiff had been in business as a boarding house keeper, and dropped it in consequence of the promise of marriage, nor were any special damages claimed. There was other testimony that the defendant, upon their engagement, requested her to dismiss her boarders, so that she could prepare for their marriage. It is unnecessary to inquire whether the testimony now in question was properly received; because in the charge to the jury they were informed that they must exclude it altogether from consideration, as in the opinion of the court the correctness of admitting it might be questionable. It is clearly to be presumed, when the contrary does not appear, that a jury follows the instructions of the court in making up its verdict. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 459, 26 L. Ed. 141. An error in admitting testimony can be cured by suitable directions to the jury subsequently given; and those in the case at bar were clear and explicit. Any other doctrine would seriously impair the value of the jury system. In the course of a trial objections to the reception of evidence must often be passed on with little opportunity for reflection or for consultation of authorities. It makes for the due administration of justice that errors in such rulings should be the subject of correction at any time before the cause is submitted to the jury.

The plaintiff introduced two letters which she sent him in September and October, 1905, stating that he had long professed affection for her, quoting some lines of verse, expressive of such sentiment, as having been addressed to her by him in her girlhood, referring to an engagement of marriage between them as made in 1903, and publicly announced, and reproaching him for what seemed to be a recent change in his feelings. On the defendant's cross-examination he, having testified that he had never known the plaintiff not to be a truthful woman, that he never sent her the lines of verse, and that he had never written to her in his life, was asked if he believed her to be a truthful woman. The question was objected to, but admitted, and he answered, "Yes." The answer had some bearing on the question of the truth of his statement that he had never written to her. He admitted that he had received the letters. In view of their statements as to his expressions of affection and engagement of marriage made by one whom he believed to be a truthful person, why, if they were erroneous, did he not answer it and make some explanation or denial? This was an argument that might not unfairly be pressed upon the jury, and the admission of this foundation for it was well within the discretion of the court. Leonard v. Gillette, 79 Conn. 669, 66 Atl. 502.

The defendant, on his direct examination, testified that shortly before the suit was brought he received a letter from Mr. Barbour, the attorney who afterwards instituted it and...