Gormley v. State Employees Retirement Com'n

• Decision Date: 27 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 14067,14067
• Citation: 216 Conn. 523,582 A.2d 764
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph T. GORMLEY, Jr. v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

Page 764

582 A.2d 764

216 Conn. 523

Joseph T. GORMLEY, Jr. v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

No. 14067.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 2, 1990.

Decided Nov. 27, 1990.

Robert A. Whitehead, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Richard J. Seserman, Hartford, with whom was Joseph T. Gormley, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, COVELLO, BORDEN and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the application to the plaintiff of General Statutes § 51-287(e), ¹ which provides for the suspension of pension benefits to a retired state's attorney who is receiving benefits under the state's attorney's retirement fund (SARF) and who is subsequently appointed a judge, constituted an impermissible retrospective application of that statute in violation of General Statutes § 55-3. ² The trial court reversed a declaratory ruling of the state employees retirement commission (commission) that suspended the plaintiff's pension and demanded the return of benefits paid after his appointment as a judge. Because at the time of the plaintiff's retirement § 51-287 did not require him to choose between retaining his benefits or accepting a judgeship, the court held that the application of § 51-287(e), enacted after the plaintiff's retirement but previous to his appointment, constituted the retrospective imposition of a "new obligation" in violation of § 55-3. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, we transferred the case to ourselves. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. In 1962, the plaintiff was appointed a per diem assistant state's attorney and, in 1963, was appointed an assistant state's attorney for Fairfield county. In 1969, the plaintiff was appointed state's attorney for that county and thereafter, in 1973, was appointed Connecticut's chief state's attorney. From 1962 until his retirement in 1978, the plaintiff contributed 5 percent of his salary to SARF as statutorily mandated. General Statutes § 51-278(b)(3). ³ SARF is administered and funded separately from the state employees retirement fund (SERF).

In October, 1978, the plaintiff retired and began receiving an actuarially reduced retirement income, having satisfied the statutory requirements of at least ten years of creditable service. See General Statutes § 51-287(c). ⁴ At the time of his retirement, § 51-287(e) was not a part of SARF and, as distinguished from SERF, SARF contained no provision for the suspension of pension rights upon a retiree's reemployment with the state. ⁵

In 1985, the legislature enacted No. 85-517, § 4, of the 1985 Public Acts, which provided: "Any such [state's] attorney who is retired under this section and who is appointed a judge shall not receive a retirement salary pursuant to this section during the period such retired attorney serves as a judge." The 1985 public act is now codified as General Statutes § 51-287(e). In July, 1987, the plaintiff was sworn in as a Superior Court judge, and continued to collect his SARF pension until November, 1988. At that time, the commission, acting pursuant to § 51-287(e), suspended the plaintiff's retirement income and demanded repayment of $26,049.18, the amount paid to the plaintiff after his appointment.

The plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling from the commission claiming that his pension income from SARF became a vested contractual or statutory right upon his retirement in 1978, and, therefore, that either § 55-3 or the impairment of contracts clause of article one, § 10, of the constitution of the United States ⁶ prohibited the application of § 51-287(e) to him. After a fact-finding hearing, the commission issued a declaratory ruling that, although the plaintiff had acquired statutory rights in SARF, § 51-287(e) operated to suspend those rights during the time of the plaintiff's appointment.

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that the application of § 51-287(e) to him (1) constituted an impermissible retroactive application of the statute, and (2) impaired vested contractual or statutory rights in his pension in violation of the federal constitution's contract clause. See footnote 6, supra. The trial court reversed the decision of the commission, concluding that the application of § 51-287(e) to the plaintiff operated as an impermissible retroactive application of that statute. In view of that conclusion, the court did not address the issue of whether § 51-287(e) unconstitutionally impaired the vested rights of the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

In enacting § 51-287(e), the legislature intended to prevent "double-dipping," the collection by one person of a pension and a salary, both paid by the state. The parties agree that the legislature intended this statute to apply prospectively only. ⁷ They disagree, however, over whether the application of § 51-287(e) to the plaintiff constitutes a retrospective application. The commission claims that the application of the statute to the plaintiff was prospective only, because it was the appointment to a judgeship seventeen months after the statute was enacted, and not the retirement and receipt of retirement income seven years prior to the enactment, that triggered the statute. ⁸ Therefore, according to the commission, no new obligation was being placed upon the plaintiff in violation of § 55-3. The plaintiff claims that because he possessed vested statutory or contractual rights in his pension on retirement, the application of § 51-287(e) to him after his retirement would impose a "new obligation" in violation of § 55-3, because it would require him to choose between maintaining his pension or accepting the judgeship. ⁹ We conclude that § 51-287(e) must be interpreted narrowly so as not to apply to the plaintiff, because to do otherwise would impose a "new obligation" on him in violation of § 55-3.

In describing the application of new legislation to preexisting transactions, § 55-3 provides that "[n]o provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect." "The 'obligations' referred to in the statute are those of substantive law"; Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180, 186, 423 A.2d 875 (1979); and "[l]egislation which limits or increases statutory liability has generally been held to be substantive in nature." Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 457, 262 A.2d 174 (1969). "[W]e have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only." Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 467, 556 A.2d 145 (1989); Westport v. State, 204 Conn. 212, 219, 527 A.2d 1177 (1987). "The legislature only rebuts this presumption when it 'clearly and unequivocally' expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively." Darak v. Darak, supra, 210 Conn. at 468, 556 A.2d 145; see also State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 741, 517 A.2d 610 (1986).

It is undisputed that prior to the enactment of § 51-287(e), the plaintiff would have been entitled to collect both his retirement income and a salary upon being appointed a judge. General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 51-287; Opinion of the Attorney General, January 30, 1984 (state's attorney retired under SARF entitled to collect pension and to collect salary once appointed as a judge). The commission does not contend otherwise. The dispositive fact is not that the plaintiff was appointed as a judge seventeen months after that enactment, but that seven years earlier, when he had retired as chief state's attorney, he was statutorily entitled to receive a pension. See footnote 8, supra. He then began receiving his pension, and it is the provisions of the plan at that time that are controlling on him. The application of § 51-287(e) would impose upon the plaintiff a new obligation, that of choosing between the continuing receipt of his pension benefits or accepting a judgeship, an obligation "to which he was not subject prior to its passage." Little v. Ives, supra, 158 Conn. at 457, 262 A.2d 174. The plaintiff's substantive right to continue to receive his pension regardless of his future employment would be implicated by the imposition of this new obligation. Such an implication would violate the presumed legislative intent embodied in § 55-3, unless the legislature "clearly and unequivocally" indicated that the statute was to apply retrospectively. Darak v. Darak, supra. We can find no such clear and unequivocal indication that the legislature intended § 51-287(e) to apply to persons already collecting SARF retirement benefits. Neither the statute's language nor its legislative history; see footnote 7, supra; provides that clarity or lack of equivocation.

The commission argues that two cases, Nagle v. Wood, supra, 178 Conn. at 188, 423 A.2d 875, and Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 148, 3 A.2d 839 (1939), nevertheless support its claim that the statute is being applied prospectively to the plaintiff. These cases are distinguishable.

In Massa v. Nastri, supra, the court addressed whether a statute allowing a guest passenger to recover for personal injuries where the driver was a negligent operator, as opposed to a heedless or reckless operator, could be applied to a driver who had negligently injured a party prior to the statute's passage. The court determined that the defendant's legal exemption from a demand of another was as much of a vested property interest as was the plaintiff's cause of action. Id., at 148, 3 A.2d 839. The court also held that to allow the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant for mere negligence,...