Gorski v. LOCAL UNION 134, INTERN. BROTH.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85 C 05352.,85 C 05352.
• Citation: 636 F. Supp. 1174
• Parties: Marie Louise GORSKI, etc., Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION 134, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

636 F. Supp. 1174

Marie Louise GORSKI, etc., Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION 134, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant.

No. 85 C 05352.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

May 14, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Benjamin P. Hyink, Drugas, Morgan & Hyink, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Robert E. Fitzgerald, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

Marie Louise Gorski ("Gorski")¹ initially sued Federal Signal Corporation ("Signal") and Local Union No. 134, IBEW ("Union") under Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") § 301 ("Section 301"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, claiming:

1. Signal breached its collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with Union by unilaterally reclassifying jobs after the CBA-established cutoff date for such reclassification.

2. Union breached its duty of fair representation toward Signal employees by conspiring with Signal to allow the job reclassifications.

Thereafter Gorski filed a first amended complaint (the "Complaint"), dropping Signal as a party defendant but reasserting her claims against Union.

This Court has inherited the case² with a fully-briefed motion by Union:

1. to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rules") 12(b)(1), (2) and (6); or

2. for summary judgment under Rule 56; or

3. to strike Gorski's prayer for punitive damages.³

Treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,⁴ the motion is granted.

Facts⁵

Signal and Union entered into the CBA December 28, 1981 (¶ 12). Gorski is a Signal employee and Union member subject to the CBA (¶¶ 8, 10). In part the CBA establishes job classifications and corresponding wage rates for Signal's hourly employees (Ex. 1 at 38-46, 52-60). CBA § 22.1 ("Section 22.1") sets the terms on which Signal may add or revise job classifications (id. at 36):

After a new or revised job classification has been established for a period of thirty (30) days, the Union may within the following thirty (30) days discuss this new or revised job classification and rate of pay and the effective dates for the rate of pay with the Company. Where the parties cannot agree upon the new or revised job classification and/or applicable rate, the Union may file a grievance at Step (c) of the grievance procedure. If such grievance thereafter goes to arbitration, the arbitrator shall only determine whether the rate for the new or revised job classification bears a fair and equitable relationship to existing rates.

When Signal and Union executed the CBA, Signal had a plant in Blue Island, Illinois (¶ 13). However, the CBA contemplated a possible move from that location, for CBA § 22.2 ("Section 22.2") provides (Ex. 1 at 36):

If during the term of this Agreement, the Company transfers any or all of its Blue Island operations to a location within the Greater Metropolitan Area of Chicago, the provision of Section 22.1 above shall not apply. The foregoing shall become effective with the installation of the first operation installed at the new location and shall end two (2) years after the last operation has been moved to the new location or upon the termination date of this Agreement, whichever date occurs the sooner; unless extended by agreement between the Company and the Union.

Signal in fact moved its Blue Island operations to Chicago. In March or April 1985 (presumably after the two-year deadline had passed, else there would be no current dispute⁶) Union Business Manager William Neylon ("Neylon") agreed on Union's behalf to extend the job reclassification period (¶ 14). In so doing, Neylon did not consult Union's Executive Board (id.), nor had he read the CBA and familiarized himself with Section 22.1 (¶ 23).

On April 29, 1985 Neylon asked Union's members to vote in favor of opening contract discussions with Signal (¶ 15). Along with a simple yes/no ballot, Neylon circulated the following explanation (Ex. 3, emphasis in original):

A. A YES VOTE — You agree to allow management and your Union representatives to meet and discuss the proposals of the management for a new contract without opening the current contract. You also agree that if your representatives and the management arrive at any mutually agreeable proposals, only then would an additional new vote be taken to consider a re-opening of the contract. Additionally, you agree to delay your May 1st 4% increase while these discussions are in progress, until either a new agreement is reached, voted upon, and accepted or, if no agreement is accepted by July 1, 1985, the wages and the job reclassifications would be enacted retroactive to May 1st.

B. A NO VOTE — You do not agree to discussions now, nor do you agree to the suspension of your May 1st 4% increase. Therefore, the company would not only pay the 4% increase as of May 1st, but also proceed with its job reclassifications, including accompanying wage adjustments.

Gorski believes the vote was 361 "no" to 31 "yes" (¶ 15).

Nevertheless some Union-Signal discussions took place, for on May 9 Signal's Acting Plant Manager Jim Lemmons ("Lemmons") sent Union Shop Steward Don Davis ("Davis") the following letter (Ex. 4):

Don,

It has been alleged that you, on Monday, May 6, 1985, notified numerous people in the factory that their new rate of pay would be $6.84/hour. I hope this is not true, but is clear the employees have information as to the amount of this rate.

It is important that you recognize our expectations of your role as steward. This information was privileged until officially released by the Company Management to the workers. Advance notice has created unnecessary anguish for some employees who were not affected.

I would appreciate hearing back from you in writing as to this allegation.

Then on May 13 Signal announced a job reclassification resulting in pay or benefits cuts for some 45% of CBA-covered employees (¶¶ 17, 24). Within 48 hours many Signal employees grieved that reclassification under the first step of the CBA grievance procedure (¶ 19).⁷ Receiving no relief at that step, the employees submitted a written grievance to a Signal officer and Chief Union Steward T. Pesavento ("Pesavento"). Pesavento refused to accept the grievance or to pursue it (¶ 19).

Neylon submitted a new ballot to Union members May 24 for a proposed May 28 meeting and May 29 vote (¶ 20). That ballot read (Ex. 5):

GIVE THE UNION REPS THE RIGHT TO GO IN AND TALK TO THE COMPANY ABOUT THE CONTRACT IN AFFECT MAY 7, 1985. IF SOMETHING COMES OUT OF THESE TALKS THE PEOPLE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE WHETHER TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE PROPOSAL.

YES NO

But on May 28 Neylon cancelled the proposed meeting, and on May 29 he asked Union's stewards to obtain the view of each Union member personally (¶ 20).

Signal denied the grievances June 3 (¶ 21).⁸ Later that month Neylon held a meeting with Union members at which he admitted he had not read the CBA before agreeing to extend the job-reclassification period (¶ 23).

Contentions of the Parties

Gorski seeks principally the difference between her actual income and benefits received since May 13, 1985 and what she would have received absent the job reclassification.⁹ Her theory of Union's liability is (¶ 30):

As a result of SIGNAL's wholesale job reclassification adversely affecting plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, defendant, Union, breached its statutory duty of fair representation owing to plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, as alleged above....

Even aside from the causal ambiguity in that statement,¹⁰ the Complaint does not clearly single out the acts on which Gorski bases her claim. Several of the Complaint's allegations initially carried that potential:

1. Neylon had no authority to agree on Union's behalf to extend the Section 22.1 job reclassification period (¶ 18).

2. Pesavento "arbitrarily refused" to accept or pursue the grievances (¶ 19).

3. Union "unlawfully permitted" Signal to reclassify jobs (¶ 22).

4. Union's negotiations with Signal over the grievances were (id.):

spurious, carried on in bad faith, and were deliberately designed to aid SIGNAL in creating new job classifications....

5. Neylon had not read the CBA before agreeing to extend the Section 22.1 reclassification period (¶ 23).

6. Union's agreement to extend the job reclassification period foreclosed employees' rights to grieve their reclassifications (¶ 24).

Gorski's Mem. 4-5 narrows down the scope of her Complaint considerably:

It is vital to note from the start that the breach of the duty of fair representation, upon which this action is based, arises solely from the manner in which Union arrived at its decision to extend the time period provided for in the CBA for SIGNAL's job reclassification. The breach herein complained of in no way relates to Union's conduct with regard to the grievances made by GORSKI and the others. The case at bar, simply stated, presents a situation in which Union arrived at a decision of great import to the employment rights under the CBA of GORSKI and all others similarly situated in an arbitrary and wrongful fashion and in a manner wholly lacking in rational consideration. It is this conduct of Union which constitutes the breach of the statutory duty of fair representation sued upon in this case.

And id. 6 supplies more specifics:

In the instant case, the conduct of NEYLON, in agreeing on behalf of Union to extend the time period in which SIGNAL could establish new job classifications, without inquiring into the collective bargaining unit's rights under the CBA and without being familiar with the provisions of the CBA at issue, was arbitrary and wrongful and, therefore, constituted a breach of the statutory duty of fair representation.

That exposition brings the Complaint into better focus. Union retorts with several arguments:

1. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Gorski and her potential class members have not exhausted the CBA grievance procedures.

2. Gorski lacks standing to bring this suit because she does

...