Gosch v. Int'l Chapter of Horseshoers & Equine Trades, Local 947

• Decision Date: 03 August 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:16-CV-00544
• Citation: 200 F.Supp.3d 484
• Parties: Austin GOSCH, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL CHAPTER OF HORSESHOERS AND EQUINE TRADES, LOCAL 947, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

200 F.Supp.3d 484

Austin GOSCH, Plaintiff,

v.INTERNATIONAL CHAPTER OF HORSESHOERS AND EQUINE TRADES, LOCAL 947, Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:16-CV-00544

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 3, 2016

Filed August 4, 2016

Kathryn L. Simpson, Mette, Evans & Woodside, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Ira H. Weinstock, Ira H. Weinstock, P.C., Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

William W. Caldwell, United States District Judge

Plaintiff, who worked as a gate-crew employee on a horse racing track, sues his labor union (Defendant) for breach of the duty of fair representation. The claim's focus is on Defendant's alleged decision not to arbitrate a grievance on Plaintiff's behalf, against his former employer, Hollywood Casino at Penn National Race Course (the "Casino"). The action was originally filed in state court; however, Defendant filed a notice of removal, asserting that the action could have originally been filed here because the Court has federal-question jurisdiction. Plaintiff, through his pending motion to remand, disagrees with Defendant. At the forefront is whether Plaintiff pleads a state-law claim and, if so, whether the claim is completely preempted by federal law. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff pleads a state-law claim that is not completely preempted by federal law, federal-question jurisdiction is lacking. Plaintiff's motion to remand will be granted.

I. Background and Procedural History

On February 18, 2016, Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, filed a civil complaint against Defendant in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1-2 at 2-9).

According to Plaintiff, he was employed by the Casino as a gate-crew employee, on a horse racing track. (Id. at 3, 4; see Doc. 6 at 1). Plaintiff also performed "ponying functions" on the same race track, as an "independent contractor." (Doc. 1-2 at 3). In other words, in addition to his job as a gate-crew employee, Plaintiff was paid to lead horses into racing gates. (Id.).

In 2015, Defendant, a labor union, was certified by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ("PLRB"), under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act ("PLRA"), as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining unit for gate-crew and valet-crew employees on the race track, at the Casino. (Id. at 3, 11-12). After certification, Defendant and the Casino approved a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). (Doc. 1-2 at 4, 11). Accordingly, as a gate-crew employee, Plaintiff became represented by Defendant under the terms of the CBA. (See id. at 4).

Indeed, the CBA provided that gate-crew and valet-crew employees employed by the Casino were required to be members of the union. (See id. at 12, 13). Relevant to this case, the CBA also provided for a grievance and arbitration procedure. (Id. at 17-18). The CBA further prohibited "Unit Employees"¹ from performing "services for pay for other employers or individuals during times when such Unit Employees are working for the [Casino]." (Id. at 26). But valet-crew employees were permitted to accept "gratuities from the Jockeys with whom they work[ed]." (Id. at 26).

After the CBA went into effect, Plaintiff received a "documented verbal warning" from the Casino. (Id. at 4, 29). Plaintiff "was warned that according to the CBA he [was] not allowed to be employed by another employer while performing work for [the Casino at the race track]." (Id. at 29). Plaintiff was also "told to finish up his outside contracts," relating to his "ponying" activities. (Id.). Then, a week later, Plaintiff received a "written warning" because, in violation of the CBA, he "continued to escort horses to the starting gate." (Id. at 4, 31). The written warning also explained that Plaintiff's "[f]ailure to comply with the CBA [would] result in further disciplinary actions, up to and including separation." (Id. at 31).

On the day after Plaintiff received a written warning, he asked his Shop Steward² to set up a meeting to discuss a problem arising out of the CBA. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff took that course of action, in compliance with the CBA's grievance procedure.

(See id. at 17). Plaintiff wanted to grieve the warnings he received "because the Casino was permitting the [v]alets to continue the past practice of working for another employer, [while] denying him the [same] right." (Id. at 5). In Plaintiff's view, he was being treated unfairly or discriminated against. (Id.).

The Shop Steward, however, did not set up any meetings. (Id. at 4). After Plaintiff informed Defendant that the Shop Steward did not set up any meetings, the union proceeded to review Plaintiff's grievance itself. (See id. at 5). In that regard, Defendant held an "informal" telephone conference. (Id.). During the conference, Plaintiff asked Defendant to have its attorney review his grievance. (Id. at 6). Not long after, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it reviewed his grievance and found that the grievance lacked merit. (Id. at 6, 33).

Plaintiff then attempted to have another, similar grievance filed. (Id. at 6). Defendant, though, rejected it, claiming that it lacked merit. (Id. at 6, 38). In the end, the Casino terminated Plaintiff's employment "because he would not choose between his work as a member of the gate crew and the independent contractor role of ponying." (Id. at 6).

Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant for breach of the duty of fair representation, seeking injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling Defendant to file a grievance with the Casino nunc pro tunc. (Id. at 7-8; see Doc. 11 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's decision not to arbitrate a grievance on his behalf was arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith. Plaintiff did not allege any sources of law.

Before filing his civil complaint, moreover, Plaintiff filed unfair-labor-practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and PLRB. (Doc. 6 at 2, 6-7; Doc. 13-1 at 1-3).

The PLRB informed Plaintiff that no complaint would be issued. (Doc. 13-1 at 5-6). According to the PLRB, even if Plaintiff had filed a charge under the PLRA, rather than the Pennsylvania Employe Relations Act ("PERA"), he failed to state a cause of action within the Board's jurisdiction to remedy. The PLRB noted that the civil courts (not the Board) possessed exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims for breaches of the duty of fair representation. (Id. at 5).

The NLRB informed Plaintiff that it would not get involved in labor disputes concerning horse racing tracks. (See Doc. 6 at 2; Doc. 13-1 at 7, 13). Consequently, Plaintiff withdrew the NLRB charge against Defendant. (Doc. 6 at 2, 8).

On February 22, 2016, Plaintiff served his civil complaint on Defendant, and, on March 11, 2016, Defendant received it. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2). Thereafter, on March 30, 2016, Defendant filed a notice of removal in this Court. (Doc. 1). According to Defendant, this Court has federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action, in that the claim raised therein is a federal claim, governed by Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and is otherwise completely preempted³ by the same federal law. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-11).

Since Defendant removed this action, Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand. (Doc. 5). In his motion, Plaintiff's basic premise is that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. According to him, the duty-of-fair-representation claim is a state-law claim that is not preempted by federal law. (See id.). Plaintiff's motion to remand has been fully briefed, (Docs. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13; see Doc. 10), and is ripe for review.⁴

II. Removal and Motions to Remand

When a plaintiff moves to remand, federal district courts must turn to the "comprehensive statutory scheme" enacted by Congress regarding the removal of state-court actions to federal court. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp. , 48 F.3d 742, 745 (3d Cir.1995) (referring to the statutory-removal scheme as "comprehensive"). This statutory scheme can be found in the United States Code at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 –1455. In this case, three sections of the statutory scheme are particularly relevant: 1441, 1446, and 1447.

Section 1441 provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In plainer language, "a defendant may remove an action brought in state court to federal district court if the claims fall within the scope of federal [subject-matter] jurisdiction." Tuckey v. Intermatic, Inc. , No. 1:13–CV–2096, 2014 WL 281692, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 24, 2014) (Conner, C.J.)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ; Allbritton Commc'ns Co. v. N . L . R . B . , 766 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir.1985) ).

"The two primary types of ‘[federal subject-matter] jurisdiction’ that § 1441(a) contemplates are diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction." Federal National Mortgage Association v. Preston , No. 4:15–CV–01739, 2015 WL 6751064, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 5, 2015) (Brann, J.); see Schulman v. MyWebGrocer, Inc. , No. 14–CV–7252, 2015 WL 3447224, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015) ("A case may be removed from state court to federal court only if it could have originally been commenced in federal court on either the basis of federal question or diversity jurisdiction."). Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—[ ] citizens of different states." See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Moreover, " ‘[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is [normally] governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a...