Gose v. Bd. of County Com'rs of County of McKinley

• Citation: 727 F.Supp.2d 1256
• Decision Date: 05 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. CIV 10-0424 JB/RHS,CIV 10-0424 JB/RHS
• Parties: Charity GOSE, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF McKINLEY and Unknown Persons 1-100, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

727 F.Supp.2d 1256

Charity GOSE, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF McKINLEY and Unknown Persons 1-100, Defendants.

No. CIV 10-0424 JB/RHS.

United States District Court,

D. New Mexico.

July 5, 2010.

William G. Stripp, Ramah, NM, for the Plaintiff.

William D. Slease, Jonlyn M. Martinez, Slease & Martinez, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant Board of County Commissioners of the County of McKinley.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed May 14, 2010 (Doc. 5). The primaryissue is whether Plaintiff Charity Gose's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA §§ 41-4-1 through 41-4-27 ("NMTCA"), are barred as untimely. Because the statute of limitations for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment begins to run, under New Mexico law, when the imprisonment ends, and because Gose filed her Complaint for Damages Due to a Deprivation of Rights Secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United States and New Mexico Pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 et seq.), filed May 3, 2010 (Doc. 1-1)("Complaint"), within two years of the end of her imprisonment, her NMTCA claims are timely, and the Court will deny the motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, on October 9, 2007, the Sierra County District Court issued a bench warrant for Gose's arrest based on an alleged probation violation. See Complaint ¶ 9, at 3. In November 2007, she was arrested on a bench warrant in McKinley County and incarcerated at the McKinley County Detention Center. See Complaint ¶ 10, at 3. On December 18, 2007, the State withdrew its motion to revoke Gose's probation, and the Sierra County District Court ordered her released to the NCI Treatment Center in Gallup, New Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 12, at 3.

On April 1, 2008, Gose was re-arrested on the same bench warrant which had been issued on October 9, 2007. Gose alleges that the warrant "was not cleared from NCIC." ¹ Complaint ¶ 10, at 3. She was placed in the McKinley County Detention Center. See Complaint ¶ 13, at 3. On April 29, 2008, the Honorable Edmund H. Kase, III, Sierra County District Judge, signed a Stipulated Order to Recall Bench Warrant and Remove from NCIC. See Complaint ¶ 14, at 3. The Order stated, in relevant part:

This Matter having come before the Court upon the Parties['] stipulation that the Defendant was illegally arrested a second time on April 1, 2008 on a bench warrant issued by the Court on 10/9/07 ... and on which the Defendant had a First Appearance on 12/4/07. Despite the numerous attempts by the State and the APPO, the detention center in McKinley County has not provided a return for the Defendant's arrest in late 2007. The bench warrant should have been cleared from NCIC at that time, but apparently never was, resulting in the Defendant's rearrest on 4/1/08.

Complaint ¶ 14, at 3-4. Gose was subsequently released from jail. See Complaint ¶ 13, at 3. Gose alleges that she was subjected to false arrest and false imprisonment from April 1, 2008 through April 30, 2008 because of the failure of McKinley County law-enforcement officers and/or corrections officers to clear the bench warrant or to file a return of service of the bench warrant, which was served on Gose in November 2007. See Complaint ¶ 17, at 4.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The procedural facts are not in dispute. Gose's Complaint, filed in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, County of McKinley, New Mexico on April 21, 2010, assertsclaims of false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the NMTCA. On May 3, 2010, Defendant Board of County Commissioners of the County of McKinley ("McKinley County") removed the case to federal court. See Defendant's Notice of Removal, filed May 3, 2010 (Doc. 1).

McKinley County moves the Court to dismiss Gose's false arrest and false imprisonment claims brought under the NMTCA as untimely. See Motion at 1. McKinley County argues that Gose's state claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations and, because she was arrested on April 1, 2008, but did not file her Complaint until April 21, 2010, the statute of limitations had expired, her state claims are barred, and the Court should dismiss them. McKinley County requests that the Court dismiss the state claims in Gose's Complaint with prejudice.

In her response, Gose concedes that, under NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15A, her claims filed under the NMTCA must be filed within two years of the date of the occurrence. See Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 1, filed May 28, 2010 (Doc. 7). Gose argues, however, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until her false imprisonment ended on April 30, 2008, and thus her state claims are timely. See Response at 1. Gose requests that the Court deny McKinley County's motion to dismiss. See Response at 2.

On June 3, 2010, McKinley County filed a Notice of Completion of Briefing. See Doc. 8. Pursuant to the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, D.N.M. LR-Civ. 7.3(b), McKinley County notified the Court that briefing is complete on its motion to dismiss and that the motion is ready for decision. Thus, there are only two documents before the Court: (i) the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; and (ii) the Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which it can grant relief. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true well-pled factual allegations, but also consider whether "they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Barrett v. Orman, 373 Fed.Appx. 823, 825 (10th Cir.2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Under rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss "admits all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as distinguished from conclusory allegations." Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 386 (10th Cir.1976) (citing Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1969)). A motion to dismiss is a request to dismiss a case before discovery has taken place and thus permits only an assessment whether a complaint is sufficient on its face. In adjudicating a motion to dismiss, a court may neither grant the motion because it believes it is unlikely the plaintiff can prove the allegations, see Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2008), nor "weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial" in assessing the motion's merit, Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1999)). It is not the court's role to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present a trial, but rather to determine whether the plaintiff's complaint states a legally sufficient claim upon which the court can grant relief. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d at 1236.

A complaint challenged by a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not requiredetailed factual allegations, but a plaintiff's obligation to set forth the grounds of his or her entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal alterations, citations, and quotations omitted). See Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir.2010) ( "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.")(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). But Dismissal is not appropriate, however, where the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"[T]he Supreme Court recently ... prescribed a new inquiry for us to use in reviewing a dismissal: whether the complaint contains 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted). "The [Supreme] Court explained that a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible' in order to survive a motion to dismiss." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (alterations omitted). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d at 1177 (emphasis in original). The court is not required to accept the plaintiff's conclusions of law or asserted application of law to the alleged facts. See Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir.1994); Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir....