Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co.

Decision Date27 June 1980
Docket Number60759,60826 and 60839,Docket Nos. 60752,Nos. 7-10,s. 7-10
Citation409 Mich. 147,294 N.W.2d 165
PartiesTipton G. GOSE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Michigan Mutual Liability Company and Second Injury Fund, Defendants-Appellants. Louise E. SANDERS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, OLDSMOBILE DIVISION, Defendant and Appellant, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant and Appellee. Louise SANDERS, Plaintiff and Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, OLDSMOBILE DIVISION, Defendant and Appellee, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant and Appellant. Calendar
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O'Hare, P. C., by A. Donald Kadushin, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee Tipton G. Gose.

LeVasseur, Mitseff, Egan & Capp, P. C., Grahame G. Capp, Detroit, for defendants-appellants Monroe Auto Equipment Co. and Michigan Mut. Liability Co.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Richard F. Zapala, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for defendant-appellant Second Injury Fund.

Mitchell, Vilella & Houk, P. C., by Thomas P. Mitchell, Lansing, for Louise E. Sanders.

Anderson, Green, McKay & Roberts, P. C., Lansing, for General Motors Corp., Oldsmobile Division.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

We granted leave to appeal to determine the effect of the doctrine of res judicata upon these workers' compensation claims.

Justice Williams has stated the facts in both cases.

I

The parties do not question that the doctrine of res judicata applies to workers' compensation proceedings; they differ only as to its scope. Plaintiffs assert that only those claims actually litigated in a prior proceeding are barred from relitigation. Defendants argue that res judicata bars those claims actually litigated and also those arising out of the same transaction which plaintiff could have brought in the first action, but did not.

The concerns behind the res judicata principle economy of judicial resources and finality of litigation apply equally to workers' compensation proceedings and other actions. 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 79.71, p. 15-307. While this Court has always maintained that the scope of the doctrine should be the same in each area, 1 we have not been consistent in defining that scope.

Our opinions have endorsed both a narrow and a broad application of the rule. Narrow application bars a second action only if the same question was actually litigated in the first proceeding. 2 Broad application bars as well those claims arising out of the same transaction which plaintiff could have brought, but did not. 3 In recent opinions, we have acknowledged the conflicting language and opted for the broad rule. Gursten v. Kenney, 375 Mich. 330, 334-335, 134 N.W.2d 764 (1965) (order of dismissal); Curry v. City of Detroit, 394 Mich. 327, 332, 231 N.W.2d 57 (1975) (order of summary dismissal).

Our workers' compensation cases also contain conflicting language. 4 Once again, we endorsed the broad rule in our most recent pronouncement:

"This Court has cited with approval the rule set forth in 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 508. See White v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 352 Mich. 201, 89 N.W.2d 439 (1958). This section states:

" 'The general rule with respect to the effect upon the application of the principles of res judicata to decisions under workmen's compensation acts, of a provision authorizing the modification of an award upon a showing of a change in the employee's condition, is that a compensation award is an adjudication as to the condition of the injured workman at the time it is entered, and conclusive of all matters adjudicable at that time, but it is not an adjudication as to the claimant's future condition and does not preclude subsequent awards or subsequent modifications of the original award upon a showing that the employee's physical condition has changed. * * * ' " Hlady v. Wolverine Bolt Co., 393 Mich. 368, 375-376, 224 N.W.2d 856, 858-859 (1975) (emphasis supplied in Hlady ).

I do not share the view expressed in Justice Williams' opinion that we applied a "narrow rule" in Hlady.

There was no disagreement there that res judicata barred all facts adjudicated or adjudicable at the time of the first hearing. There was also no disagreement that the law applied to those facts at such hearing if unchanged would also preclude subsequent redetermination.

We disagreed only over whether a change in the law as would a change in facts permits a subsequent redetermination of an issue.

Thus while we disagreed over whether the rule of res judicata should be applied, there was no dispute over the scope of its coverage if applicable.

The expression in Hlady :

" * * * the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law which were necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of the litigation", Hlady, supra, 376, 224 N.W.2d at 859,

is no expression of a "narrow" rule but a simple affirmation that the rule of res judicata, whatever its breadth, applies equally to facts and law. Barring a change, under the doctrine we all agree neither can be relitigated.

I am not persuaded that the scope of the rule should be narrowed, as plaintiffs urge. A compensation award represents " 'an adjudication as to the condition of the injured workman at the time it is entered.' " Theodore v. Packing Materials, Inc., 396 Mich. 152, 158, 240 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1976), citing 58 Am.Jur., supra. Disability benefits "are a form of income maintenance for persons whose wage earning capacity has been suspended or terminated. A claimant's entitlement to such benefits depends on the circumstances at the time of application and payment". Hlady, supra, 391, 224 N.W.2d at 866 (Levin, J., concurring).

The requirement that he present all of his available claims in a single proceeding is consistent with this purpose of adjudicating the worker's needs. The remedial character of the legislation, if affected at all by this rubric, would scarcely be enhanced by a construction which would authorize piecemeal compensation for an injury.

II

Central to any application of the res judicata rule narrow or broad is the principle that one may not relitigate the identical question once determined. The adjudicative process would fail to serve its social function if it did not have this effect. James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977), ch. 11, p. 530.

I agree with Justice Williams that plaintiff Sanders' second petition is barred because she is asserting the same claim. 5

I disagree with his conclusion that plaintiff Gose's claim should not be barred for the same reason.

There can be but one claim for total and permanent disability. Although the statute recognizes seven alternative bases for it, 6 evidence establishing more than one basis would occasion only one award.

Gose's second petition, although upon a different basis (insanity instead of industrial loss of use of both legs), nonetheless seeks compensation for the same claim of total and permanent disability arising from injury to his left ankle. He was obligated to advance in a single proceeding every alternative basis which could support this claim. Failure to do so bars relitigation of the claim previously resolved against him. Restatement Judgments, 2d (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1978), § 61, comment c, p. 144.

We reverse and remand in both cases for entry of an order denying benefits based on res judicata.

COLEMAN, C. J., and FITZGERALD and RYAN, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, Justice (concurring and dissenting).

We are asked in these two cases to revisit and more explicitly define the application of the doctrine of res judicata to workers' compensation law. This Court most recently faced this task in Hlady v. Wolverine Bolt Co., 393 Mich. 368, 224 N.W.2d 856 (1975), in which res judicata was found to control, and Morgan v. Freedman Artcraft, 401 Mich. 54, 257 N.W.2d 85 (1977), in which it was not.

In Gose, the issue is whether a claim based on insanity which was withdrawn before adjudication can be re-petitioned in a subsequent case without being barred by res judicata. In Sanders the issues are of fact as to whether determinations had been made in the prior case. Based on the facts of each case and the rule set forth by this Court in Hlady, supra, we find the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the claim of plaintiff Gose but does bar the claim of plaintiff Sanders.

I. FACTS
A. Gose

Plaintiff, Tipton G. Gose, commenced employment with defendant Monroe Auto Equipment in 1945. In 1946, plaintiff cut his left ankle; on August 3, 1953, he reinjured the same area. Both incidents occurred while at work.

The 1953 incident developed into an ulcerated skin condition which caused intermittent absences from work while plaintiff received treatment. Workers' compensation benefits were voluntarily paid during these absences.

By 1960, plaintiff was apparently totally unable to continue employment (Defendant-Appellant's Appendix, 15a) and on February 19, 1962, plaintiff underwent a below-the-knee amputation of his left leg.

Compensation benefits were paid voluntarily through the expiration of a 500-week period. Ten days subsequent to the expiration of that benefit period, March 14, 1963, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Bureau indicating personal injury dates of August 3, 1953, and the summer of 1960 (presumably the last day of work). The disability was described as "ankle, leg amputation thereof, permanent and total disability, and related injuries" (71a). The petition was withdrawn August 12, 1963, however, when the defendant-employer agreed to pay compensation on a voluntary basis. This payment continued for 250 more weeks and terminated December 4, 1967.

Plaintiff testified that after his amputation he was depressed and felt like killing...

To continue reading

Request your trial
91 cases
  • Pike v. City of Wyoming
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1987
    ...368, 375, 224 N.W.2d 856 (1975); Theodore v. Packing Materials, 396 Mich. 152, 158, 240 N.W.2d 255 (1976); Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co., 409 Mich. 147, 161, 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980). However, workers' compensation determinations, which generally involve claims for continuing benefits, are......
  • Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • November 15, 1993
    ...concerns behind the doctrine of res judicata are economy of judicial resources and finality of litigation. Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co., 409 Mich. 147, 159, 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980). The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law nec......
  • Hackley v. Hackley
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • November 24, 1986
    ...privies." Socialist Workers Party v. Secretary of State, 412 Mich. 571, 583, 317 N.W.2d 1 (1982), citing Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich. 147, 161, 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980). The doctrine of res judicata was judicially created in order to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of ......
  • Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanderbush Sheet Metal Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • April 29, 1981
    ...has already been undermined by the need to analyze procedural errors which should never have arisen. See Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co., 409 Mich. 147, 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980). II. Collateral Defendant next contends that ninety per cent of Kertesz's damages were found in the previous litig......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT