Goshorn v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co.

Decision Date13 July 1944
Citation38 A.2d 585,131 Conn. 200
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesGOSHORN v. ROGER SHERMAN TRANSFER CO. et al.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; Wynne, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Lulu Goshorn to recover compensation for the death of her son-in-law, employee, opposed by the Roger Sherman Transfer Company, employer, and another. From a finding and award of a compensation commissioner in plaintiff's favor, she appealed to the superior court, which reserved the case for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors on the parties' stipulation.

Commissioner's finding and award affirmed, and question in the stipulation as to whether plaintiff was a member of decedent's family within the act answered in the affirmative.

Edward J. Lonergan, of Hartford, for plaintiff.

David R. Woodhouse, of Hartford, for defendants.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

DICKENSON, Judge.

The question is whether the plaintiff, mother-in-law of the deceased employee, is a dependent within the meaning of the word as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act. The compensation commissioner round that she was. The subordinate facts upon which his conclusion rested were as follows: The plaintiff's daughter married the decedent in 1920. A son, Robert, was born of the marriage in 1921. When Robert was about five months old, the decedent and his family went to live with the plaintiff and her husband. In 1923 the plaintiff and her husband separated and she has not received any support from him since about 1926. In 1923 the decedent and his wife separated and he did not support her thereafter. The plaintiff brought up the son Robert from the time he was about five months old, living with the decedent in various places before coming to Hartford in 1932, where she, Robert and the decedent lived with other members of her family for a short time. From 1936 to the date of the decedent's injury he, his son and the plaintiff lived together as a family group. The decedent took care of all of the family expenses including those of the plaintiff. He and his son regarded the plaintiff as the mother of the family and she managed the household in that capacity. The decedent had claimed her as a dependent in his income tax returns and promised her he would maintain a home for her as long as she lived and would provide for her in his will. She had no property, and since 1936 has been wholly dependent upon him for her support. She saw Robert through high school and into the armed services.

The commissioner concluded that she was wholly dependent upon the decedent and was a member of his family at the time of his injury and death on October 16, 1943, and awarded her compensation. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court from the finding and award upon the grounds that the subordinate facts of the finding did not support these conclusions, and that the commissioner erred in finding that as the mother-in-law she was a member of the deceased's family. The Superior Court reserved the matter to this court on stipulation of the parties.

The question reserved is whether the plaintiff mother-in-law was a member of the decedent's family. The defendants contend that it is the statutory duty of the plaintiff's husband to support her and, in case of his inability, that of her next of kin; hence she was not dependent upon the deceased for support. The act specifies the classes to which the dependent must belong, conclusively presumes certain relationships to involve dependency and provides that in all other cases the question of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact at the time of the injury. General Statutes, § 5235. The ultimate question is the application of the proper standard to the facts found. Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 151, 93 A. 245. General Statutes, § 5223, defines dependents as ‘members of the injured employee's family or next of kin who were wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of the employee at the time of the injury.’ The commissioner's finding shows that the plaintiff was, in fact, wholly dependent upon the decedent for her support. The question before us is whether he applied the proper standard to those facts in awarding her compensation. In McDonald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 95 Conn. 160, 165, 111 A. 65, we stated that a wife living with her husband, whose earnings are adequate for her support presumably relies upon him and him alone for support. We added that there was nothing in the evidence to indicate that the husband was not supporting her and that, unless the facts indicated to the contrary, a wife is presumed to be supported by him, thus suggesting that it was a question of fact, not of law. In the case before us it is found that the husband of the plaintiff was neither living with her nor supporting her and that she had no means of support other than through the decedent. The commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff depended upon the decedent for support is properly based upon subordinate facts found and, indeed, is not presented as a separate question in the stipulation for reservation.

The plaintiff was not a ‘next of kin’ of the decedent. The remaining question is whether a mother-in-law living with a son-in-law, under the conditions and circumstances found to have existed here, is a member of his family. The precise question has not hitherto been decided in this state. In Passini v. Aberthaw Construction Co., 97 Conn. 110, 112, 115 A. 689, we called attention to the fact that the word ‘family’ had not been defined in the Compensation Act and stated that in the common law of the state the word is recognized as one of variable and elastic meaning, but when used in connection with the Workmen's Compensation Act should be given a meaning consistent with its remedial purpose. The act itself draws a distinction between members of a family in the sense of next of kin and those composing the immediate family of the employee, for it...

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3 cases
  • Kiska v. Skrensky
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 21, 1958
    ... ... Goshorn v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 131 Conn. 200, 206, 38 A.2d 585. Recently, ... ...
  • Collins v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. Of Danbury.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1944
  • Rathbun v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1956
    ...Co., 93 Conn. 423, 425, 106 A. 330, and cases cited; Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 451, 138 A. 365; Goshorn v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 131 Conn. 200, 203, 38 A.2d 585; see Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 359, 363, 84 A.2d 687. The concept of the word 'family' is br......

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