Gosline v. Place
| Decision Date | 01 January 1858 |
| Citation | 32 Pa. 520 |
| Parties | Gosline versus Place. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Kutz and Hakes, for the plaintiff in error.—Of the power of this court to bring these proceedings before them for revision, there can be no doubt: 1. Because the writ of certiorari is not taken away; 2. Because no appeal is given: Townsend v. Morel, 10 Wend. 577. The judge who issued the warrants acted under a special statutory power; it is a special and limited jurisdiction, and all things necessary to give the jurisdiction must appear on the face of the proceedings: Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Cox v. Thomas, 9 Gratt. 312.
The affidavit does not establish legally any one of the particulars required to be established by the act, and consequently, the warrant was issued without authority of law: Spencer v. Hilton, 10 Wend. 609; Smith v. Luce, 14 Id. 237; The People v. The Recorder of Albany, 6 Hill 429; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 6 Penn. L. J. 153. And we think the commitment is void, because it does not recite the facts of the case.
Haughawout and Merrifield, for the defendants in error.—This court has no power to revise the proceedings of Judge Merrifield; the only question is, whether he exceeded his jurisdiction: Commonwealth v. Nathans, 5 Barr 124; Rex v. Morley, 2 Burr. 1042; Carpenter's Case, 2 Harris 486.
It is enough that the affidavit was sufficient to satisfy the mind of the judge who heard the case below: Dougherty v. Dougherty, 6 Penn L. J. 153. That which is matter of discretion is not subject to review here: 6 S. & R. 1; Mauch Chunk v. Nescopeck, 9 Harris 48. But we contend that it was sufficient, under the terms of the act: Commonwealth v. Burkhart, 11 Harris 522; Commonwealth v. McCabe, 10 Id. 453; 3 Penn. L. J. 307; 1 Miles 75; 3 Watts 144; George v. Graham, 1 Tr. & H. Pr. 295.
This is a case of certiorari to review the proceedings of an associate judge of the Common Pleas of Luzerne county, on an arrest under the Act of 1842 abolishing imprisonment for debt. The defendant, Gosline, was, on hearing, committed to prison; and we are to inquire whether or not the proceedings are regular, and show sufficient cause for his detention.
In order to obtain a proper position for interpreting the act in question, we must recall the state of the law which it was intended to correct. It had long been the law, that the plaintiff might, on bringing his suit on any kind of claim, arrest the defendant to compel him to give bail to the action, and might imprison him if he did not give bail; and that, on obtaining judgment, he might imprison him as a means of enforcing payment, even though he was totally, and not fraudulently, insolvent. This was felt to be a great evil, as putting the personal liberty of the debtor in the power of creditors to a degree that was unreasonable, and that was scarcely reconcilable with the constitution, article 9th, section 16th, which forbids debtors without property to be continued in prison where there is not a strong presumption of fraud. This evil was partially corrected by the Act of 1836, for the commencement of actions; and it was in order to correct it completely that the Act of 1842 was passed. It is a substitute for the old law of arrest and imprisonment, in actions on contracts.
How then are we to treat proceedings under it? Certainly not on the principles that govern in the matter of summary convictions; for they convict of nothing. The judge who hears the case decides no final question, but only that there is sufficient ground for an arrest under the statute. The cases now before us are cases of arrest before judgment, and we consider the law only in this aspect. This proceeding is collateral to the action for a breach of contract, and in aid of it and dependent on it. If the case be shown to be within the law, the party may be committed unless or until he shall pay the debt, or secure its payment, in due course of law after judgment, or give security not to remove or dispose of his property in fraud of his creditors, or to take the benefit of the insolvent laws, and, without fraud, assign all his property for the benefit of his creditors.
This proceeding is, therefore, not of the nature of a summary conviction; but simply an arrest for debt under the regulated supervision of a judge, instead of the arbitrary and badly controlled discretion of a party. Its purpose is to limit arrests to cases where there appears to be a strong presumption of some kind of fraud on the creditor, or on creditors generally; and this presumption is sufficiently shown when a judge, on hearing the case, is satisfied that the fraud described in the act has been proved.
The second section of the act provides, that if a party has commenced a suit on contract, in court, of which an affidavit by himself or others is sufficient evidence, he has a right to apply to one of the judges of the court for a warrant of arrest. The affidavit is also to specify the nature and amount of the claim, so that it may appear to be on contract, and that the amount of bail, if offered, may be known.
Then (by section 3) on further showing in the affidavit, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the defendant is about to remove, or is concealing, or has disposed of his property in fraud of his creditors, or that he fraudulently contracted the debt sued on, the plaintiff is entitled to a warrant of arrest in aid of his suit.
But this arrest is for the purpose of a hearing on the charges contained in the affidavit; and the defendant may deny them by his own oath, or by such other evidence as he may think proper to produce, § 6: and if, after hearing, the judge is satisfied that the plaintiff...
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Smith v. Gallagher
...Brown, speaking for a unanimous Court, quoted with approval in Schmuck v. Hartman, 222 Pa. 190, 194, 70 A. 1091, 1092, from Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520: 'The judicial authority of this court extends to review and correction of all proceedings of all inferior courts, except where such revie......
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Smith v. Gallagher
...Brown, speaking for a unanimous Court, quoted with approval in Schmuck v. Hartman, 222 Pa. 190, 194, 70 A. 1091, 1092, from Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520: 'The judicial authority of this court extends to the review and correction of all proceedings of all inferior courts, except where such r......
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...writ is used in a new class of cases. See Commonwealth ex rel. Levine v. Fair, 394 Pa. 262, 285, 146 A.2d 834, 846 (1958); Gosline v. Place, 32 Pa. 520, 524 (1859); Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 9 Pa.Super. 527, 533 (1899), aff'd sub nom. Kelly's Contested Election, 200 Pa. 430, 50 A. 248 (1901)......
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