Goss v. Moutrie
| Decision Date | 11 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-01090-RBH-MGB |
| Parties | Darrell L. Goss, Sr., #305517, Plaintiff, v. Edward Moultrie, Ann Sheppard, Jake Gadsden, Jr., and Mike Brown, in their individual capacities, and Brian Kendall and Bryan Stirling in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 87.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion be granted.
Plaintiff filed this civil action on April 13, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since May 9 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Warden Brian Kendall (“Kendall”), Associate Warden Ann Sheppard (“Sheppard”), and Chaplain Edward Moultrie (“Moultrie”) have been violating his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to attend “in person” Sunday morning worship service “with fellow believers” at Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”). (Dkt. No. 56 at 7.) According to Plaintiff, such conduct violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), and Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff also claims that since May 9, 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Director Bryan Stirling, Deputy Director Jake Gadsden, Jr., and Chief of Pastoral Care Services Mike Brown have been violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights “by failing to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (chaplains and officers)” for Sunday morning worship service at Lieber. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff claims that this conduct violates RLUIPA and his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9-10.)
On October 7, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 87.) On October 11, 2022, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 88.) Plaintiff responded to the motion on November 22, 2022, and filed a supplemental response on December 5, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 103; 107.) On December 6, 2022, Defendants filed a reply brief, to which Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on December 15, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 108; 109.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “‘against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” Phillips v. Nlyte Software Am. Ltd., 615 Fed.Appx. 151, 152 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” News & Observer Pub'g Co., 597 F.3d at 576 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Lane & Roderick, Inc., 736 Fed. App'x 400, 400 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, this standard must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of RLUIPA or a violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983; (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to any alleged violations; and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 87-1.) In response, Plaintiff concedes that his claim for injunctive relief is “now moot” because “he was transferred from Lieber to Lee prison on October 13, 2022.”[1] (Dkt. No. 103 at 13.) Plaintiff asserts that questions of fact preclude summary judgment as to his remaining claims. (Id. at 7-14.)
As an initial matter, RLUIPA “only provides equitable relief to prisoners.” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 113 (4th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims center on: (1) Defendants' alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to attend “in person” Sunday morning worship service “with fellow believers” at Lieber; and (2) Defendants' alleged failure “to hire and/or maintain adequate staffing (chaplains and officers)” for Sunday morning worship service at Lieber. (Dkt. No. 56 at 8-9.) The record shows that Plaintiff is no longer housed at Lieber and, by Plaintiff's own account, his claim for injunctive relief is now moot based on his transfer out of Lieber. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends any claim for injunctive relief and therefore any claim under RLUIPA is moot. See e.g., Firewalker-Fields, 58 F.4th at 113-14 (“Because Firewalker-Fields was transferred out of Middle River [Regional Jail] to long-term imprisonment in the Virginia Department of Corrections, any injunctive relief and therefore any claim under RLUIPA is moot.”); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and violations of RLUIPA.
Given the foregoing recommendation, Plaintiff's only remaining claims are for alleged constitutional violations. The undersigned considers these claims below.
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court applies “a familiar two-step inquiry.” Harris v. Pittman, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *10 (4th Cir. June 18, 2019) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S 223, 236 (2009)). At step one, courts ask “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). “At step two, the question is whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the officer's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meyers, 713 F.3d at 731). District court and court of appeals judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in...
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