Gossard v. Jp Morgan Chase & Co.
| Decision Date | 19 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 08-60565-CIV. |
| Citation | 612 F.Supp.2d 1242 |
| Parties | Sonya GOSSARD, Plaintiff, v. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Loring Noel Spolter, Loring N. Spolter PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.
Dawn Elizabeth Siler-Nixon, Kelly Hagan Chanfrau, Ford & Harrison LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant JP Morgan Chase & Co.'s Motion For Summary Judgment (DE 26). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
This is an employment action. Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, alleges that she was discriminated and retaliated against by her immediate supervisor. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was treated less favorably than other employees, ranging from less courteous treatment up to termination, and that she was retaliated against for complaining about the same. Defendant denies any wrongdoing.
Before turning to the facts of this action, the Court desires to state clearly the calculus that went into distilling the Parties' two contrary versions of the facts into one. Along with its instant Motion, Defendant filed its Undisputed Statement Of Facts (DE 26, pp. 2-10) as required by Local Rule 7.5. It is evidently necessary to draw Plaintiffs attention to the text of that Local Rule concerning the form and substance responses in opposition to summary judgment must take. Local Rule 7.5 states, quite clearly, that papers opposing a summary judgment motion "shall include a memorandum of law, necessary affidavits, and a single concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried." S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5.B. The statement of material facts submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must correspond with the order and paragraph numbering scheme used by the movant. Id. 7.5.C. Any additional facts that the non-moving party contends are material are to be likewise numbered and placed below. Id. This rule "ensure[s] that statements of material facts filed by movants and opponents shall correspond with each other in numerical order so as to make review of summary judgment motions less burdensome to the Court." Local Rule 7.5 Comments (2008 Amendment). If only this was the case here.
Plaintiff did not attempt to comply with the Local Rule in this regard. She does not oppose Defendant's Undisputed Statement Of Facts in any way. Instead, she offers her own, contrary version of the relevant events in her Statement Of Disputed Material Facts (DE 30) filed along with her Response (DE 31). The facts she lists fail to meet Defendant's Statement Of Facts. Her version does give the Court a clear picture of her idea of the treatment she received while employed by Defendant and what this case is truly about. However, she fails to frame the factual issues that are in dispute and allow the Court to resolve this matter more easily. An example is set forth in the margin.1
Local Rule prescribes the proper course for Plaintiff's failure to controvert Defendant's Undisputed Statement Of Facts. All facts stated therein and supported by the record are deemed admitted by Plaintiff based on her failure to controvert the same. S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5.D. The Court wants to make plain that this ruling should not be looked at as a sanction against Plaintiff or her Counsel. Because Plaintiff did not abide by Local Rule 7.5 regarding her Statement Of Facts, by operation of the same Local Rule—and not by calculated choice of this Court—Defendant's uncontroverted facts are deemed admitted to the extent supported by the record. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld this Rule. Digioia v. H. Koch & Sons, 944 F.2d 809, 811 n. 6 (11th Cir.1991) (); Calmaquip Eng'g W. Hemisphere Corp. v. W. Coast Carriers, Ltd., 650 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (same).2
Plaintiff Sonya Gossard was hired in 2005 as an Account Executive (hereinafter "AE") with Defendant in its mortgage division. She held a sales job and was tasked with building and maintaining relationships with mortgage brokers for whom Defendant would provide funding. AE's were expected to make sales calls to two brokers per day as part of the job. James Theckston, who hired Plaintiff, remained her boss during her two-year tenure with Defendant. As part of his duties as head of Plaintiff's team, he occasionally accompanied AE's on their sales calls.
In June of 2006, the woman with whom Plaintiff lives and has a relationship gave birth to a baby boy, Spencer. Theckston was invited to and attended the baby shower.
In late January of 2006, Theckston evaluated Plaintiff and found that she met expectations but also noted some areas that needed improving. This evaluation was not materially different from the other quarterly evaluations Plaintiff would receive before Spencer was born. During these evaluations Theckston told Plaintiff that she needed to bring her numbers up and refocus on certain different areas. In February, March, and April of 2006, Plaintiff failed to meet her sales goals. Following Spencer's birth, she did not meet her sales goals in July, September, November, and December of 2006.
Plaintiff alleges that in September and October of 2006, Theckston made comments to her that'Spencer might affect her ability to do her job effectively. In October, Theckston drove to Plaintiff's home, not far from the local office of Defendant, to pick her up and accompany her on a sales call. While Plaintiff took a phone call, he waited and spoke with her mother. The conversation is not material.
Plaintiff was invited to Theckston's New Year's Eve party at the end of 2006, and Theckston was disappointed that she did not go. In 2007, though, the two continued to be in touch and Plaintiff invited Theckston out for a drink.
In the first quarter of 2007, Plaintiff was the second lowest AE on her team in terms of production and recognized that she needed every deal she could get. In January of 2007 a top performing AE with Defendant resigned and the accounts were distributed to the remaining AEs. Each AE on Theckston's team got one account, but in an effort to help Plaintiffs production, Theckston gave her four, including the best account.
On January 31, 2007, Theckston met with Plaintiff to discuss her production. Plaintiff had come to the meeting from the Post Office and was upset because she could not put her name on Spencer's passport because she was not his biological mother. Theckston again questioned whether Spencer is affecting her performance, and Plaintiff was greatly offended and wanted Spencer left out of the discussion. Later that day, Plaintiff emailed Theckston to tell him again that she found the questions insulting. Theckston made several attempts to contact her and the two eventually met to discuss the matter. After this meeting, Plaintiff sent Theckston a thank you note and did not report the matter to Human Resources.
As the leader of Plaintiff's team, Theckston had the discretion to grant price concessions to brokers. A concession is an adjustment to the interest rate in favor of the broker used to keep or increase business as necessary. No AE was given every concession requested. Like the others, Theckston denied some of Plaintiff's requests for concessions but granted them on numerous occasions in the first quarter of 2007. He also responded to her emails during this time. See DE 26, ¶ 12.
On March 20, 2007, Harsha Ramayya, an AE with Defendant, met with Marcia Williamson, a broker client of Defendant. Williamson told Ramayya that she was upset because she has repeatedly failed to get in contact with Plaintiff regarding a loan Plaintiff was processing. Ramayya reassured Williamson and telephoned Plaintiff while sill in Williamson's presence. After getting Plaintiff on the phone, Ramayya told her that he was with Williamson and that Williamson was trying to reach Plaintiff. Plaintiff told Ramayya that she was not going to do anything further on Williamson's loan and that he could tell Williamson to "f* * * off." Williamson told Ramayya that she heard what Plaintiff said and asked for the name of Plaintiffs manager. Ramayya gave Williamson Theckston's name and number and also told Plaintiff that Williamson was planning to call Theckston.
Williamson called Theckston to tell him that she would no longer do business with Plaintiff and faxed a written complaint to the same effect. Williamson also complained to several other managerial employees of Defendant. Theckston tried unsuccessfully to get in contact with Plaintiff and then referred to matter to Deborah Johnson of Human Resources.
The following afternoon, March 21, 2007, Plaintiff called Deborah Johnson to report that Theckston had been discriminating against her through his comments about Spencer and her ability to keep her production up. She also told Johnson that Theckston had not been responding to her email messages. Johnson investigated both the complaint regarding the explicit comment by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's complaints about Theckston.
Also on March 21, a broker by the name of Tim Atteberry informed Plaintiff that he was requesting to move his account to a different AE. Theckston became aware of the matter and informed Atteberry that he would not allow the account to be moved away from Plaintiff. Atteberry then called Rodney Brace, Theckston's supervisor's supervisor, to demand that his account be moved. Brace made the decision to transfer the account away from Plaintiff. The account was reassigned after Plaintiff left the employ of Defendant.
After a thorough investigation, including meetings with Plaintiff, Theckston, and others, Deborah Johnson concluded that Theckston had not treated Plaintiff differently than other...
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