Gossett v. Chrysler Corporation, 16255.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 16255.,16255.
• Parties: Willie C. GOSSETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

359 F.2d 84 (1966)

Willie C. GOSSETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16255.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

April 19, 1966.

Charles R. Taylor, Detroit, Mich., Ronald R. Pawlak, Detroit, Mich., on brief, for appellant.

William C. Ibershof, Detroit, Mich., Kenneth C. Davies, Detroit, Mich., on brief, for appellee.

Before WEICK, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by Chrysler Corporation, defendant-appellant, from a judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in favor of Willie C. Gossett, plaintiff-appellee. Hereinafter we will refer to Gossett as plaintiff and to the defendant-appellant as Chrysler. The plaintiff was a driver-employee of Commercial Carriers, Inc. Chrysler was a manufacturer of motor vehicles, including Dodge motor trucks. Commercial Carriers, Inc. was engaged in delivering motor vehicles for Chrysler.

On April 26, 1960, the plaintiff was delivering three new Dodge trucks to a destination in New Jersey. He was driving the largest truck which was a frame on wheels with no body, cab or windshield. The second truck was mounted on top of the first or drive truck and the third truck was pulled by a tow bar fastened to the frame of the drive truck. This arrangement of trucks was referred to as a three way strip. It is claimed that while the plaintiff was driving in Ohio on U. S. Route 20, the hood of the drive truck became disengaged and came up in front of him, so as to obscure his vision. Because of this he failed to make a turn in the road and was seriously injured when his trucks went into a ditch at the side of the road.

The plaintiff brought an action against Chrysler. In his complaint he charged Chrysler with negligence,

"which negligence consisted of improperly designing said hood latch, improperly manufacturing and assembling said hood latch and in failing to properly test and inspect said hood latch, * * *."

The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000. Judgment was entered on the verdict and Chrysler appealed.

One of the assignments of error made by counsel for Chrysler is that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the negligent manufacture, assembly, fabrication, inspection or testing of the hood latch was in issue. The District Judge instructed the jury:

"I charge you, too, that if you find the defendant negligently manufactured, designed, or assembled the hood latch and the plaintiff\'s injuries resulted therefrom, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff even though a human agency may have contributed to the cause of the accident if the intervention of the human agency could reasonably be anticipated, that is, if that human agency was other than himself, other than the plaintiff in this case." (Emphasis added)

* * * * * *

"To put it in summary form, really, the sole issue in this case which you are required to decide in regard to the defendant and its alleged liability is whether or not the hood latch mechanism was defectively designed, manufactured and or assembled and whether or not such defective condition, if any, as claimed by the plaintiff, was a proximate cause of the injuries complained of." (Emphasis added.)

These instructions and other references to negligence in manufacture, assembly, fabrication or testing are erroneous. There is no evidence that there was any defect in manufacture or negligence of Chrysler in respect to any of these processes. From all of the evidence in the case it must be inferred that the hood latch was properly manufactured and was fit for the use and purpose for which it was intended. It worked perfectly in the manner for which it was designed. The sole issue, as developed by counsel for the plaintiff in his opening statement at the trial and in his argument to the jury and through the testimony of his expert witness, was negligence on the part of Chrysler in the design of the hood latch.

Another assignment of error relates to the sufficiency of evidence on the question of negligence of Chrysler in the design of the hood latch. Should the trial judge have directed a verdict for Chrysler for want of evidence of negligence in design?

The hood latch which is the subject of this action is known in the automotive industry as a "dove tail type latch." Its purpose is to secure the hood in position so that when it is closed it cannot be opened without manually tripping a device on the latch. It is designed so that when the hood is slammed down in closed position a tongue or tooth fits into a hole made and designed for that purpose. When the hood is being closed it is possible to manually hold the device used for the release of the latch so that the tongue or tooth of the latch will go outside of the hole for which it is designed. When this happens the hood is not securely fastened and it may "fly" up as a result of various causes such as wind or travelling over rough and bumpy roads.

The plaintiff testified that as he approached U. S. Route 6 while travelling on U. S. Route 20, there was a little bend to the left in his road. He looked in his rear view mirror to see if his back truck was wiggling and if he could see LaVaughn Spencer, his companion driver. He said,

"There was a yellow flash, the hood flew up and I didn\'t have time to get away from it. It just happened so quick, almost like a streak of lightning."

This is all he knows about the happening of the accident and he has no recollection of any of the events at the scene of the accident.

LaVaughn Spencer was also driving a three way strip for Commercial Carriers and was following the plaintiff at the time and place of the accident. He was between 500 and 1,000 feet behind the plaintiff and they were travelling at about forty miles per hour. Spencer described the accident as follows:

"His truck — it just seemed like it started to drifting off to the right of the road and I couldn\'t imagine what was wrong because he got way off on to the berm and when he got over there then he was in a position I could see and the hood was laying back."

The hood was back over the steering wheel and the plaintiff was still on his seat.

"His truck started up the incline of Route 6 which comes around and merges with 20 and then it swung back around like that (indicating) and over into the fence and when the truck started to go over, that is when he left the seat."

When the truck driven by the plaintiff came to rest it was lying upside down with the wheels in the air.

The plaintiff stopped at Erie, Michigan for a gas and oil check. He did not see the filling station attendant open the hood and he did not know whether or not it was opened. He stopped again at Four Mile Truck Stop near Fremont, Ohio, with Spencer and Chastine, another companion driver. They ate dinner there. This was about a mile from the scene of the accident.

The plaintiff testified that he checked the hood at both of these stops. In checking the hood he pushed up on it instead of down. He said, "If the hood isn't fastened it is going to rattle. Something is going to happen that will tell you it is not fastened." He further testified that when the hood comes loose you can see it vibrate, that it is something you can observe. He did not notice any flutter on the truck in this instance.

This testimony of the plaintiff would indicate that the hood was securely fastened; otherwise he would have observed it. This is inconsistent with the theory upon which this case was tried. The theory of the plaintiff is that the tongue or tooth of the latch did not go into the hole which was designed for it. As evidence of this an examination of the truck after the accident showed scratch marks outside of the hole. Mr. Taylor gave it as his opinion that this is what caused the hood to become disengaged. Professor Howell gave this as his theory of the accident. It was upon this theory that he based his judgment that the design was inadequate.

We will now consider the duty of Chrysler in relation to the design of its product in question and determine whether there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on the issue of negligence in design. We proceed on the assumption that Chrysler owed a duty to the plaintiff since no question is raised on that issue.

It is conceded that the law of Ohio is applicable to the facts of ...