Gosteli, In re

Decision Date24 April 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-1611,88-1611
Citation10 USPQ2d 1614,872 F.2d 1008
Parties, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 In re Jacques GOSTELI, Ivan Ernest and Robert B. Woodward.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Bruce M. Collins, Mathews, Woodbridge, Goebel, Pugh & Collins, P.C., Morristown, N.J., argued for appellant.

Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Com'r of Patents and Trademarks, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Charles E. Van Horn, Deputy Sol., John W. Dewhirst and Harris A. Pitlick, Associate Sol.

Raymond C. Stewart, Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch, Falls Church, Va., was on the brief for amicus curiae, Kitamura et al.

Before BISSELL and ARCHER, Circuit Judges, and RE, Chief Judge. *

BISSELL, Circuit Judge.

DECISION

The decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board), Appeal No. 665-18 (June 30, 1988), affirming the examiner's final rejection of claims 48-51 in the patent application, Serial No. 423,348, of Jacques Gosteli, Ivan Ernest and Robert B. Woodward [hereinafter Gosteli or Applicants], under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 102(e) (1982), is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Gosteli's patent application discloses bicyclic thia-aza compounds containing a beta-lactam ring unsubstituted in the beta-position and having antibiotic properties. The claimed compounds are chemical intermediates used in the preparation of antibiotics known as 2-penems. Claims 48 (see Appendix A) and 49 are Markush-type genus claims, and dependent claims 50 (see Appendix A) and 51 are subgenus claims, each consisting of 21 specific chemical species. The examiner rejected claims 48-51 under section 102(e) as being anticipated by United States Patent No. 4,155,912 (Menard). Menard discloses, but does not claim, a first species, 2-[ (4R,S)-4-Acetylthio-2-oxo-1-azetidinyl]-2-hydroxyacetic acid p-nitrobenzyl ester, that is within the scope of claims 48 and 50, and a second species, 2-[ (4R,S)-4-Acetylthio-2-oxo-1-azetidinyl]-2-chloroacetic acid p-nitrobenzyl ester, that is within the scope of claims 49 and 51.

Attempting to antedate Menard, Gosteli claimed the benefit, under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119 (1982), of their Luxembourg patent application's foreign priority date. The disclosure of the Luxembourg application is not as complete as that of Gosteli's United States application. The Luxembourg application discloses a subgenus of the genus claimed in the United States application and specifically describes the two chemical species disclosed by Menard. Menard's effective date is December 14, 1977, seven months after the May 9, 1977, filing date of Gosteli's Luxembourg application, but five months before Gosteli's May 4, 1978, United States filing date. Thus, Menard is not an effective reference under section 102(e) if Applicants are entitled to their Luxembourg priority date.

The Board denied Gosteli the benefit of their Luxembourg priority date reasoning that:

[Gosteli's] problem in attempting to antedate the Menard reference is that their Luxembourg priority application does not disclose the "same invention" in a manner that complies with the first paragraph of 35 USC 112 as is claimed in the claims on appeal (48-51). In other words claims 48-51 contain considerable subject matter which is not specifically disclosed in the Luxembourg application.

....

Since [Gosteli's] Luxembourg application does not provide a written description of the entire subject matter set forth in the appealed claims 48-51, as required by the first paragraph of 35 USC 112, we have concluded that claims 48-51 have an effective filing date as of the May 4, 1978 filing date of [Gosteli's] grandparent application Serial No. 902,639, and not as of the Luxembourg filing date. Accordingly, [Applicants have] not antedated the Menard reference.

Gosteli, Appeal No. 665-18, slip op. at 2, 3.

Alternatively, Gosteli attempted to swear behind Menard by using declarations submitted under 37 C.F.R. Sec. 1.131 (1988) (Rule 131). The Board rejected the use of Rule 131, because "the declaration does not ... contain 'facts showing a completion of the invention in this country before the filing date of' Menard." Gosteli, Appeal No. 665-18, slip op. at 4. Gosteli appeals from the Board's decision, and the Institute of Bio-Active Science, Nippon Zoki Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., filed an amicus curiae brief.

ISSUES

1. Whether claims 48-51 are entitled, under section 119, to the benefit of a foreign priority date.

2. Whether Rule 131 allows Gosteli to swear behind the two chemical species disclosed in Menard by establishing a constructive reduction to practice in this country based on Gosteli's foreign priority date of those two species.

3. Whether Gosteli's Luxembourg priority application provides a written description sufficient to support the entire subject matter of claims 48-51, as required by 35 U.S.C. Sec. 112, p 1 (1982).

OPINION
I. Section 119

Claims 48-51 of Gosteli's application stand rejected under section 102(e) as anticipated by Menard. The two chemical species disclosed by Gosteli's Luxembourg priority application are disclosed by Menard and also fall within the scope of the claims on appeal. Section 102(e) bars the issuance of a patent if its generic claims are anticipated by prior art disclosing individual chemical species. See, e.g., In re Slayter, 276 F.2d 408, 411, 125 USPQ 345, 347 (CCPA 1960) (stating that species anticipate a generic claim). The parties agree that Menard is an effective anticipatory prior art reference unless Applicants are entitled to their Luxembourg priority date.

Generally, an applicant may antedate prior art by relying on the benefit of a previously filed foreign application to establish an effective date earlier than that of the reference. See 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119; In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 261, 191 USPQ 90, 95-96 (CCPA 1976); Rollins, 35 USC 119-Description and Enablement Requirements, 67 J.Pat.Off.Soc'y 386, 386 (1985). Under section 119, the claims set forth in a United States application are entitled to the benefit of a foreign priority date if the corresponding foreign application supports the claims in the manner required by section 112, p 1. Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 261-62, 191 USPQ at 95-96; Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 887-89, 178 USPQ 158, 164-65 (CCPA 1973).

Gosteli contends that their rights under section 119 are determined by focusing on (1) what is the subject matter disclosed in the Luxembourg priority application, and (2) whether that subject matter removes Menard. We disagree with Gosteli's reading of section 119. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has ... previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country ... shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country....

35 U.S.C. Sec. 119. The reference to the "invention" in section 119 clearly refers to what the claims define, not what is disclosed in the foreign application. Cf. In re Scheiber, 587 F.2d 59, 61, 199 USPQ 782 784 (CCPA 1978) (stating that "invention" as used in 35 U.S.C. Sec. 120 (Supp. IV 1986), refers to what is claimed). Section 119 provides that a foreign application "shall have the same effect" as if it had been filed in the United States. 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119. Accordingly, if the effective filing date of what is claimed in a United States application is at issue, to preserve symmetry of treatment between sections 120 and 119, the foreign priority application must be examined to ascertain if it supports, within the meaning of section 112, p 1, what is claimed in the United States application. Compare Kawai, 480 F.2d at 886, 178 USPQ at 162-63 (construing the section 112, p 1 requirements of section 119) with Scheiber, 587 F.2d at 62, 199 USPQ at 784-85 (construing the section 112, p 1 requirements of section 120).

At oral argument, the government conceded that if Gosteli claims the species disclosed in the Luxembourg application they would be entitled to the foreign priority date with regard to those claims. Thus, Menard would be ineffective as a reference against those claimed species, or any other claim properly supported by the Luxembourg disclosure as required by section 112, p 1. We conclude, therefore, that claims 48-51 are entitled to the benefit of their foreign priority date under section 119 only if the foreign priority application properly supports them as required by section 112, p 1. An application relying on the benefit of an earlier filing date in the United States would receive the same treatment under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 120. See Kawai, 480 F.2d at 886, 178 USPQ at 163.

"In re Ziegler"

The Federal Circuit has adopted as precedent the decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369, 215 USPQ 657, 657 (Fed.Cir.1982). The government urges on appeal that In re Ziegler, 347 F.2d 642, 146 USPQ 76 (CCPA 1965), should be overruled as in conflict with Wertheim, Kawai, Scheiber, and In re Smyth, 189 F.2d 982, 90 USPQ 106 (CCPA 1951). According to the government, Ziegler's fundamental premise is that a foreign application need show support for only so much of the claimed invention as is disclosed in the prior art reference to achieve a priority date for the entirety of the claimed invention. Accord In re Kitamura, 9 USPQ2d 1787 (Bd.Pat.App.Int.1988) (providing an extensive discussion by an expanded Board on the same issue).

Ziegler never mentions section 112 by name in its analysis of section 119, and yet the application of section 112 to section 119 had already been set forth in Smyth. See Kawai, ...

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