Goudy-Bachman v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:10–CV–763.
• Citation: 2011 USTC P 50625,108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011,811 F.Supp.2d 1086
• Parties: Barbara GOUDY–BACHMAN and Gregory Bachman, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; United States Department of the Treasury, and Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-6345

2011-2 USTC P 50,625

811 F.Supp.2d 1086

Barbara GOUDY–BACHMAN and Gregory Bachman, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; United States Department of the Treasury, and Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:10–CV–763.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Sept. 13, 2011.

Held Unconstitutional

26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A

Paul Anthony Rossi, Kennett Square, PA, for Plaintiff.

Kathryn L. Wyer, Sheila M. Lieber, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, District Judge.

One of the benefits of the myriad challenges to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “Health Care Act” or the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029, is the distillation of relevant issues. As a threshold matter, I emphasize, as Judge Vinson emphasized in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 780 F.Supp.2d 1256 (N.D.Fla.2011), that this case is not about whether the Health Care Act merely treats the symptoms or cures the disease which has so clearly afflicted our health care system. Nor is it about the exhaustive efforts of Congress to document and to project the increasing costs of health care services or to pinpoint discriminatory practices associated with pre-existing conditions.

Rather, this case concerns the precise parameters of Congress's enumerated authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the issue is whether Congress can invoke its Commerce Clause power to compel individuals to buy insurance as a condition of lawful citizenship or residency. The court concludes that it cannot. The power to regulate interstate commerce does not subsume the power to dictate a lifetime financial commitment to health insurance coverage. Without judicially enforceable limits, the constitutional blessing of the minimum coverage provision, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, would effectively sanction Congress's exercise of police power under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, jeopardizing the integrity of our dual sovereignty structure.

I. Statement of Facts

The court set forth relevant facts in its January 24, 2011 decision, Goudy–Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 764 F.Supp.2d 684 (M.D.Pa.2011), familiarity with which is presumed. Nevertheless, in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment, certain facts deserve reiteration and emphasis.¹

Plaintiffs Barbara Goudy–Bachman and Gregory Bachman, a married couple with two children, reside in Etters, York County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 47–2 ¶¶ 1–3; Doc. 50 ¶ 7). They instituted this suit to challenge the constitutionality of the requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage (hereinafter either “the minimum coverage provision” or “the individual mandate”).² Barbara is 48 years old, and Gregory is 56 years old. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 8–9). They are self-employed and do not carry health insurance. (Doc. 47–2 ¶ 10; Doc. 50 ¶ 16). Neither currently qualifies for Medicaid and neither will qualify for Medicare before January 1, 2014, when the individual mandate takes effect. (Doc. 50 ¶ 8; see also Doc. 47–2 ¶ 4). Barbara and Gregory are also not members of any group that is exempt from the individual mandate and, hence, they will be subject to the mandate when it takes effect on January 1, 2014. (Doc. 47–2 ¶¶ 2, 5–7; Doc. 50 ¶¶ 10–13).

The Bachmans do not dispute that there is a health care crisis that is national in scope. To the contrary, the Bachmans' personal financial decisions exemplify the Hobson's choice of family budgets across the country that lies at the very core of the health care crisis. They dropped all health insurance coverage in 2001 because their insurance premiums exceeded their mortgage payments. (Tr. at 10–11). The insurance that the Bachmans had maintained was of limited use in that it covered only eighty percent (80%) of qualified expenses and imposed a twenty percent (20%) deductible per occurrence. ( Id.) Since terminating their health insurance coverage, the Bachmans have incurred medical expenses for various health care services, and have paid these expenses in full out of current assets.

II. Procedural History

On April 12, 2010, the Bachmans filed the instant action facially challenging the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, the individual mandate. The Bachmans seek a declaration that the individual mandate specifically, and the entire Act as a whole, violate Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution. They seek to enjoin enforcement of the individual mandate.

On June 14, 2010, the government filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) asserting jurisdictional and merits-based grounds for dismissal. On January 24, 2011, the court issued a Memorandum and Order denying the government's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. (Doc. 37). The court concluded that the Bachmans adequately alleged standing to bring the challenge and that the action was not barred by the Anti–Injunction Act.³ (Doc. 37). The court indicated that a separate opinion would issue addressing the government's merits-based contention that the Bachmans fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Prior to issuance of that opinion, the parties stipulated to the modification of the government's motion to dismiss with a motion, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (Doc. 41). The court approved the joint stipulation on June 10, 2011 (Doc. 42), and on June 21, 2011, the government filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43) with numerous exhibits. ( See Doc. 45, Exs. 1–24; Doc. 46, Exs. 25–51). The Bachmans filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 47) on July 6, 2011. The court heard oral argument on the cross motions on July 21, 2011. Subsequent to oral argument, the parties filed supplemental briefing on the most recent opinion from the Eleventh Circuit in Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235, 1268–69 (11th Cir.2011). ( See Docs. 59, 60). The motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for disposition.⁴

III. Standard of Review ⁵

Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden of proof is upon the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D.Pa.2004); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on the claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–89, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c), (e). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.

The court is permitted to resolve cross-motions for summary judgment concurrently. See Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Rains v. Cascade Indus. Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968)); 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998). When doing so, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to each motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310. In the instant matter, the challenge to the individual mandate presents a pure question of law appropriately addressed through summary adjudication.

IV. DiscussionA. Guiding Principles

Congress undoubtedly has the power to regulate the national health care services and health insurance markets. See United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944). At issue is the means by which Congress has chosen to regulate and reform those markets. Fundamentally, the Health Care Act presents novel questions about the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and how that power conflicts with the principles of federalism upon which this nation was founded. The individual mandate represents an unprecedented use of Commerce Clause powers. However, the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate does not render it constitutionally suspect ab initio. To the contrary, the court, according “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government,” begins with the presumption that the Act, passed by Congress, is constitutional. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000); id. (stating that a court should “invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds”); see also United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir.2002); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir.1995) (“[The court] ... must give substantial deference to a Congressional determination that it had the power to enact particular legislation.”). But see Va. Office for Prot. and Advocacy v. Stewart, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1641, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011) (“Lack of historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity.” (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3159–60, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010))); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S....