Goudy v. Hall
| Decision Date | 31 January 1865 |
| Parties | WILLIAM C. GOUDY et al.v.JOHN HALL. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Fulton County.
The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.
W. C. Goudy, pro se. J. S. Bailey, for appellee.
This is an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiffs below, who are also the plaintiffs in error, claimed title under the heirs of one John Fridley, deceased, and the defendant claimed under a deed from his administrator. The decree, by virtue of which the administrator sold, was afterwards reversed in this court upon a writ of error brought by the heirs. The case is reported, 25 Ill., 146. The case at bar depends, first, upon the character of the judicial proceedings anterior to the sale; and, secondly, upon the effect of the reversal. The first point evidently resolves itself into a pure question of jurisdiction.
It is first urged by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that the petition for leave to sell was addressed by the administrator to the judge “in chancery sitting,” and that therefore the question of jurisdiction is to be determined, not by the statute of wills, but by the general principles of chancery practice. The case of Cost v. Rose, 17 Ill., 266, cited in support of this position, was a proceeding in partition in regard to which, the court had both a statutory and a general chancery jurisdiction, and the address of the bill was there held to indicate the intention of the party, as to which jurisdiction he sought to call into action. But the court could not take jurisdiction of an administrator's petition of this specific character, and grant the particular relief sought, except by virtue of the statute, and the petition clearly shows it was the statutory power of the court that was invoked. Besides, the action of the court, when collaterally called in question, will be referred either to its general or its statutory powers, as may be necessary to sustain its jurisdiction, and without reference to such a mere matter of form as the address of the petition. Its jurisdiction depends upon weightier considerations. In this case, however, the address was not improper, because the jurisdiction invoked is of an equitable character, and this species of business is always transacted on the chancery side of the court.
The question then is, Did the court have jurisdiction under the statute? It is urged that the notice is insufficient because no state is named, and because the notice is not dated. The advertisement is as follows:
“ADMINISTRATOR'S NOTICE.--Notice is hereby given, to all persons interested in the estate of John Fridley, deceased, that application will be made at the next term of the Fulton county circuit court, to be holden in Lewiston on the second Monday in March next, for an order for the sale of all or so much of the real estate of said deceased as will be sufficient to pay his debts, to wit [[[[description of the lands]; when and where all persons interested may attend and show cause, if any they have, why said property should not be sold for the purposes aforesaid.
ABRAHAM MURPHY, Adm'r.”
The words “state of Illinois,” do not appear in the advertisement. It was, however, published for the requisite time in a newspaper printed in Lewiston, Fulton county; the first publication being in October preceding the term of the court when the petition was filed. No special form is given by the statute, and this notice is not to be subjected to hypercriticism. The simple question is, Would any person reading it be advised of the time and place when and where the petition would be presented, and its objects? The answer cannot be doubtful. The paper was published in Lewiston, Fulton county, in the state of Illinois. Could a person reading the advertisement suppose that “the Fulton county circuit court to be holden in Lewiston,” described in the advertisement, referred to some possible Fulton county in another state? And so of the date. Could the reader, finding this notice in a paper bearing date October 29, 1847, have any doubt but that “the next term” of the court, to be holden “on the second Monday of March next,” referred to the month of March next after the date of the paper. It would be most unjust to overturn titles acquired by innocent purchasers at public sales upon such minute criticism. We have to consider whether the object of the law has been substantially attained, and whether a reasonable person, in the exercise of his ordinary faculties, reading this notice, would be apprised by it in what court, and at what term, the petition would be presented. Counsel do not object that no particular day in the term was named in the notice, nor do we deem that necessary, notwithstanding a possible inference to the contrary might be drawn from a casual expression in the opinion, in the case of Gibson v. Roll, 30 Ill., 179.
It is also objected that the guardian ad litem did not answer for one of the infant heirs. This, however, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Gibson v. Roll, 27 Ill., 91, it is decided, that jurisdiction of the subject matter is acquired by filing the petition, and jurisdiction of the persons by publication of the notice. We entertain no doubt of the correctness of this decision. But in ...
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