Gough v. Allied Universal

• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-cv-1176-LKG
• Decision Date: 11 September 2023
• Parties: LINDA GOUGH, Plaintiff pro se, v. ALLIED UNIVERSAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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LINDA GOUGH, Plaintiff pro se,
v.
ALLIED UNIVERSAL, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-1176-LKG

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this employment discrimination matter, Plaintiff pro se, Linda Gough, alleges that the Defendant, Allied Universal, discriminated and retaliated against her during her employment with the company, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621; and the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. See generally, ECF No. 7. Plaintiff also asserts claims against Allied Universal for workplace injury and violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201. Id.

Allied Universal has moved to dismiss this matter, or, alternatively, to transfer venue, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and (b)(6). ECF No. 10. The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 7, 10-1, 14. No hearing is necessary to resolve the motion. See L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS Allied Universal's motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, to transfer venue; and (2) DISMISSES the amended complaint.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[1]

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff pro se, Linda Gough, alleges that the Defendant, Allied Universal, discriminated and retaliated against her during her employment with the company, in violation of Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA. See generally, ECF No. 7. Plaintiff also asserts claims for workplace injury and violation of FLSA in the amended complaint. Id.

Plaintiff is a 51-year-old, White female, who resides in Bethesda, Maryland. Id. at 5.

Defendant Allied Universal is a security and facility services company headquartered in Santa Ana, California and Conshohocken, Pennsylvania. See https://www.aus.com. Plaintiff's Employment History

On October 19, 2019, Allied Universal hired Plaintiff to work as a security officer for the company's Washington, DC office. ECF No. 7 at 2. Plaintiff is currently employed by Allied Universal in this capacity. Id. at 13. In December 2019, Plaintiff was assigned to Allied Universal's “SAIC” location. Id.

Plaintiff's Discrimination Allegations

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation based upon her race, color, age, religion, national origin, and disability while assigned to Allied Universal's “SAIC” location. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that another security officer for Allied Universal, Officer Teashonnda Hubbard, discriminated against and harassed her at the “SAIC” location, by: (1) making inappropriate phone calls to Plaintiff; (2) sending Plaintiff inappropriate text messages; and (3) changing her work uniform in front of Plaintiff. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff also alleges that she was discriminated against, because she was the oldest member on the security officer team assigned to the “SAIC” location and because she was the

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only White employee on her team. Id. at 13 and 15. Plaintiff also alleges that she reported her concerns about Officer Hubbard to her supervisor, Captain Phedra Vaval, and that Captain Vaval dismissed her concerns. Id. at 9

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, in January 2021, she suffered a workplace injury, because Allied Universal did not accommodate her request to sit during certain work shifts. Id. at 15. And so, Plaintiff maintains that this workplace injury caused her pain and resulted in her having to undergo surgery.^[2]Id. at 14-15.

On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed an internal complaint against Captain Vaval and two other Allied Universal managers, Kevin Ringgold and Lawrence Clottey, alleging, among other things, that: (1) she suffered workplace harassment from Officer Hubbard since December 2019; (2) management had dismissed and failed to address this workplace harassment; (3) her rate of pay made her ineligible to receive food stamps; and (4) she had been required to stand for “eighthours straight” each day despite having requested a workplace accommodation to sit as needed. ECF No. 7-1. Plaintiff also sent letters regarding these concerns to Allied Universal's General Manager, Michael Fontz, on November 29, 2021, December 27, 2021, and May 9, 2022, respectively. Id. at 9-11.

In December 2021, Plaintiff communicated her concerns about Officer Hubbard to Allied Universal's human resources department. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to retaliation after reporting her concerns to the human resources department, because Kevin Ringgold told her not to return to the “SAIC” worksite. Id. at 9, 14.

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Allied Universal may have manipulated her rate of pay to affect her eligibility for food stamps. Id. at 2, 12.

Plaintiff's Charge Of Discrimination

On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based upon race, national origin,

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sex, religion, age and retaliation. Id. at 13; ECF No. 7-1 at 16-17. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination alleges that:

I began working for Allied Universal as a security officer in or around October 2019. Shortly after hire, I began to encounter a hostile work environment. My relief, a special police officer, regularly reports to work late and ill prepared for duty. Upon her arrival, the officer intimidates yells and harasses me as she inappropriately dresses in front of me preparing for duty. I complained to management beginning in and around December 2019, but my complaints were dismissed and I continued to work with the officer again in or around September 2021. On or about 01 October 2021, I complained about issues regarding my pay rate as hire. On or about 29 November 2021, I filed a grievance to address operational concerns. My complaints were never addressed and on or about 09 December 2021, I was instructed not to return to site for my regular shifts. I believe I was discriminated and retaliated against based on race (White/Caucasian), national origin (United States), sex (female), and religion (Catholic), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. I believe I was discriminated and retaliated against based on age (50 years), in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.

Id. at 17. Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on or about March 28, 2022. Id.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this matter on May 17, 2022. ECF No. 1. On August 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 7.

On September 20, 2022, Allied Universal filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, to transfer this matter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and (b)(6). ECF No. 10. On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Allied Universal's motion. ECF No. 14.

Allied Universal's motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, to transfer this matter having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pro se Litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel. And so, the Court must construe the complaint liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980).

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But in doing so, the Court cannot disregard a clear failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable claim. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); see also, Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-0478, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obliged to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (quotations omitted). And so, if Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts setting forth a cognizable claim, the Court must dismiss the complaint.

B. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Factual allegations raise a claim from merely speculative to “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Courts must separate factual allegations from legal conclusions. Factual allegations are assumed to be true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 607 (4th Cir. 2015). But, the Court “need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William Cnty., Va., 59 F.4th 92, 101 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(3) And Title VII Claims

When a plaintiff's chosen forum is improper, federal courts may dismiss or transfer the case to the proper forum. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3); see also, Tusha v. Greenfield, No. CV GLR-20-2143, 2021 WL 1530211, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2021). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial *1106 part of the

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